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Over the past generation, the Supreme Court has applied its jus-
ticiability doctrines with increasing stringency. Initially, a plaintiff
must establish standing by showing that a defendant has personally
injured her. Furthermore, the case must be ripe (i.e., well-developed
factually and legally) but not moot (i.e., irrelevant because the parties'
dispute has ended). Finally, the question presented cannot be "polit-
ical," but instead must be capable of "judicial" resolution. When a
party lacks standing, presents an unripe or moot claim, or raises a
political question, a federal court's rendering of a decision would be a
forbidden "advisory opinion."
According to the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, these jus-
ticiability doctrines "define with respect to the Judicial Branch the
idea of separation of powers on which the Federal Government is
founded," and thus demonstrate "'concern about the proper-and
properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."" In the
Court's view, justiciability principles implement the Framers' vision of
constitutional democracy by requiring unelected federal judges to
leave Congress and the President undisturbed-even when they are
allegedly violating the law-unless they happen to injure someone
whose dispute with the government is deemed sufficiently vigorous,
mature, and nonpolitical. 2
The Court has candidly admitted that its conception of separa-
tion of powers and justiciability is "more than an intuition but less
than a rigorous and explicit theory,"s as if the point were so obvious as
1 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (O'ConnorJ.) (quoting Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (PowellJ.)). OtherJustices have written opinions for the Court
emphasizing thatjusticiability reflects the Founders' understanding of separation of pow-
ers. See, e.g., Reno v. Catholic Social Servs., 509 U.S. 43, 56-59 (1993) (SouterJ.); North-
eastern Fla. Chapter of the Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. City ofJacksonville, 508 U.S. 656,
663-64 (1993) (Thomas, J.); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60, 576-77
(1992) (Scalia,J.); Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312,316-24 (1991) (KennedyJ.); Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464,
471-76 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 171-80 (1974)
(Burger, C.J.); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-40 (1972) (Stewart, J.). See infra
part II for analysis of these cases.
2 See infra part ll.A.
3 ALLen, 468 U.S. at 750.
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to require no further elaboration. This approach reflects unquestion-
ing fealty to Justice Felix Frankfurter, who almost singlehandedly de-
veloped the modem justiciability doctrines during the middle of this
century. Based on slender evidence, Frankfurter asserted that these
doctrines were rooted in the Constitution's history and underlying
political philosophy, which incorporated English beliefs about the ju-
diciary's appropriate function. 4
Like the Court, commentators have failed to provide a rigorous
theory of justiciability built upon the Founders' ideas. Indeed, the
most influential modem scholar, Alexander Bickel, consciously disre-
garded history in arguing that the Court should manipulate the jus-
ticiability doctrines to minimize judicial review, "a deviant institution
in the American democracy. '5 Other defenses of the Court's position,
including an important essay by then-Judge Scalia, have reiterated Jus-
tice Frankfurter's claim that justiciability preserves the judiciary's cir-
cumscribed role in our democratic system of tripartite governmental
powers. 6 Critics of the orthodox wisdom, most notably Erwin Chemer-
insky and Martin Redish, have responded that justiciability under-
mines separation of powers by restricting or barring the exercise of
judicial review-the principal control against unconstitutional action
by the political branches.
7
No scholar, however, has analyzed justiciability comprehensively
in light of Federalist separation-of-powers concepts. This intellectual
4 See infra part IIA2.b (discussingJustice Frankffurter's major justiciability opinions).
5 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 18 (1962).
6 See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L REv. 881, 890-99 (1983).
7 Professor Chemerinsky's theme is that the authoritative interpreter of the Constitu-
tion should be the federal judiciary, whose independence and principled decisionmaking
process make it the institution best able to protect fundamental constitutional values from
majoritarian pressures. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSrIrUTION 1-24, 86-97
(1987) [hereinafter CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING]. He correctly contends that the jus-
ticiability doctrines undercut judicial review by allowing the elected branches to be the
final expositor of constitutional provisions designed to regulate their own conduct. Id. at
97-105. However, Chemerinsky discusses the Framers' ideas only briefly, id. at 7-8, 27-29,
and indeed discounts the relevance of originalist evidence. Id. at 17-23, 49-80, 112-17.
Professor Redish maintains thatjusticiability weakens the "Countermajoritarian Princi-
ple" fundamental to our limited constitutional democracy, which requires judicial review
by independent federal courts so that the majoritarian branches will not be the final judge
of the restrictions the Constitution imposes upon them. MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL
COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER 4-6, 75-100, 103-09, 121, 124-26, 131-39 (1991). Redish
also stresses, however, that federal courts are confined to a "judicial" function, which he
defines as the resolution of a live dispute. Id. at 5, 88-90, 104. Much of Redish's book has
separation-of-powers implications, which he sometimes makes explicit in insightful
passages. See, e.g., id. at 92-97. He does not, however, exhaustively examine justiciability
from the perspective of Federalist separation-of-powers theory and earlyjudicial decisions.
My analysis of those historical materials leads me to diverge from Redish on several points,
even though I agree with many of his conclusions (particularly about standing). See gener-
ally infra part II.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
void is surprising, given the massive body of case law and literature
that considers justiciability8 and separation of powers9 as discrete top-
ics. This Article fills that gap by offering a "Neo-Federalist" approach,
which aims to (1) recapture the understanding of the Constitution's
text, structure, and political theory held by leading Federalists such as
James Wilson,' 0 James Madison," and Alexander Hamilton; 12 and (2)
apply those aspects of their philosophy that retain vitality in address-
ing modem legal problems.' 3
Part I discusses the Federalist idea of justiciability in America's
constitutional framework of separated powers. Federalists accepted
the English doctrine that separation of powers promoted efficient gov-
ernment yet also preserved liberty by checking and balancing govern-
mental authority and by securing the "rule of law" (i.e., the impartial
administration ofjustice). However, Federalists transformed this the-
ory by linking it with their novel proposition that all government offi-
cials, including judges, were representatives of the sovereign People.
In the Constitution, the People divided their government into
three coordinate departments and delegated to each certain powers.
Thus, as compared to the political branches, the judiciary was neither
8 The major decisions and scholarship on the justiciability doctrines will be discussed
infra part II.
9 Over the past 15 years, separation-of-powers cases outside the justiciability context
have increased exponentially. See infra notes 292, 368 (summarizing decisions). These
cases have sparked substantial commentary, which will be examined throughout this
Article.
10 Although neglected by posterity, Wilson was "the most learned and profound legal
scholar of his generation." 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 2 (Robert G. McCloskey ed.,
1967) [hereinafter WiLSoN's WORKS]; see also 1 id. at 24, 28-29, 37. Wilson developed the
earliest version of the argument used tojustify the Declaration of Independence (which he
signed), joined with Madison in dominating the Constitutional Convention, convinced
Pennsylvania to ratify the Constitution, became the nation's first law professor, delivered
the most important lectures on American law in the 18th century, and served as one of the
original Supreme CourtJustices. Id. at 2, 45.
11 Of particular relevance are Madison's essays on separation of powers. See THE FED-
ERAXusr Nos. 47-51 (James Madison).
12 Hamilton's explanation of the role of federal courts in the constitutional system is
especially pertinent. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78-82 (Alexander Hamilton).
13 For a detailed description and justification of this methodology, see Akhil R. Amar,
A Neo-Federalist View of Article Li: Separating the Two Tiers of FederalJursdictiom, 65 B.U. L. Ray.
205, 207-08 n.7, 208-09 n.9, 230-31 n.86 (1985) [hereinafter Amar, Neo-Federalist]; Akhil R.
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1426 n.9 (1987) [hereinafter Amar,
Sovereignt]; see also BRUCE AcKERmAN, WE THE PEOPLE 19-20, 34-57, 165-67 (1991) (arguing
that the Founding period remains meaningful as a source of timeless constitutional values
and insights, despite enormous social, economic, political, and moral differences between
the 18th and 20th centuries).
I have adopted a Neo-Federalist approach to illuminate two distinct but related
themes. First, the modem Court has purported to adhere to the Framers' intent about
justiciability and separation of powers, but has gotten its history wrong. Second, although
the Federalists' design may not legally bind the current Court, and although certain details
of their scheme have become outmoded, their fundamental ideas have an internal logic
and consistency that can help clarify the confused justiciability doctrines.
1996]
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inferior nor uniquely limited. Like Articles I and II, Article III simul-
taneously granted and restricted authority: Federal courts were to ex-
ercise 'judicial power" (i.e., the interpretation and application of pre-
existing legal rules to particular facts) in nine specified categories.
Moreover, judges were not antidemocratic merely because they
were appointed rather than elected. On the contrary, the People de-
liberately removed the judiciary from majoritarian pressures to give it
the independence needed to uphold the People's fundamental law,
the Constitution. Far from being a "deviant institution," judicial re-
view was essential to safeguard our system of separated powers. The
rule of law presumed that Congress and the President could not im-
partially determine whether they had complied with constitutional
provisions that limited their own powers. Similarly, checks and bal-
ances could be maintained only if courts prevented the political
branches from exceeding their constitutional bounds.
Therefore, under Federalist theory, separation of powers would
be violated if federal courts refused to exercise the authority constitu-
tionally conferred on them.' 4 But it would be equally subverted if
judges arrogated power not granted, for doing so would flout the rule
of law, disrupt governmental efficiency, and lead to judicial tyranny.
To distinguish cases falling within its jurisdiction from matters beyond
the scope of "judicial power," the early Supreme Court-dominated
by Federalists like James Wilson, John Jay,' 5 James Iredell,' 6 andJohn
Marshall' 7-developed three main justiciability doctrines. First, the
political departments could not require Article III courts to render
advice outside the context of a lawsuit. Second, federal judges could
not consider legal questions committed by the Constitution to the dis-
cretion of Congress or the President. Third, when a court decided a
nonpolitical question in a litigated case, its judgment could not be
14 Several commentators have argued that separation of powers warrants judicial def-
erence to congressional grants of standing, albeit on policy rather than historical grounds.
See, e.g., David A. Logan, Standing to Sue: A Prposed Separation of Powers Analysis, 1984 Wis. L
REV. 37; Jonathan Poisner, Comment, Environmental Values and Judicial Review After Lujan:
Two Critiques of the Separation of Powers Theory of Standing, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 335 (1991).
15 Jay, the first Chief Justice, significantly influenced the Constitution's ratification
(e.g., writing THE FEDERALIST Nos. 2-5 and 64) and was a preeminent figure in foreign
affairs. See I THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1789-1800, at 5-7 (Maeva Marcus &James R. Perry eds., 1985) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY
HisToRY].
16 In 1783, Iredell became the first lawyer to persuade a state supreme court that
judges had the right to enforce constitutions as fundamental law against contrary legisla-
tive acts. Iredell led the Federalist ratification effort in North Carolina and was the young-
est of the early Justices. See 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 15, at 62-63.
17 Although Marshall played a minor role in the Virginia Ratification Convention, he
presented one of the most eloquent defenses of the federal judiciary. See 3JONATHAN EL-
LUOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVEN'nONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTrrUTION 551-62 (1901). His contributions as ChiefJustice are inestimable.
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reviewed by the majoritarian branches. These rules. of justiciability
and separation of powers endured for over a hundred years.
Part II examines the erosion of the traditional approach in this
century and argues that reintroducing Federalist principles would
clarify analysis. The Court has gradually come to view elected officials
as the only representatives of the People. This distortion of popular
sovereignty is a legacy of the New Deal's exigent embrace of the Pro-
gressive recommendation that America adopt the British model of de-
cisive, centralized legislative-executive rule. To facilitate such
efficient government, the Court has largely insulated the political de-
partments' actions from "antidemocratic" judicial scrutiny by altering
the justiciability doctrines to .decrease access to federal courts.
Although efficiency is one classical objective of separation of pow-
ers, it must be balanced-against the competing aims of promoting lib-
erty, ensuring the rule of law, and enforcing checks and balances.
The modern Court, however, has discounted the latter goals because
it does not recognize the Federalist ideas they reflect: that federal
judges represent the People; that judicial power must be commensu-
rate with legislative and executive authority; and that judicial review
must be exercised to remedy political branch conduct that trans-
gresses constitutional limits. To better account for these Federalist
principles, the Court should reformulate the standing, mootness, ripe-
ness, and political question doctrines according to the detailed guide-
lines set forth in Part II.
I
THE FEDERALIST CONCEPTION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
AND JUSTICIABILITY
The Federalist Court's seminal justiciability opinions-Marbury v.
Madison,'8 Haybum's Case,19 and the Correspondence of the Justices2 0-
presuppose familiarity with the Constitution's underlying theory,
which adapted English separation-of-powers concepts to the American
idea of popular sovereignty. The modern Court has based its jus-
ticiability doctrines upon these three decisions but has misread them,
primarily because it has failed to grasp their theoretical foundation.
To appreciate just how far the Court has departed from the Founders'
design, it is necessary first to examine how Federalist principles
1s 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See generally infra part I.0.3 (analyzing Marbuiy).
19 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). See generally infra part I.C.1 (examining Haybum's Case).
20 Letter from ChiefJusdce Jay and Associate Justices to President Washington (Aug.
8, 1793), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBUC PAPERS OFJOHNJAY 488-89 (Henry P.John-




emerged from a century-and-a-half of intellectual ferment in England
and America.
A. The Pre-Constitutional Background
1. English Separation-of-Powers Theories
English political theorists developed the idea that governmental
power should be divided and that different people should exercise the
major governmental functions.2 1 Separation of powers was first men-
tioned during the 1640s,22 became a major tenet for Locke a half-
century later,23 and then underwent continual refinement that
culminated in Montesquieu's work.24 These men defined the powers
of government and explained why they had to be partitioned.
a. Basic Governmental Functions
British theorists located "sovereignty"-absolute, indivisible, and
final lawmaking authority-in the People only during revolutions.
Once citizens had consented to a new government, sovereignty re-
vested in the "King-in-Parliament."25 Not surprisingly, governmental
21 This section presents a simplified version of pre-19th century English separation
theory. For more detailed accounts, see W.B. GWvN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS (1965) [hereinafter GwYN, MEANING]; MJ.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS 1-118 (1967).
22 See, e.g., CHARLES DALLISON, THE RoyAisS DEFENCE 80 (1648) ("[W]hilst the
Supremacy, the Power to judge the Law, and the Authority to make new Lawes, are kept in
severall hands, the known Law is preserved, but united, it is vanished, instantly thereupon, and
Arbitrary and Tyrannicall power is introduced."); CLEMENT WALKER, RELATIONS AND OBsER-
VATIONS, HisToRIcAL AND POLITICK UPON THE PARLIAMENT BEGUN ANNO DoM. 1640 (1648),
reprinted in Max Radin, The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers in Seventeenth Century Controver-
sies, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 842, 855 (1938) ("[F]or any one man, or any Assembly, Court, or
Corporation of men ... to usurp[ I these three powers: 1. The Governing power. 2. The
Legislative power. 3. And theJudicative power, into themselves, is to make themselves the
highest Tyrants, and the people the basest slaves in the world; for to govern supremely by a
Law made, and interpreted by themselves according to their own pleasure, what can be
more boundlesse and arbitrary?").
23 JoHN LoCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 1960) (1698). For
analysis of Locke's theories, see Gw,Y, MEANING, supra note 21, at 66-81; VILE, supra note
21, at 51-67, 79, 86-87, 95-96.
24 See BARON DE MONTESQUuIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Franz Neumann ed. &
Thomas Nugent trans., 1949) (1748). For discussion of Montesquieu, see GwYN, MEANING,
supra note 21, at 100-28; VILE, supra note 21, at 76-97.
25 See 1 WILtAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *44-52, 147-55, 160-62, 185-86; LOCKE,
supra note 23, ch. XIX, 11 221, 241, 243. Under Lockean theory, the People collectively
formed a social compact and consented to a government, but retained the right to dissolve
that government if it breached the People's trust. Donald L. Doernberg, "We the People":
John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, and Standing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CAL.
L. REv. 52, 57-61, 92-94 (1985). Absent a revolution, however, the government was "the
virtual embodiment of the abstract sovereignty of the People." Amar, Sovereignty, supra
note 13, at 1430-31, 1435-36; see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 346-48 (1969).
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power was classified in terms of the activities of the Crown and Parlia-
ment.2 6 "Legislative" power consisted of enacting, amending, or re-
pealing general rules of conduct 2 7-most importantly, laws governing
taxation and spending.28 "Executive" power included not merely the
ministerial task of carrying out statutes, 29 but also broad discretionary
authority3°-for example, to conduct foreign affairs5 ' and to appoint
and direct civil and military officers.
3 2
26 See VILE, supra note 21, at 28-29; William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation
of Powers in theAge of the Framers, 30 WM. & MARL. REv. 263, 266 (1989) [hereinafter Gwyn,
Indeterminacy]. For statements of this dualist approach, see, e.g., LocKE, supra note 23, ch.
XrV, [ 159 ("[T]he Legislative and Executive Power are in distinct hands... in all... well-
framed Governments."); MARcHAMoiT NEDHAM, THE EXCELLENCIE OF A FREE-STATE (1656),
reprinted in GwN, MEANING, supra note 21, app. 1, at 131 ("In the keeping of these two
Powers distinct.., consists the safety of a State.").
27 See, e.g., MONTESQUIEU, supra note 24, bk. XI, ch. 6, at 153 (explaining that the
legislature enacts laws declaring the "general will of the state"); NEDHAM, supra note 26,
app. 1, at 131 ("Legislative Power" consists of "making, altering, or repealing Laws. .. ").
See generally VILE, supra note 21, at 24-27, 44, 59, 95-96 (examining the origins of the con-
cept of legislative power); 10 WILLAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 412-14
(1938).
28 See, e.g., MoNTEsQumu, supra note 24, bk. XI, ch. 6, at 160 ("IT]he raising of public
money... [is] the most important point of legislation."); JOHN TRENCHARD, SHORT HIS-
TORIE OF STANDING ARMIES IN ENGLAND (1698), reprinted in GwN, MEANING, supra note 21,
app. 3, at 138 (noting that the legislature has the "sole Power of giving Monl[e]y"); GWYN,
MEANING, supra note 21, at 93-94 (citing Henry Bolingbroke to similar effect). Legislative
power was supreme, see, e.g., LocKE, supra note 23, ch. XIII, 150, meaning that its func-
tion had to be exercised before the executive could act-not that legislative power was
unrestrained or could interfere with executive power. SeeVILE, supra note 21, at 63-64, 95-
96. The Constitution incorporated English ideas about legislative power-including the
equation of "legislative supremacy" with "primacy in time." See infra notes 107-08, 115 and
accompanying text.
29 See, e.g., LoCKE, supra note 23, ch. XII, 1144 (referring to the executive's "Execu-
tion of the Laws"); MONTESQUmu, supra note 24, bk. XI, ch. 6, at 152 ("Executive power"
means "executing the public resolutions."); NEDHAM, supra note 26, app. 1, at 131 (defin-
ing "Executive Power" as "administration of Government, in the Execution of Laws");
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The Preident's Power to Execute the Laws, 104
YALE U.T. 541, 605-06 (1994) (Historically, the core meaning of "executive power" was the
authority to execute the law.).
30 See, e.g., GwYN, MEANING, supra note 21, at 93-94 (The king "'is entrusted with the
executive Power, and several other Powers and Privileges, which we call Prerogatives
.... '") (quoting HENRY BOLINGBROKE, THE CRAFTSMAN 12 (1730)); LocKEF, supra note 23,
ch. XIV, 11[ 159-60, 166 (stating that prerogatives included discretion to act in the public
good, without specific legal authority). In exercising such powers, the King was not "in
Parliament," but wholly independent.
31 Locke distinguished this discretionary "federative" power over foreign affairs (e.g.,
to make war and peace) from the ministerial "executive" power to administer statutes, even
though both powers were exercised by the executive. See LocKE, supra note 23, ch. XII, 11
144-48, 153; see also MON-rESoUIEU, supra note 24, bk. XI, ch. 6, at 151 (to similar effect).
For discussion of Locke's and Montesquieu's taxonomy of executive power, see GWYN,
MEANING, supra note 21, at 101; VILE, supra note 21, at 60-61, 86.
32 Executive power also encompassed regulating national commerce, coining money,
and pardoning criminals. See GwvN, MEANING, supra note 21, at 28-29; see also infra notes
111, 168-70 and accompanying text (describing how Federalists authorized Congress to
share in most "executive" prerogatives).
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Furthermore, executive power extended to judicial processes-
including the King's Bench's discretionary issuance of the prerogative
writs of prohibition, certiorari, mandamus, and quo warranto at the
request of any citizen who claimed that the government's conduct was
illegal.33 Despite the absence of a distinct judicial power, courts were
independent 34 and had a discrete function35-the application of pre-
existing law to a particular set of facts.36 This function was exercised
both in common law cases 37 and in actions brought under either pre-
rogative writs or informer and relator statutes, which authorized citi-
zens to enforce public rights even if they had no personal stake in a
matter.3 8 Judicial proceedings were open, and judges had to give rea-
sons for their decisions.39
b. Justifications for Separation of Powers
By the end of the seventeenth century, three main rationales had
been developed for separation of powers. One was efficiency: Because
33 See VILE, supra note 21, at 28-30. Writs of prohibition and certiorari restrained
lower courts (and other executive officials) from proceeding in excess of theirjurisdiction.
See Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It A Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE
LJ. 816, 819-22 (1969) (citing Coke and Holt). Mandamus compelled a government offi-
cial to do a particular act that he was under a legal duty to perform. Id. at 824-25 (citing
Blackstone, Coke, and Mansfield). Finally, a quo warranto action vindicated the general
public interest in the enforcement of statutes. Id. at 823; see also Steven L. Winter, The
Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REv.'1371, 1396-98 (1988)
(discussing prerogative writs).
34 The Act of Settlement, 12 & 13 Will. III, c. 2 (1701), guaranteed judicial indepen-
dence. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *268 (praising such independence as
the key to impartial justice). For analysis of the evolution ofjudicial independence, see
Gw, MEANING, supra note 21, at 5-7; 10 Ho.nswoRTH, supranote 27, at 644-50; VILE, supra
note 21, at 54.
35 See, e.g., GwvN, MEANING, supra note 21, at 101-103; VILE, supra note 21, at 87-88.
36 See, e.g., 3 WILtAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARES *380. Thejudge's role was "only to
declare and pronounce, not to make or new-model, the law." 3 id. at *327. See gen.erally RobertJ.
Pushaw, Jr., Article Is Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 447, 474-75 n.140, 477-78 (1994) (citing 17th and 18th century
sources describing the judicial function of expounding existing law). English courts also
had equitable power to construe statutes non-literally if consistent with the spirit and rea-
son of the law. See 1 WiLLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARmES *62. Finally, they had power to
make their own procedural rules. See 10 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 221.
37 See Pushaw, supra note 36, at 477-79.
38 Informers alleged violations of criminal or regulatory statutes (regardless of
whether those laws were being applied to them), usually to obtain a financial share of the
penalty imposed on the wrongdoer. Relator actions enabled citizens with no personal
stake in a matter of general public interest (e.g., the administration of a public trust) to
prosecute as private attorneys general. See Berger, supra note 33, at 825-26 (citing sources);
Winter, supra note 33, at 1398-99, 1406.
39 See, e.g., FRANCIS BACON, A TREATISE OF UNIVERSALJUSTICE 95 (Garland Pub., 1978)
(1727). The Framers accepted the English view thatjudges had to be independent, that
their function was to interpret existing law, that judicial proceedings included common
law and public actions, and that decisions had to be rendered publicly. See infra notes 113-
14, 122, 138-40, 143, 152-54 and accompanying text.
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legislators could not act with the unity, speed, and secrecy necessary to
govern effectively, an executive with these attributes was required.
40
The otherjustifications focused on preserving liberty and avoiding tyr-
anny.41 First, dividing power promoted the rule of law-"a
[g]overnment of [lI]aws and not of [m]en."42 To ensure that the law
was impartially administered and that no official was above it, those
who made the laws could not execute orjudge them43-as reflected in
the maxim "no man can be the judge of his own case."44 The prohibi-
40 See, e.g., 1 WituAm BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *242 (The English constitution
places executive power "in a single hand ... for the sake of unanimity, strength, and
dispatch."); LOCKE, supra note 23, ch. XIV, 160 (The legislature ii "too numerous, and so
too slow, for the dispatch requisite to Execution."); id. ch. XII, 1 142-43 (same); MoNTEs-
QUIEU, supra note 24, bk. XI, ch. 6, at 156 ("[G]overnment, having need of despatch, is
better administered by one than by many.. .. "); NEDHaM, supra note 26, app. 1, at 131-33;
see also GwYN, MEANING, supra note 21, at 28, 32-35, 43, 57, 75-77, 108-09, 118, 127; VILE,
supra note 21, at 61-62; William C. Banks, Effidency in Government: Separation of Powers Recon-
sidered, 35 SYRACUSE L. REv. 715, 718-22 (1984); see also infranotes 109, 187 and accompany-
ing text (describing Federalists' insistence on a unitary executive).
41 "Liberty" consisted of the rights to free movement, personal security (i.e., enjoy-
ment of life, health, and reputation), and enjoyment of property. See 1 Wt.LtaM BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTAIES * 129, 134, 138. Theorists assumed that government officials tended
to use their power against the common interest. See, e.g., MONTESQUIEU, supra note 24, bk.
XI, ch. 4, at 150 ("[E]very man invested with power is apt to abuse it. .. ."); NEDHAM, supra
note 26, app. 1, at 131; TRENcHARD, supra note 28, app. 3, at 138. For analysis of this
theme, see GwYN, MEANING, supra note 21, at 11-27, 40-43, 128; VILE, supra note 21, at 61-
63; WOOD, supra note 25, at 21-22.
42 THE OCEANA oFJAMEs HARRINGTON AND His OTHER WORKS 240, 386 (John Toland
ed., 1700); see also id. at 240-43 (discussing whether the English government fulfilled this
maxim). Indeed, the legitimacy of government-its right to rule-depended upon its se-
curing the rule of law. See GARRY WiLLs, EXPLAINING AMERICA 113 (1981).
43 See LOCKE, supra note 23, ch. XII, 1 143 (It is "too great a temptation to humane
frailty apt to grasp at Power, for the same Persons who have the Power of making Laws, to
have also in their hands the power to execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves
from Obedience to the Laws they make, and suit the Law, both in its making and execu-
tion, to their own private advantage.... ."); MONTESQUIEU, supra note 24, bk. XI, ch. 6, at
151-52 (Where one person or group combines legislative and executive power, "the same
monarch or senate [might] enadt tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical man-
ner."); NEDHAM, supra note 26, app. 1, at 131 ("[I]f the Law-makers... should be also the
constant Administrators and Dispencers of Law and Justice, then (by consequence) the
People would be left without Remedy, in case of Injustice .... [I]n all ... [free) States...
the Legislative and Executive Powers have been managed in distinct hands.... ."); see also
GwYN, MEANING, supra note 21, at 12-18, 35-36, 42, 52-58, 71-76, 104-13, 127-28; Paul R.
Verkuil, Separation of Powers, The Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L.
Rxv. 301, 306 (1989) (connecting the rule of law to the English concept of natural justice,
which guarantees to every citizen-a fair hearing by an unbiased decisionmaker); VILE, supra
note 21, at 23-33, 49-51, 86-97.
44 See, e.g., JOHN SADLER, RIGHTS OF THE KINGDOM; OR CUSTOMS OF OUR ANCESTOURS
87 (1649), quoted inVILE, supra note 21, at 45 ("[F]or if Lawmakers, bejudges, of those that
break their Laws; they seem to beJudge in their own cause: which our Law... abhorreth,
so it seemeth also to forbid, both the Lawmaker, and the Judge to Execute .... ."). See
generally Verkuil, supra note 43, at 305 (discussing the development of this idea).
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tion against legislative or executive revision ofjudicial orders was criti-
cal to preserving the rule of law.
4 5
Second, separation of powers established balanced government,
thereby discouraging rash or arbitrary action and encouraging consul-
tation and cooperation. 46 Balanced government was related to the an-
cient theory that mixing the basic forms of government-monarchy,
aristocracy, and democracy (e.g., King, Lords, and Commons)-en-
sured stability and protected liberty.
4 7
Eighteenth-century theorists like Montesquieu accepted the
premise that liberty hinged on keeping government powers separated
and in different hands.48 Nonetheless, they recognized that pure sep-
aration among independent, unrestrained branches was unwork-
able.49 Consequently, they argued that separation of powers must be
complemented by checks and balances, whereby each department
had a limited right to review and control the others' actions.50 For
example, the king could share in the legislative power by vetoing
bills. 5 ' Conversely, Parliament could hold executive officials account-
45 See WILs, supra note 42, at 148-49. The finality ofjudicial orders was an ancient
cornerstone of English law. See, e.g., 6 Coke's Reports, Mich. 5Jacobi 1 (1607), reprinted in
PROHIBITIONS DEL Roy 281-82 (John Fraser ed., 1826) (The king appointed judges but
could not interfere with their determinations.); see also infra notes 99, 116, 146-48, 176 and
accompanying text (describing Federalists' emphasis on the rule of law, especially the need
to preserve the finality of court orders).
46 See, e.g., SADLER, supra note 44, cited in GwvN, MEANING, supra note 21, at 55-56
("One Reason... [to] plac[e] the Power Legislative, Judiciall, & Executive, in 3 distinct
Estates;... [is] so, they might be forced to Consult Often, and Much; in All they did ....
This frequent Consultation... [will] prevent.., a sudden Vote, or Act, of One House, or
one Body.... ."); see also GwYN, MEANING, supra note 21, at 55-56, 64-65, 85-87; VILE, supra
note 21, at 53-75.
47 See GwYN, MEANING, supra note 21, at 24-25; VILE, supra note 21, at 23, 33-47, 51, 57,
64, 68, 72, 83-85, 98-99, 102-03, 106-08, 110-11; WOOD, supra note 25, at 19-20, 153, 197-98.
Mixed government gives each social group a voice on political issues, whereas separation of
powers divides governmental functions. See WILS, supra note 42, at 97-100.
48 See, e.g., MONTESQUIEU, supra note 24, bk. XI, ch. 6, at 151-52.
49 See, e.g., id. at 158-61; 1 WIUIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *154 ("[T]he execu-
tive power should be a branch, though not the whole, of the legislature. The total union of
them.., would be productive of tyranny; the total disjunction of them.., would in the
end produce the same effects .... The legislature would soon become tyrannical, by mak-
ing continual encroachments, and gradually assuming to itself the rights of the executive
power.").
50 See, e.g., TRENCHARD, supra note 28, app. 3, at 140 ("[A]ll wise Governments endeav-
our as much as possible to keep the Legislative and Executive Parts asunder, that they may
be a check upon one another."). See GwYN, MEANING, supra note 21, at 82-99; VILE, supra
note 21, at 93-95.
51 See, e.g., 1 WiLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *154 ("To hinder.., any such
[legislative] encroachments, the king is himself a part of the parliament: and . .. very
properly... (has a] share of legislation, which... consists in the power of reecting, rather
than resolving.... ."); MONTESQUIEU, supra note 24, bk. XI, ch. 6, at 159 ("The executive
power.., ought to have a share in the legislature by the power of rejecting, otherwise it
would soon be stripped of its prerogative."); TRENCARD, supra note 28, app. 3, at 140-41
("Our Government trusts the King with no part of the Legislative but a Negative Voice,
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able for their administration of the laws and could exercise final judi-
cial power to impeach and punish judges and executive officers
(except the king) who had abused their authority.52 Moreover, the
upper legislative chamber, the House of Lords, could reconstitute it-
self as a "court" and exercise supreme appellate judicial power.53 Fi-
nally, within the legislature, popular and aristocratic bodies checked
each other.5
4
Montesquieu was the first to conceptualize 'judicial power" as a
distinct component of government (not merely an extension of execu-
tive authority) and thus assumed the burden of explaining why it had
which is absolutely necessary to preserve the Executive."); see also GwYN, MEANING, supra
note 21, at 111-12; ViiE, supra note 21, at 92-94.
52 See, e.g., 1 WiLLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAmES *155 ("[E]xecutive power is...
checked, and kept within due bounds by the two houses through the privilege they have of
enquiring into, impeaching, and punishing the conduct.., of [the King's] evil and perni-
cious counsellors."); MONTSUIE, supranote 24, bk. XI, ch. 6, at 158 (The legislature may
"examin [e] in what manner its laws have been executed" and may hold all executive offi-
cials accountable except the king.); see also Gwvr., Mf.ANIo, supra note 21, at 16-17, 25, 31-
32, 40-43, 60-64, 77-78, 82-87, 102, 112-13; ViLE, supra note 21, at 94.
Thus, by the early 18th century, Parliament could check the executive through both
ordinary oversight and impeachment. See RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT 97 (1973). In im-
peachment proceedings, the House of Commons charged an official with "high crimes and
misdemeanors" (i.e., political offenses that injured the entire nation); the House of Lords
then exercised the judicial power of holding a trial, rendering a final judgment, and im-
posing an appropriate punishment (which could include imprisonment or execution). See
id. at 7-52, 59-73.
In short, the executive and legislature would be mutually dependent because of the
threat of veto or impeachment, but would be independent in exercising these extraordi-
nary powers:
"The constitutioalDependency... [is] that the Proceedings of each Part of the
Government... are liable to be examin'd and controul'd by the other Parts.
The Independency... [is] that the Resolutions of each Part, which direct these
Proceedings, be taken Independently and without any Influence, direct or indi-
rect, on the others. Without thefirst, each Part would be at Liberty to attempt
destroying the Ballance, by usurping, or abusing Power; but without the last,
there can be no Ballance at all."
HENRY BOLINGBRO,, THE CRArrSMAN (1730), quoted in Gwm, MEANING, supra note 21, at
95; see also Vit, supra note 21, at 73-74, 95.
53 See, e.g., 3 WiLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAIEs *56 (The House of Lords is "the
supreme court ofjudicature."); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398 (1798) (Iredell,J.)
("[O]ne branch of the parliament, the House of Lords, not only exercises ajudicial power,
in cases of impeachment,... but [also] as a court of dernier resort, takes cognisance of
many suits of law and in equity... ."); see also Wits, supra note 42, at 148. When legislators
exercised "judicial" power (e.g., in determining impeachments and appeals), their orders
were as final as those of a court composed ofjudges and thus could not be reviewed by
either executive or judicial officials. See, e.g., Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 398 (Iredell, J.);
supra note 45 (discussing the principle of the finality of court orders); supra note 52
(describing Parliament's independence in exercising the impeachment power).
54 See, e.g., MoNTEsQumu, supra note 24, bk. XI, ch. 6, at 160 ("The legislative body
being composed of two parts, they check one another by the mutual privilege of re-
jecting."); see also 1 WiLLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAmEs *155.
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to be kept separate. 55 First, judicial and executive power had to be
divorced to avoid a tyranny in which "the judge might behave with
violence and oppression."5 6 Second, if judicial power were "joined
with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be ex-
posed to arbitrary control,"5 7 because decisions would reflect the
judge's personal opinion rather than existing legal rules. 58
Even if cabined, however, judicial power potentially posed the
greatest threat to liberty. While the political branches formulated
general rules, only judicial power-which applied that law to specific
circumstances-could lead directly to a loss of freedom.59 Therefore,
it had to (1) be vested not in permanent tribunals but in temporary
juries;60 (2) follow established judicial procedures; 61 and (3) result in
final judgments based on the letter of the law.62 These strict controls
would render judicial power insignificant compared to legislative and
executive authority.
63
Blackstone reiterated Montesquieu's ideas about separating judi-
cial from executive and legislative power, but defended England's per-
manent, independent courts.64 Montesquieu and Blackstone agreed
55 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 24, bk. XI, ch. 6, at 152 ("There would be an end of
everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people,
to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolu-
tions, and of trying the causes ofindividuals."). See GwYN, MEANING, supra note 21, at 105-
08; VILE, supra note 21, at 76, 82, 88-91, 96.
56 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 24, bk. XI, ch. 6, at 152.
57 Id.
58 See 1 WIL-AM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *269; see also 1 id. at *71; 4 id. at *377f.
59 See GwYN, MEANING, supra note 21, at 108; VILE, supra note 21, at 88.
60 Thejudiciary power ought not to be given to a standing senate; it should be
exercised by persons taken from the body of the people at certain times of
the year, and consistently with a form and manner prescribed by law, in or-
der to erect a tribunal that should last only so long as necessity requires. By
this method thejudicial power, so terrible to mankind, not being annexed to
any particular state or profession, becomes, as it were, invisible. People have
not then thejudges continually present to their view; they fear the office, but
not the magistrate.
MONTESQUIEU, supra note 24, bk. XI, ch. 6, at 153; see also VILE, supra note 21, at 85, 89
(examining Montesquieu's proposal to grant adjudicatory power to juries).
61 See MoNTEsQumu, supra note 24, bk. VI, ch. 2, at 74; VILE, supra note 21, at 89-90.
62 See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 24, bk. XI, ch. 6, at 158 ("But though the tribunals
ought not to be fixed, the judgments ought; and to such a degree as to be ever conforma-
ble to the letter of the law. Were they to be the private opinion of the judge, people would
then live in society, without exactly knowing the nature of their obligations."); see also VIE,
supra note 21, at 89.
63 See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 24, bk. XI, ch. 6, at 156 (With these restraints, "the
judiciary is in some measure next to nothing- there remain, therefore, only two [i.e., execu-
tive and legislative power].").
64 In this distinct and separate existence of the judicial power, in a peculiar
body of men, nominated indeed, but not removeable at pleasure, by the
crown, consists one main preservative of the public liberty; which cannot
subsist long in any state, unless the administration of common justice be in
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that England's government provided the best model of separation of
powers and checks and balances.65
2. Separation of Powers and Popular Sovereignty During the
Revolutionary War and Its Aftermath
The Revolutionary War ushered in a decade of political, social,
and intellectual upheaval during which Americans gradually reevalu-
ated-and ultimately transformed-English notions of separation of
powers and sovereignty.
66
Initially, however, Americans reaffirmed British political princi-
ples and contended that these precepts had been disregarded in the
colonies. For example, the Declaration of Independence condemned
England's tyrannical violation of separation of powers.67 Moreover, in
repudiating the claim that the sovereign King-in-Parliament had abso-
lute power over the colonies,68 the Declaration relied on the Lockean
idea that the People had the right to revolt against an unjust govern-
ment not founded on their consent.69 Once Americans had success-
some degree separated both from the legislative and also from the executive
power.
1 WILLLAM BLACKSToNE, COMMENTARIES *269; see also ViLE, supra note 21, at 104-05 (describ-
ing Blackstone's integration of Montesquieu's idea of a separate judicial power with the
English tradition of independent, professional judges).
65 First, the British legislature had aristocratic and democratic chambers that checked
each other, and the House of Lords moderated differences between the people and the
king, especially through its ultimate judicial authority. Second, Parliament exercised full
legislative powers and could hold the executive accountable. Finally, the king wielded con-
siderable executive power and could veto legislation. See MONTESQUiEU, supra note 24, bk.
XI, ch. 6; 1 WxuAM BLAcKsToNE, COMMENTARIES *233-36.
66 The definitive account of this period is WOOD, supra note 25; see also ViLE, supra
note 21, at 119-75; Juuus GOEBEL, JR., HIsTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 1-195 (1971) (describing the transplan-
tation of English judicial ideas to American colonial, state, and early national courts).
67 The Declaration assailed the King's tyrannous consolidation of legislative, execu-
tive, andjudicial functions and accused him of (1) forcing colonial legislatures to comply
with his will and, failing that, either dissolving them "for opposing.., his invasions on the
rights of the people" or suspending them and'assuming legislative powers; (2) not execut-
ing existing laws fairly; (3) "obstruct[ing] the Administration of Justice, by refusing his
Assent to Laws for establishingJudiciary powers .... [and making] Judges dependent on
his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their sala-
ries;" and (4) creating new executive offices to harass Americans. THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE paras. 7, 11-13. See generally ViLE, supra note 21, at 121-22, 126-32 (detailing
Americans' criticism of colonial governments for violating separation of powers).
68 The Declaration deemed the King "unfit to be the ruler of a free people" because
he had sought to establish "an absolute Tyranny over these States," and criticized Parlia-
ment's "attempts... to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us." THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 2, 30-31. See generally WooD, supra note 25, at 173-81, 259-68, 344-
54 (discussing the colonists' rejection of Parliament's claims of unlimited sovereign
power); Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 13, at 1430, 1444-45 (same).
69 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 ("Governments ... deriv[e] their
just powers from the consent of the governed."); see also supra note 25 (discussing Locke);
Akhil R. Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94
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fully asserted that right, however, they followed British theory by
immediately re-vesting sovereignty in the government (specifically, in
the legislature).
70
The new state constitutions (adopted 1776-77) and the Articles of
Confederation (drafted 1778) granted nearly all power to legislatures
and established only token executive and judicial branches. 71 These
government charters had separation of powers in form but not sub-
stance. State constitutions generally distinguished the three govern-
mental functions,72 and many required absolute separation. For
example, the Virginia Constitution provided:
The legislative, executive, and judiciary departments, shall be sepa-
rate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly be-
longing to the other: nor shall any person exercise the powers of
more than one of them, at the same time.73
COLUM. L. REv. 457, 463 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, Consent] (The Declaration's main pur-
pose was to demonstrate Americans' Lockean right to revolt because England had violated
their fundamental legal rights.). Wilson had made the earliest version of the argument
that culminated in the Declaration: The American People had not consented to be gov-
erned by the British Parliament and had no power in it; therefore, Parliament should have
no authority over the colonies. See Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legisla-
tive Authority of the British Parliament (1774), reprinted in 2 WILSON'S WORKs, supra note
10, at 721-46.
70 See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 25, at 352-53, 373-74.
71 See id. at 132-61, 305 (Americans' bitter experience with royal governors and judges
led them to dramatically decrease executive and judicial power and to increase legislative
authority.); see alsoVnE, supra note 21, at 134-35, 148; William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of
the Separation of Powers and the Federal Courts, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 474, 478-79 (1989)
[hereinafter Gwyn, Separation].
72 See, e.g., Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and
Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. Rxv. 211, 216 (1989); Malcolm P. Sharp, The Classical American
Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers," 2 U. Cai. L. REv. 385, 417 (1934). For an excellent
summary of separation of powers in state constitutions, see WOOD, supra note 25, at 150-61.
73 VA. CONsr. of 1776 para. 2; see also GA. CoNsr. of 1777 art. I (adopting same lan-
guage); MASS. CONsT. of 1780, pt. I, art. 30 ("[T]he legislative department shall never exer-
cise the executive andjudicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise
the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the
legislative and executive powers, or either of them."); MD. CONST. of 1776 art. VI ("[T]he
legislative, executive and judicial powers of government, ought to be forever separate and
distinct from each other."); N.C. CONSr. of 1776 art. IV (same). SeeViE, supra note 21, at
119; Russell K. Osgood, Early Versions and Practices of Separation of Powers: A Comment, 30 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 279, 280-83 (1989).
Only one constitution acknowledged that absolute separation was impossible, and it
was ratified long after the earlier state charters had proved untenable. See N.H. CONST.,
Bill of Rights, art. XXXVII; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 327 (James Madison) (Jacob
E. Cooke ed., 1961) (praising New Hampshire's practical approach). (All citations to par-
ticular material within a Federalist Paper will be from this edition and will include the au-
thor's last name only.) See generally Casper, supra note 72, at 218-19 (discussing New
Hampshire constitution); infra notes 93, 161-62, 170 and accompanying text (describing
the Framers' rejection of pure separation of powers).
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With few exceptions, however, state constitutions failed to fortify these
"parchment barriers" with meaningful checks. 74 Indeed, state legisla-
tures chose the chief executive and did not allow him to appoint and
direct his ministers75 or to veto bills. 76 The legislatures also controlled
the judiciary's appointment, tenure, and salary,77 and often could re-
quire judges to render advice.78 In short, state constitutions allowed
dangerous combinations of legislative, executive, and judicial
powers.79
So did the Articles of Confederation, which granted the limited
powers of the central government almost entirely to a Congress that
dominated the executive and judiciary.80 The Revolution's end in
1783 accelerated the disintegration of the Confederation, and corre-
74 THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 333 (Madison); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 331
(Madison) (noting that state constitutions did not provide "for maintaining in practice the
separation delineated on paper," reflecting the "haste" and "inexperience" of the drafters).
See VILE, supra note 21, at 133-34, 141.
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 and the New York Constitution of 1777 were
notable exceptions. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 327-29 (Madison). In the former, Ad-
ams implemented the sophisticated ideas about separation of powers he had presented in
his THOUGHTS ON GOVERNMENT (1776), reprinted in 4 THE WORKS OFJOHN ADAMS 195-96,
205-06 (C.F. Adams ed., 1865) [hereinafter ADAMS's WORKS]. See generally WOOD, supra
note 25, at 434, 568 (observing that the Massachusetts Constitution was considered a
model); Sharp, supra note 72, at 406. The NewYork Constitution was similarly influential.
See ViNE, supra note 21, at 133-34, 148; Casper, supra note 72, at 216-17; Sharp, supra note
72, at 417-18.
75 See ViLE, supra note 21, at 142-43; WOOD, supra note 25, at 138-50. Only New York,
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire allowed the direct election of governors. See WOOD,
supra note 25, at 434-35; Casper, supra note 72, at 216-17.
76 The only exceptions were Massachusetts and New York, which recognized a veto
that the legislature could override. See WooD, supra note 25, at 136-37, 141, 434; Casper,
supra note 72, at 217; see also Dean Alfange, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Separation of
Powers: A Welcome Return to Normalcy?, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 668, 673 (1990) [hereinafter
Alfange, Normalcy) (discussing state constitutional provisions that created weak executive
branches).
77 See 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 27-28 (1911)
(Madison) (emphasizing state judges' dependence on legislators); THE FEDERALIST No. 81,
at 544-45 (Hamilton) (noting that four of thirteen states did not even have separate judi-
ciaries); see also WOOD, supra note 25, at 159-61, 407-08; Pushaw, supra note 36, at 469-70.
78 See, e.g., MAsS. CONST. of 1780, pt II, ch. 3, art. 2 (The legislature and the governor
could "require the opinions of the justices of the supreme judicial court, upon important
questions of law, and upon solemn occasions."); Pushaw, supra note 36, at 481-82 nn.176-77
(summarizing advisory opinion practice).
79 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 333 (Madison) (In drafting their state constitu-
tions, Americans feared executive prerogatives so much that they ignored "the danger
from legislative usurpations; which by assembling all power in the same hands, must lead to
the same tyranny as is threatened by executive usurpations."); see also VILE, supra note 21, at
120, 143; WooD, supra note 25, at 155-56, 403-13; Gwyn, Separation, supra note 71, at 479.
80 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX (authorizing Congress to appoint temporary
executive committees andjudicial tribunals). See 2 ELLOT, supra note 17, at 459 (Wilson)
(The Articles created "a single body ... possessed of legislative, executive, and judicial
powers."); 3 id. at 83 (Randolph) (same); THE FEDERALIST No. 38, at 247 (Madison)
(same). For discussion of the separation-of-powers problems with the Articles, see WOOD,
supra note 25, at 549-50; Alfange, Normalcy, supra note 76, at 674-75; Amar, Sovereignty, supra
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spondingly increased the autonomy--and abusiveness-of the
states.81 In sum, America's early constitutions were defective in theory
and proved disastrous in practice, as unrestrained legislatures pro-
duced near-anarchy. 82
The necessity of reconstructing these governments became the
mother of invention, as reformers like Wilson, 83 Madison, and Hamil-
ton 84 gradually created a novel political theory. Experience had
demonstrated the wisdom of English separation-of-powers doctrine-
note 13, at 1442-43; Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 29, at 600-03; Sharp, supra note 72, at
418-19.
81 The Articles created a loose confederation of sovereign states that ignored the na-
tional government with impunity. See, e.g., THE FEDERAuST Nos. 15-16, 20-21 (Hamilton)
(describing the disastrous consequences of state defiance); 1 FARRAND, supra note 77, at 18-
19 (Randolph) (lamenting the federal government's total inability to protect national in-
terests, enforce federal law against defiant states, or check often-violent quarrels between
states); see also WOOD, supra note 25, at 354-63, 393-429, 463-67; Amar, Sovereignty, supra
note 13, at 1441, 1446-48.
82 See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT, supra note 17, at 399 (Madison). The classic descriptions of the
defects of America's state and national governments are found in THE FEDERAUs'r Nos. 1,
6-9, 11-13, 15-17, 21-22 (Hamilton); Nos. 2-5 (Jay); Nos. 10, 14, 18-20 (Madison); see also
WOOD, supra note 25, at 475-83; Alfange, Normacy, supra note 76, at 673; Amar, Sovereignty,
supra note 13, at 1440-41.
83 Wilson was the leading critic of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, which vested
nearly all governmental power in a single legislature and produced some of the earliest
and worst legislative abuses. See 1 WIsoN's WORKS, supra note 10, at 20-24 (editor's com-
ments) (describing Wilson's attacks against Pennsylvania's government); see also THE FEDER-
Aisr No. 48, at 336-38 (Madison) (The Pennsylvania legislature usurped executive and
judicial power.).
Accordingly, Wilson was the first to articulate the ideas that became the foundation of
Federalist thought-namely, that the People should delegate some of their sovereign
power to a government consisting of a two-house legislature, an elected executive, and an
independentjudiciary. SeeWooD, supra note 25, at 438-53; see also 1 WILSON'S WORKS, supra
note 10, at 24-25 (editor's comments) (In the 1780s, Wilson developed the argument that
popular sovereignty could justify strengthening the national government without threaten-
ing liberty.). Wilson also joined the effort to amend the Articles of Confederation. See 1 id.
at 21 (editor's comments).
84 Immediately after the war ended, Madison and Hamilton recommended proce-
dures for paying the war debt and preserving the Confederation's harmony. See ADDRESS
TO THE STATES, BY THE UNITED STATES IN CONGRESS ASSEMBLED (Apr. 26, 1783), rep-inted in 1
ELLIOT, supra note 17, at 96-100; see also MR. MADISON'S RESOLUTION FOR EMPOWERING CON-
GRESS TO REGULATE TRADE (Nov. 30, 1785), reprinted in 1 ELLIOT, supra note 17, at 114-15.
At the Annapolis Convention, Hamilton and Madison lamented the deficiencies of the
Articles in administering domestic and foreign affairs and recommended that Congress be
given greater power to regulate trade and commerce. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSION
TO REMEDY THE DEFECTS OF THE FEDERAL GovERNMENT (Sept. 11, 1786), reprinted in 1 EL-
LiOT, supra note 17, at 116-18.
While Madison spearheaded national reform efforts,Jefferson played the leading role
within Virginia. Indeed, Madison's definitive treatment of separation of powers explicitly
built upon Jefferson's trenchant observation that Virginia's legislature combined
"[all the powers of government, legislative, executive, and judiciary....
The concentrating [of] these in the same hands is precisely the definition of
despotic government .... An elective despotism, was not the government we
fought for; but one which should not only be founded on free principles,
but in which the powers of government should be so divided and balanced
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especially its insistence on a strong executive 5 and independent
courts.8 6 But the British model of separation, which balanced three
competing social orders, could not be duplicated in America, which
lacked a hereditary aristocracy and monarchy.
8 7
Federalists responded by developing a fresh approach, based on
the insight that "the People" collectively (not as members of social
classes) were the source of the governmental power that had to be
separated.88 The relocation of sovereignty from legislatures to the
People (notjust in moments of revolution, but permanently) 89 made
all government departments-including the executive andjudiciary-
the People's agents and representatives. 90 Acting through conven-
tions, the People could define and limit all governmental power in
written constitutions-a fundamental, supreme law. The reconceptu-
alization of separation of powers especially benefitted the judiciary,
which came to be seen as the People's representative in upholding
their constitutions against contrary legislative and executive acts. 91
... that no one could transcend their legal limits, without being effectually
checked and restrained by the others."
See THE FEDERAuST No. 48, at 335 (Madison), quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE
STATE OF VIRGINIA (1786); see also ViNE, supra note 21, at 149 (concluding that Madison,
Jefferson, and Wilson primarily developed the new American constitutional theory).
85 See supra notes 29-32, 40 and accompanying text. Adams andJefferson, who at the
time of the Revolution had believed that the legislature should appoint the executive, now
argued that separation of powers required his popular election. See Sharp, supra note 72,
at 399 (citing sources).
86 See supra note 34. Legislative domination ofjudiciaries after the Revolution led to a
renewed appreciation of the need for independent courts. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 25,
at 454.
87 SeeViLE, supra note 21, at 120,126, 141, 151; WiLts, supra note 42, at 104-07; WOOD,
supra note 25, at 554-56.
88 The British Constitution, based on "different orders" in society, could not be ap-
plied to America, where "all authority is derived from the People." 2 ELLIOT, supra note 17,
at 434 (Wilson); see also 2 id. at 428-24 (Wilson) (The English government was not based on
popular representation because (1) the executive was not elected, and the Crown ap-
pointed judges; and (2) the legislature included the House of Lords and the King, neither
of whom represented the people.); 1 WILSON'S WoRKcs, supra note 10, at 310-11 (England
did not treat executive and judicial officers as representatives of the People.). For further
discussion, see WiLLs, supra note 42, at 104-07; Casper, supra note 72, at 216.
89 See WOOD, supra note 25, at 362-63, 372-83; Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 13, at 1430-
37, 1444-45. The Declaration of Independence embodied the Lockean principle that sov-
ereignty was derived from the People and could be reclaimed by them only in violent
revolutions, see supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text, whereas the Constitution re-
flected the new American idea that sovereignty always remained vested in the People. This
sovereignty could be exercised peacefully'by majority vote in special conventions called to
ratify, alter, or abolish constitutions. See Amar, Consent, supra note 69, at 464, 470-94, 500.
90 See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780 art. V ("All power residing originally in the people,
and being derived from them, the several magistrates and officers of government, vested
with authority, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, are their substitutes and agents,
and are at all times accountable to them."). See ViLE, supra note 21, at 137, 145; WOOD,
supra note 25, at 383-89.
91 SeeViLE, supra note 21, at 157; WOOD, supra note 25, at 259-63, 273-82, 291-343, 389,
453-63; see also GoEBEI., supra note 66, at 50-95 (describing the emerging judicial control
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These new ideas about separation of powers and sovereignty inter-
acted synergistically in the mid-1780s and crystallized during the fram-
ing and ratification of the Constitution.92
B. Separation of Powers in the Constitution
Just as a skeleton cannot be observed but shapes a body, the
phrase "separation of powers" cannot be found in the Constitution 93
yet structures the document. Indeed, it was "the sacred maxim" of
government.94 Therefore, the Framers' understanding of separation
over legislatures); David E. Engdahl, John Marshall's effersonian" Concept ofJudicial Review,
42 DuKE LJ. 279, 282-83 n.7 (1992) (summarizing state court exercises ofjudicial review in
the 1780s).
Two decisions are of particular significance. First, in Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va.
(4 Call) 5 (1782), Virginia's highest court invalidated a pardon because it was not granted
in accordance with the state constitution. The court includedJohn Blair, who became one
of the original Supreme CourtJustices. See infra note 191. Second, in Bayard v. Singleton,
1 N.C. (1 Mart.) 42 (1787),James Iredell persuaded the North Carolina Supreme Court to
invalidate a statute because it conflicted with the state constitution, a fundamental and
superior law. See WOOD, supra note 25, at 460-62; see also supra note 16 (describing Iredell's
understanding ofjudicia review as early as 1783); infra part I.C (analyzing Iredell's applica-
tion of this theory as one of the first Supreme CourtJustices).
92 Americans grasped these new concepts at different times. Wilson began to articu-
late such theories shortly after the Revolutionary War began. See supra note 83. During the
mid-1780s, Madison and others embraced and refined this concept of separation of pow-
ers, which became "the dominant principle of the American political system." See WOOD,
supra note 25, at 449.
On the other hand, many Americans rejected the new wisdom. Indeed, even Adams,
the foremost constitutional theorist of the Revolutionary War era, misunderstood the Fed-
eralist Constitution's fusion of popular sovereignty and separation of powers. In 1787,
Adams published a three-volume treatise in which he defended traditional separation theo-
ries. See A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITuTIONS OF THE UNrrE STATES OF AMERIcA (1787),
reprinted in 4 Ans's WoRuS, supra note 74, at 284, 308-09, 382, 398, 405, 429; 5 id. at 452-
54; 6 id. at 114, 116-18, 127, 145-46; see also Sharp, supra note 72, at 398-406 (summarizing
Adams's work and influence). Adams, however, clung to the classical mixed-government
view that each department represented a different social interest, rather than the People.
See VILE, supra note 21, at 148-49; WOOD, supra note 25, at 567-92.
93 Madison proposed amending the Constitution to include the following
requirement
The powers delegated by this constitution, are appropriated to the depart-
ments to which they are respectively distributed: so that the legislative de-
partment shall never exercise the powers vested in the executive or judicial;
nor the executive exercise the powers vested in the legislative orjudicial; nor
the judicial exercise the powers vested in the legislative or executive
departments.
12 THE PAPERS OFJAMES MADISON 202 (C. Hobson & R. Rutland eds., 1979) [hereinafter
MADISON PAPERS]. Madison argued that this amendment would make explicit that "the
powers ought to be separate and distinct" and would provide a rule for "the construction of
the Constitution." 1 A ALs OF CONG. 760 (J. Gales ed,, 1789). The House adopted
Madison's amendment, 1 ii at 760-61, but the Senate rejected it. See 1 THE BiLL OF RIGHTS
1150 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971). For analysis of why the Constitution does not contain
an express separation-of-powers provision, see infra notes 161-62, 170 and accompanying
text.
94 See THE FEDERAuST No. 47, at 331 (Madison); see also id. at 323 (expressing the
"political maxim" that "the legislative, executive and judiciary departments ought to be
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of powers and the related concept of checks and balances must be
carefully examined.
1. Separation of Powers, Popular Sovereignty, and Limited National
Government
The Constitution incorporated a theory of separation of powers95
transformed by popular sovereignty.96 'We the People of the United
States" established the Constitution 97 for three principal reasons, all
related to separation of powers. The first was "to secure the Blessings
of Liberty," an overriding goal of separation.98 The second was "to
establish Justice"-the purpose of the rule of law, which had emerged
as perhaps the most important justification for the doctrine.99 The
separate and distinct"); THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 543 (Hamilton) (emphasizing the "cele-
brated maxim requiring a separation of the departments of power").
95 Every plan for government submitted at the Convention rested on separation of
powers. See I FARRAND, supra note 77, at 21-22 (Randolph Plan); 1 id. at 243-44 (Paterson
Plan); 3 id. at 108 (Pinckney's explanation of his plan). The Convention's first substantive
resolution, accepted without debate, was "that a national government ought to be estab-
lished consisting of a supreme legislative, judiciary, and executive." 1 id. at 30; see also 1 id.
at 335. No one at the Convention or Ratification debates questioned that the Constitution
had to be based on this principle.
96 See ACyERMAN, supra note 13, at 216-18; WOOD, supra note 25, at 530-53, 596-609.
The Constitution balanced government power flowing from a People undifferentiated
by class-unlike England's sovereign "King-in-Parliament," which balanced various social
interests. See supra note 47. Nonetheless, the Constitution retained vestiges of mixed-
government theory by providing for the one (the President), the few (the Senate), and the
many (the House of Representatives). See Gwvm, MEwnuo, supra note 21, at 117. None of
those institutions, however, spoke for a particular social class. See 1 WILsON'S WORKs, supra
note 10, at 314-15 ("In the government of the United States, separate orders of men do not
exist .... "). Rather, the Constitution depended on the "republican genius" of the Ameri-
can People. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 39, 55 (Madison); THE FEDERALIST Nos. 36, 60 (Ham-
ilton); see also VixLE, supra note 21, at 134; Wius, supra note 42, at 104-07, 179-84.
97 The Preamble announced the Constitution's "leading principle": that the very exis-
tence of the government "depends upon the supreme authority of the people alone." 2
ELuOT, supra note 17, at 443 (Wilson); see also 2 id. at 434-35, 497-99 (Wilson); THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 84, at 578-79 (Hamilton).
98 See supra note 41 and accompanying text; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 348
(Madison) ("[The] separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government
... is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty.. . ."); 4 fLuOT,
supra note 17, at 73-74 (Iredell).
99 See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text. The Constitution guaranteed the
impartial administration ofjustice by separating Congress's power over general legislation
from the specific execution and application of the law by an independent executive and
judiciary. This rule-of-law rationale undergirds Madison's famous declaration that "[t]he
accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether
of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny." THE FEDERALuST No. 47, at 324; see also id. at
325-26 ("[W]here the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which
possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free con-
stitution, are subverted."); Witis, supra note 42, at 112-15 (stressing the importance of the
rule of law in Publius's view of separation of powers). Other Founders shared this commit-
ment to "a government of laws and not men." See, e.g., 1 WitsoN's Wopxs, supra note 10, at
290.
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third was to resolve the nation's domestic and foreign problems by
instituting an efficient government-another major rationale for
separation. 100
The People delegated far more power to their national govern-
ment so it could achieve its objectives effectively. 1° 1 They prevented
that government (specifically, its legislature) from becoming tyranni-
cal' 0 2 by dividing Congress into two houses'03 and by creating strong
100 U.S. CoNsT. pmbl. (The Constitution aimed "to form a more perfect Union ....
insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, [and] promote the general
Welfare."). See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 2-5 (Jay) (describing foreign dangers facing disunited
America); THE FEDERALIST Nos. 6-9 (Hamilton) (predicting that interstate conflicts would
escalate without a strong union); see also supra note 40 and accompanying text (setting
forth the efficiency justification).
101 See, e.g., 1 ELLIOT, supra note 17, at 498 (Jay) (The Constitution defines that portion
of the national business that the People thought proper to assign to the federal govern-
ment.). Correspondingly, the People granted less of their sovereign power to their state
governments.
Wilson made the argument linking popular sovereignty to both federalism and separa-
tion of powers "[m] ore boldly and more fully than anyone else." WOOD, supra note 25, at
530. According to Wilson, "the supreme power.., resides in the people, as the fountain of
government." See 2 ELLIOT, supra note 17, at 456; see also 2 id. at 432-34, 443, 455, 457-58,
461, 478, 524; 2 FARRAND, supra note 77, at 52, 69; 1 WirSoN's WORKS, supra note 10, at 77,
79, 303-04,.414; 2 id. at 497. The People exercised this power by delegating portions of
their authority to their representatives. See 2 ELLIOT, supra note 17, at 423, 478; 1 WILSON'S
WoRsS, supra note 10, at 317, 402-06. America diffused this "vital principle" of popular
representation throughout its governments. See 2 ELLIOT, supra note 17, at 424-25; 1 WL-
SON'S WORKS, supra note 10, at 311-12. The People could "distribute one portion of power
to the... state government" and "another proportion to the government of the United
States" in "what manner they please." 2 ELLIOT, supra note 17, at 444, 456-57; see also 1
WrLsoN's WORKS, supra note 10, at 73, 401-02. Thus, "[tihe power both of the general
government, and the state governments... [are] emanations of power from the people."
2 ELLIOT, supra note 17, at 502.
Other leading Federalists echoed Wilson's argument that the People could iallocate
power between the federal and state governments, then subdivide this power among three
branches in eaih government, thereby establishing "a double security for the people." 2
ELLIOT, supra note 17, at 257 (Hamilton); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 315 (Madison);
THE FEDERAIiST No. 51, at 323 (Madison); Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 13, at 1443-44,
1449-51, 1493-94.
102 "In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to controul the governed; and
in the next place, oblige it to controul itself." THE FEDERAISr No. 51, at 349 (Madison).
The branch least restrained and most likely to become tyrannical was the legislature, be-
cause "[ifn republican government the legislative authority, necessarily, predominates." &d.
at 350; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 341-42 (Madison); THE FEDERALST No. 71, at 483-
84 (Hamilton). Thus, "it is against the enterprising ambition of [the legislature], that the
people ought to indulge all theirjeaousy and exhaust all their precautions." THE FEDERAL-
iST No. 48, at 334 (Madison). See generally RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT
8-16, 82, 126-27, 132 (1969) (describing the Framers' fear of despotic legislators).
103 Congress was split into a large lower house and a more selective upper chamber-
the familiar English device of bicameralism, except that both the House and Senate repre-
sented the People. See 1 WILSON'S WoRKS, supra note 10, at 414.
Bicameralism was essential to diffuse legislative power. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at
349-50 (Madison); THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 418 (Madison); THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at
425 (Madison); see also 2 ELLIOT, supra note 17, at 445, 447, 454-55, 480 (Wilson) (charac-
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executive and judicial branches. 0 4 Jay summarized this balanced
approach:
The Convention... [formed] a government... sufficiently ener-
getic to raise us from our prostrate and distressed situation... [yet]
perfectly consistent with the liberties of the people .... [The Fram-
ers] not only determined that [the government] should be erected
by, and depend on the people; but remembering the many in-
stances in which governments vested solely in one man, or one body
of men, had degenerated into tyrannies, they judged it most pru-
dent that the three great branches of power should be committed to
different hands.'0 5
a. Separating Power In Coordinate, Independent Branches
With trinitarian symmetry, the Constitution's first three Articles
establish three distinct departments and grant each primary responsi-
bility for exercising one of the three major types of governmental
power.10 6 Article I vests in Congress "legislative powers"-authority to
terizing the legislative branches as "mutual checks"); 1 WuLsoN's WORKS, supra note 10, at
414-16, 431 (Legislative power was divided to avoid congressional extremism and tyranny
and to promote thoughtful lawmaking.). See generally WooD, supra note 25, at 559 (arguing
that Federalists treated bicameralism as another way of achieving the separation-of-powers
goal of dispersing legislative power).
104 See 2 ELuoT, supra note 17, at 445-48 (Wilson) (To prevent "dreadful" legislative
despotism, the Constitution cleaves the legislature and establishes a powerful, independent
President and judiciary.); 2 FAXRuAND, supra note 77, at 79 (Wilson) ("[T]hejoint weight of
the[se] two departments was necessary to balance the.single weight of the Legislature.");
THE FEDERAIIST No. 48, at 333 (Madison) (The Constitution properly gave the executive
and judiciary adequate defenses against the legislature, which "is everywhere extending the
sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex."); 1 FhARNmD, supra
note 77, at 108 (Madison); Amar, Sovereigny, supra note 13, at 1442-43; Sharp, supra note
72, at 393, 396, 408, 435.
105 1 ELuoT, supra note 17, at 496-97; see also 2 id. at 438 (Wilson) (To prevent tyranny,
the People "properly distributed" the powers of government among its "three constituent
parts."); 2 id. at 350 (Hamilton) ("The true principle of government is this-make the
system complete in its structure, give a perfect proportion and balance to its parts, and the
powers you give it will never affect your security."); 2 id. at 348 (Hamilton).
106 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; art. U1, § 2; art. III, § 1; see alto Calabresi & Prakash, supra
note 29, at 559-70 (The Constitution's first three Articles begin with similarly worded
clauses that vest only three kinds of powers-legislative, executive, and judicial-in three
institutions.); id. at 606, 609-10 (describing the Framers' attachment to the idea that all
government was divided into three parts).
Wilson held a particularly rigid and symmetrical view of separation. See, e.g., 2 ELuoT,
supra note 17, at 479 ("[T]he legislative, executive and judicial powers are kept nearly
independent and distinct .... [I]n no constitution ... is this great principle so strictly
adhered to or marked with so much precision and accuracy as in this."); 2 id. at 438, 458-
59, 461, 504-07, 510-14 (urging strict separation); 1 WILSON'S WORKS, supra note 10, at 290-
300, 402 (same). See generally Sharp, supra note 72, at 411-14 (explaining Wilson's theory).
Madison took a more flexible approach. On the one hand, he embraced the "funda-
mental principle of free Govt. that the Legislative, Executive, &Judiciary powers should be
separately exercised." 2 FARRAND, supra note 77, at 56. He also recognized that the Consti-
tution "discriminat[es], the several classes of power, as they may in their nature be legisla-
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make general, prospective rules reflecting the electorate's policy pref-
erences' 0 7-in eighteen areas.' 08 Article II vests in the President "the
executive Power" to administer the laws,10 9 imposes the duty to do so
ive, executive, or judiciary," and protects from interference "the powers properly
belonging to one of the departments." See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 332; see also 6
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 93, at 144. Madison elsewhere reaffirmed that certain powers
inherently fell into one of those three categories. See, e.g., 1 FARRAND, supra note 77, at 67.
On the other hand, Madison argued that maintaining separation in practice required func-
tional blending and other checks, thereby rendering impractical the formulation of exact,
all-inclusive definitions of legislative, executive, andjudicial power. SeeJack N. Rakove, The
Madisonian Moment, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 473, 489-96 (1988) (evaluating Madison's complex
separation theory); infra part I.B.2 (discussing checks and balances).
It does not logically follow, however, that Madison or his colleagues thought that the
Constitution's references to those powers were hopelessly indeterminate, as some have ar-
gued. See, e.g., Alfange, Normalcy, supra note 76, at 711-12; Gwyn, Indeterminacy, supra note
26, at 265-68. If that were so, the Constitution would simply have declared: "Congress can
do X, the President can do Y, and the courts can do Z." Instead, the Framers chose to
begin Articles I, II, and III with the parallel phrases "legislative power," "executive power,"
and "judicial power," presumably intending to convey some meaning thereby. And there
was a common understanding of the basic nature of such powers, which derived its content
from Anglo-American legal experience, as modified by specific constitutional language.
See, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 29, at 561 n.69; see also Martin H. Redish & Eliza-
beth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were To Govern":" The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of
Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 455, 465 (1991) (Articles I, II, and III convey to each
branch a particular type of power and thereby prohibit any department from exercising
power not granted, with specific and limited exceptions.); id. at 453-55, 475-90, 505-06
(proposing a separation-of-powers approach that formally defines each branch's authority
but pragmatically allows those definitions to evolve).
In short, the Framers believed that all governmental powers could be classified as
either legislative, executive, orjudicial and therefore could be divided functionally among
the three departments, even though they disagreed about the proper category in which to
place certain governmental activities. SeeAnn Stuart Anderson, A 1787 Perspective on Separa-
tion of Powers, in SEPARATION OF PowERs-DOES IT STILL WoRuK? 141, 145 (Robert A.
Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1986).
107 See supra note 27 and accompanying text; see also THE FEDERAIST No. 75, at 504
(Hamilton) ("The essence of the legislative authority is to enact laws."); THE FEDERALST
No. 33, at 204 (Hamilton) ("What is a LEGISLATIVE power but a power of making
LAWS?"); TiE FEDEPAiisT No. 78, at 523 (Hamilton) (Congress "prescribes the rules by
which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated."); Redish & Cisar, supra
note 106, at 479 (defining "legislative power" as the promulgation of general standards of
conduct to achieve certain policy ends).
108 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The core legislative powers of taxing and spending are
included. See id. Of special importance is Congress's power to define federal court juris-
diction. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; U.S. CONST. art. Ill, §§ 1-2; see also infra note 179
(discussing this power).
109 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. See THE FEDERALIST No. 72, at 486 (Hamilton) (The Consti-
tution entrusts the President with "[t]he administration of government."); THE FEDERAusT
No. 75, at 504 (Hamilton) (The executive function centers on "execution of the laws."); 6
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 93, at 141, 145-46 ("Executive" power presupposes an existing
law to be carried out.). See generally Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 29, at 579-80 (In Anglo-
American law, the minimalist definition of "executive power" is authority to administer
laws.); Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Preidency, 93 COLUM. L. RPv. 1, 15-16
(1993) [hereinafter Monaghan, Protective] (demonstrating that the Framers shared an un-
derstanding that "executive power" limited the President to executing, rather than making,
laws).
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"faithfully,"n 0 and confers eleven other traditional executive func-
tions.'1 ' Finally, Article III vests in federal courts "the judicial
Power" 2-the authority to expound pre-existing legal rules in a
110 The President must "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 3. Calabresi and Prakash have argued that Article II's initial Vesting Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1, grants the President the executive "power," whereas the Take Care
Clause creates a "duty." Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 29, at 583. The Take Care Clause
was intended to prevent the President from claiming that the "executive power" includes
the ability to suspend or violate a duly enacted and constitutional statute. See id. at 620-21;
Peter M. Shane, The Separation of Powers and the Rule of Law: The Virtues of "Seeing the Trees,"
30 WM. & MARY' L. REv. 375, 380 (1989). Wilson persuasively interpreted the Vesting and
Take Care Clauses as giving the President "authority, not to make, or alter, or dispense
with the laws, but to execute ... the laws, which [are] established." 1 WILSON'S WOPKS,
supra note 10, at 440.
The foregoing evidence refutes Justice Scalia's argument that modem standing doc-
trine serves separation of powers by giving the President absolute discretion over whether
or not to enforce a statute. See infra notes 441-42 and accompanying text.
111 Although some of the President's powers are exclusive (e.g., granting pardons),
most are shared with -Congress (e.g., appointing executive officers and directing military
and foreign affairs). See infta notes 168-70.
Some scholars have argued that the Vesting Clause merely designates the office of the
President and that the content of "executive power" is completely defined in its later provi-
sions (e.g., to make treaties, be Commander-in-Chief, etc.). See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin,
The Imperial Presidency 's New Vestments, 88 Nw. U. L. Ray. 1346, 1363-66 (1994); Lawrence
Lessig & Cass K Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 47-48
(1994). Others view the Vesting Clause as a broad grant of "executive power" to the Presi-
dent that is subsequently qualified by the listed powers, but contend that the President
retains certain unenumerated, residuary powers (for example, to remove all executive of-
ficers at will) as part of the general "executive power" to control the administration of
federal law. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 29, at 570-78; see also Monaghan, Protectiv
supra note 109, at 9-11, 20-31, 39, 48-51 (contending that the President has limited residual
powers to protect U.S. personnel and property, to exercise discretion as to the means of
implementing legislation, and to make foreign policy, but cannot violate the law, invade
private rights absent statutory authorization, or act inconsistently with specific constitu-
tional grants of power to other branches).
Although the Framers understood that workable government requires some exercise
of discretion, they felt that the scope of such discretionary powers had to be narrow. Broad
assertions of "inherent" executive authority conflict with the idea of a limited Constitution
that separates and expressly specifies the powers of government departments. See Redish &
Cisar, supra note 106, at 483-85.
112 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1. Calabresi and Prakash support their argument for
vast executive power by emphasizing that the Vesting Clauses of Articles II and III contain
broad grants of "the executive power" and "the judicial power," whereas Article I vests in
Congress not "the legislative power" generally, but only "legislative Powers herein granted."
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 29, at 563, 570-71, 577-78 (emphasis added). Convention
records, however, indicate that this linguistic variation has no substantive importance. See
Monaghan, Protective, supra note 109, at 22. Professor Pfander has suggested to me that this
wording might reflect the coextensiveness principle: A "herein granted" limit on legislative
power would necessarily restrict executive and judicial power to those same grants, for the
latter two powers could operate only on prior legislative acts. See infra notes 115-16 and
accompanying text.
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particular fact situationll3-in nine types of "Cases" and
"Controversies."114
The Founders accepted the inherent primacy of legislative power:
Without congressional action, the President would have no law to exe-
cute, and the courts no law to expound."15 The exercise of legislative
power, however, was a two-edged sword. If Congress did pass a statute,
it could be executed only by the President and interpreted authorita-
tively only by the courts. Indeed, a Federalist axiom, rooted in the
rule of law, was that "the executive and judicial departments ought to
have power commensurate to the extent of the laws." 1 6
Effective separation demanded that each branch exercise its core
function independently," 17 which the Constitution ensured through
113 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. See, e.g., 1 WILSON'S WORKs, supra
note 10, at 296 ("The judicial authority consists in applying, according to the principles of
right and justice, the constitution and laws to facts and transactions in cases.. . ."); Ander-
son, supra note 106, at 146 (The Convention delegates "agree [d] thatjudicial power meant
expounding the laws, explaining or interpreting them."); Pushaw, supra note 86, at 490-91
(detailing Federalists' consensus that judicial power consisted of expounding laws). The
Framers tried to limit the 18th-century practice of havingjudges perform multiple nonjudi-
cial functions. See, e.g., Russell Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Cour4
1973 Sup. CT. REv. 123, 158.
114 These nine Heads ofJurisdiction arguably constitute an affirmative grant of power
to federal courts to act. See Froomkin, supra note 111, at 1852-57. But see Calabresi &
Prakash, supra note 29, at 571 (Article III's initial Vesting Clause is the sole constitutional
grant of authority to federal courts.).
115 See, e.g., WiLs, supra note 42, at 121, 129; Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 13, at 1443
n.71; see also supra note 28 (In English theory, legislative supremacy meant that its function
had to be exercised first, not that such power was unlimited.). Legislative power was not
merely first in time but also greatest in scope. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 350
(Madison); THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 384 (Madison). Indeed, the Constitution could not
enumerate all legislative powers. See THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 808-05 (Madison). By con-
trast, executive and judicial powers could be more easily cabined because they were appli-
cations of prior legislative acts. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 884 (Madison).
116 2 ELLoT, supra note 17, at 464 (Wilson). For similar statements by Wilson, see 2 id.
at 461 ("For what purpose give the power to make laws, unless they are to be executed? and
if they are to be executed, the executive and judicial powers will be engaged in the busi-
ness."); 2 id. at 445 ("The judicial powers are coextensive with the objects of the national
government ... . "); 1 FARRAND, supra note 77, at 147 ("[TlheJudicial, Legislative, and
Executive departments ought to be commensurate."); see also 1 id. at 124 (Madison) ("An
effectivejudiciary establishment commensurate to the legislative authority, was essential. A
Government without a proper Executive and Judiciary would be the mere trunk of a body
without arms or legs to act or move."); 3 ELuOT, supra note 17, at 532 (same); THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 80, at 585 (Hamilton) (emphasizing "political axiom" that "the judicial power of
a government [must be] co-extensive with its legislative" to ensure uniformity in the inter-
pretation of laws). See Amar, Neo-Federalis4 supra note 18, at 250-52.
In short, although the three branches might not have been equal in power, they were
coordinate in function and equally independent. SeeAnderson, supra note 106, at 151-52.
The current justiciability doctrines have subverted this coextensiveness principle by abdi-
cating judicial review of legislative and executive action. See infra part II.
117 See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, supra note 77, at 34 (Madison) ("If it be essential to the preser-
vation of liberty that the Legisl: Execut: &Judiciary powers be separate, it is essential to a
maintenance of the separation, that they should be independent of each other."); THE
FEDERALIST No. 71, at 488 (Hamilton).
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several provisions. First, each department was selected by a different
method.118 Second, terms were fixed-two years for Representa-
tives, 119 six for Senators,120 four for the President,121 and permanent
tenure for federal judges.122 Third, all federal officers enjoyed guar-
anteed compensation. 123 These and other mechanisms were designed
primarily to shield the executive and judiciary from congressional
influence.
124
118 [T]o lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the dif-
ferent powers of government,... each department should have a will of its
own; and consequently should be so constituted, that the members of each
should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members
of the others.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 348 (Madison). Even though the People were the source of all
power, each part of the government featured a different mode of selection: the House of
Representatives by vote of the People according to population, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3;
the Senate by state legislatures, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3, cls. 1-2 and § 4, cl. 1; the President
by vote of the People through electors, U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, §§ 1-3; and the judiciary
through joint presidential-senatorial appointment, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See 2 ELuOT,
supra note 17, at 438-39 (Wilson).
119 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
120 U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
121 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; see also THE FEDERALST No. 71, at 484-86 (Hamilton) (argu-
ing that a four-year term is long enough to ensure that the President will firmly exercise his
constitutional powers, but short enough to avoid threatening liberty).
122 U.S. CONSr. art. Ill, § 1 (assuringjudicial tenure during "good Behaviour"). Life
tenure was an "excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representa-
tive body [a]nd... the best expedient.., to secure a steady, upright and impartial admin-
istration of the laws." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 522 (Hamilton); see also id. at 524
(Permanent tenure is "the citadel of the public justice and the public security.").
123 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (providing for compensation of Representatives and
Senators); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (The President's salary shall "neither be encreased
nor diminished."); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1 (ensuring that judges' salaries could not
be reduced).
Federalists repeatedly linked the independence of the President and judges to their
fixed compensation. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 348-49 (Madison) ("[T]he mem-
bers of each department should be as little dependent as possible on those of the others,
for the emoluments annexed to their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges,
not independent of the legislature in this particular, their independence in every other
would be merely nominal."). For similar sentiments, see 2 ELLioT, supra note 17, at 446
(Wilson); THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 531 (Hamilton). See generally Pushaw, supra note 36, at
485 n.194 (describing consistent support at the Convention for safeguarding judicial inde-
pendence through tenure and salary guarantees); id. at 492-93 nn.227-28, 497 n.247 (citing
other sources on judicial independence).
124 For example, members of the executive and judiciary were prohibited from simul-
taneously holding seats in Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; see also Steven G. Cala-
bresi &Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel?,
79 CotNEL. L. Rav. 1045 (1994) (examining the history and purpose of the "Incompatibil-
ity Clause" prohibition against multiple officeholding). Similarly, members of Congress
cannot be appointed to executive or judicial offices that are created (or given salary in-
creases) during their legislative tenure. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; see also 1 WILSON'S
WoRKs, supra note 10, at 322 (praising this "Ineligibility Clause"). See generally infra notes
463-64 and accompanying text (criticizing the modern Court's denial of standing to citi-
zens who claim that the government has violated the Incompatibility and Ineligibility
Clauses).
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b. The Executive and Judiciary as the People's Representatives
Federalists boldly claimed that all three departments of govern-
ment represented the People, 25 albeit through the exercise of differ-
ent functions.' 26 In the words of Wilson, the earliest and most
forceful proponent of this representational principle: "The executive
and judicial powers are now drawn from the same source... [as] the
legislative authority: they who execute, and they who administer the
laws, are as much the servants, and therefore as much the friends of
the people, as they who make them."1 27 This theme was echoed by
The Framers expressed little concern that the executive or judiciary might threaten
the independence of the legislature. Nonetheless, the Constitution does protect Con-
gress's independence in various ways. See, e.g., U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 5 (Each House deter-
mines its membership and procedures.); U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (granting members of
Congress "privilege[ I from Arrest" during legislative session and immunity from "ques-
tion[ing] in any other Place" about "any Speech or Debate").
125 See supra notes 88-92, 96-97, 101, 105 and accompanying text; see also WOOD, supra
note 25, at 549 ("[B]ecause the Federalists considered 'every branch of the constitution
and government to be popular' and regarded the president, Senate, and even thejudiciary
as well as the House of Representatives as somehow all equal agents of the people's will,
they could more easily than their opponents justify the separation and protection of each
branch 'by the strongest provisions.. . .'") (citations omitted); Akhil R. Amar, Philadelphia
Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Artide V, 55 U. CI. L. REv. 1043, 1085-86 (1988)
("All three branches of government derive, with various degrees of direcmess, from the
People; all three are agencies of the People. No branch, or combination of branches, can
uniquely claim to speak for the People themselves; no branch is uniquely representative.
Each represents the People in a different and ultimately problematic way."). For similar
statements, see ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 181-83, 186; Edward H. Levi, Some Aspects of
Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. RFv. 371, 376-77, 385-86 (1976).
126 "IThe whole people of the United States are to be trebly represented in [the Constitu-
tion] in three different modes of representation.. . ." Letters of Fabius (John Dickinson)
(1788), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CoNswrrnrrIoN OF THE UNITED STATES 178 (Paul L.
Ford ed., 1888).
127 See 1 WILSON'S WORxs, supra note 10, at 293; see also 1 id. at 73 ("[E]very citizen
elects the legislative, and he takes a personal share in the executive and judicial depart-
ments .... ."); 1 id. at 317 ("[T]he powers of magistrates, call them by whatever name you
please, are the grants of the people."); 2 Etuo-t, supra note 17, at 478-79, 482 (The People
exercise supreme power through representation in the legislative, executive, and judicial
departments.). See generally 1 WILsON'S WORKS, supra note 10, at 39 (editor's comment)
(Wilson argued that "all branches of government represent the people: the pronounce-
ments of the judiciary, no less than the enactments of the legislature, speak with [their]
sovereign authority."); WooD, supra note 25, at 530, 596-603 (discussing Wisonian repre-
sentation doctrine).
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Madison, 128 Jay,129 Hamilton, 30 and Iredell.' 31 Indeed, the Federal-
ists' original contribution to separation-of-powers theory was the alter-
ation of executive and judicial power through popular sovereignty.'3 2
First, while Locke and Montesquieu had insisted that the execu-
tive must be a hereditary monarch, and early American governments
had required his legislative appointment, 33 the Constitution provided
for election of the President. 3 4 Thus, the President would be the
"representative of the people" and account directly to them. 3 5
Second, Federalists introduced the radical notion that federal
judges derived their power from the People, 36 even though they were
not elected to ensure their quality.'37 The Constitution established
128 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 339 ("[T]he people are the only legitimate foun-
tain of power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter, under which the several
branches of government hold their power, is derived...."); THE FEDERALIs-r No. 39, at 251-
52 (The Constitution is truly republican because all government officials, includingjudges,
"derive[ ) all [their] powers directly or indirectly from.., the people.").
129 [T]hejudgments of our courts, and the commissions constitutionally given
by our [executive], are as valid and as binding on all persons whom they
concern, as the laws passed by our legislature are. All constitutional acts of
power, whether in the executive or in the judicial departments, have as
much legal validity and obligation as if they proceeded from the legislature
.... [T]he people may with much propriety commit the power to a distinct
body from the legislature, the executive or judicial.
THE FEDLRAUST No. 64, at 436; see also 1 ELuOT, supra note 17, at 498 ("The proposed
Government is to be the government of the people: all its offices are to be their offices,
and to exercise no rights but such as the people commit to them.").
130 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 578 (The Constitution is "founded upon the
power of the people, and executed by their immediate representatives and servants."); THE
FEDERALIST No. 28, at 178 ("[T]he whole power of the proposed government is to be in the
hands of the representatives of the people.").
131 See, e.g., 4 ELLIOT, supra note 17, at 148 (The Constitution is "a declaration of partic-
ular powers by the people to their representatives, for particular purposes."); 4 id. at 9-10
("The people are known with certainty to have originated [the government] themselves.
Those in power are their servants and agents....").
132 See Gwv,, MEANING, supra note 21, at 123-26; WooD, supra note 25, at 596-606.
133 See supra notes 29-32, 47, 51, 75-76, 80, 87 and accompanying text.
134 U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1-3. The President was elected indirectly through the Electo-
ral College, which could not include members of Congress. RL This electoral system was
designed to make the President independent of all but "the People," who would choose
distinguished electors to select the President. See THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 458-61 (Hamil-
ton); see also 1 FARRAND, supra note 77, at 69 (Madison) (arguing that this mode of choos-
ing the President would ensure his independence from both Congress and the states).
135 See 2 ELuOT, supra note 17, at 253 (Hamilton); see also 4 id. at 74 (Iredell); THE
FEDERALIST No. 70, at 472, 476-80 (Hamilton); THE FEDERALiST No. 69, at 463, 470 (Hamil-
ton); 1 WILSON'S WoRS, supra note 10, at 319 (The President is the "accountable magis-
trate of a free and great people.").
136 See, e.g., 1 WILSON'S WORs, supra note 10, at 329 (stressing that "the people" have
"vested" in federal courts "thejudicial Power of the United States"). The Court's modem
justiciability doctrines, which assume that only Congress and the President represent the
People, reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the implications of popular sovereignty
for judicial power. See infra part II.
137 Although in principle the chief officials of all government departments should
have been elected so that none was dependent on another for selection, in practice the
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'Judicial power" as a distinct part of government (as Montesquieu rec-
ommended, contrary to English theory) and vested it in independent
courts (following British practice, which Montesquieu criticized).138
Because the judiciary could not threaten the People's liberty'3 9 unless
it was united with executive or legislative power, the Constitution im-
munized federal judges from political branch influence. 14°
That independence was especially critical for courts charged with
deciding "all Cases . . . arising under this Consituion"' 4 1-the
People could not discern the "peculiar qualifications" needed in ajudge; thus, the Consti-
tution ensured their quality by providing for presidential appointment with the Senate's
advice and consent. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; THE FEDERAUST No. 51, at 348 (Madison); see
also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 529-30 (Hamilton) (defending this method for selecting
judges).
188 See supra notes 34-35, 55-64 and accompanying text.
139 [T]hejudiciary, from the nature of its furnctions, will always be the least dan-
gerous to the political rights of the constitution; because it will be least in a
capacity to annoy or injure them .... [It has] neither Force [i.e., executive
power] nor Will [i.e., legislative power], but merelyjudgment; and must ulti-
mately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its
judgments.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 522-23 (Hamilton).
Hamilton asserted that "the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three
departments," relying upon Montesquieu's statement that "'of the three powers above
mentioned, the JUDICIARY is next to nothing.'" Id. at 523 (citation omitted). Hamilton
distorted Montesquieu's argument, which was that the judicial power became insignificant
only when it was given to temporary tribunals. To Montesquieu, vestingjudicial power in
permanent courts posed a grave threat to liberty. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying
text.
140 [T]hough individual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts
ofjustice, the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from
that quarter... so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the
legislative and executive. For I agree [with Montesquieu] that "there is no
liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and
executive powers."
THE FEDERALIsT No. 78, at 523 (Hamilton).
Other leading Federalists echoed this rule-of-law theme that an independent judiciary
was needed to avoid tyranny:
[If] the legislative and judicial powers united... [t]he lives, liberties, and
properties of the citizens would be committed to arbitrary judges, whose de-
cisions would, in effect, be dictated by their own private opinions, and would
not be governed by any fixed or known principles of law .... Let us suppose
a union of the executive and judicial powers: this union might soon be an
overbalance for the legislative authority... [and become] an engine of tyr-
anny and injustice.
1 WILsoN's WoRs, supra note 10, at 298; see also THE FEDERAIST No. 47, at 326 (Madison)
(quoting Montesquieu to similar effect).
Judicial independence was assured through guaranteed tenure and salary. See 2 EL-
LiOT, supra note 17, at 480-81, 489 (Wilson); THE FEDERALIST NOS. 78-79 (Hamilton); see also
1 WILSoN's WoRus, supra note 10, at 297 ("In their salaries, and in their offices, they ought
to be completely independent: in other words, they should be removed from the most
distant apprehension of being affected, in their judicial character and capacity, by any
thing, except their own behavior and its consequences.").
141 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178-79
(1803) (The Framers could not have intended "[t]hat a case arising under the constitution
should be decided without examining the instrument under which it arises.");, BERGER,
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"supreme Law."142 As Hamilton argued, impartial judges assigned the
function of expounding the law-which included the written Consti-
tution143-had to invalidate political branch actions that exceeded
the restrictions the People had placed on those departments. 144
Otherwise, those limitations (for example, the bars against ex post facto
laws and bills of attainder) "would amount to nothing."145
supra note 102, at 198-222 (arguing that judicial review derives from "arising under"
language).
142 U.S. CONSr. art VI. Article VI makes "this Constitution," which necessarily includes
the limits on the political branches established in Articles I and II, "the supreme Law."
Although Article VI is typically viewed through the lens of federalism, it also serves the
separation-of-powers purpose of requiring federal government officials to make laws "in
Pursuance" of the Constitution. See, e.g., Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180; BERGER, supra
note 102, at 228-34; 4 ELLIOT, supra note 17, at 178-79 (Iredell); Wius, supra note 42, at
143; Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 2-
5 (1959). For contrary arguments, see, e.g., BicKEt, supra note 5, at 8-11; Dean Alfange,
Jr., Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandings of Judicial Review, 1993 Sup. Cr. REv.
329, 417-18 [hereinafter Alfange, Marbury].
143 "The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A
constitution is in fact, and must be, regarded by the judges as a fundamental law." THE
FEDERAL.ST No. 78, at 525 (Hamilton); see also REDISH, supra note 7, at 79-80 (A written
constitution is positive law that imposes concrete limits on the government.).
144 Hamilton based judicial review on the "general theory of a limited constitution."
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 543; see also THE FEDERAaSr No. 78, at 526 (Independent courts
are "the bulwarks of a limited constitution against legislative encroachments."); id. at 525
("[C]ourts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legisla-
ture.., to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority."). See generally
RDIsH, supra note 7, at 79-84 (Judicial review by an independentjudiciay is not compelled
by the Constitution's text or history, but rather is a logical and practical necessity to main-
tain limited democracy under a written constitution.); Philip B. Kurland, The Rise and Fall
of the "Doctrine" of Separation of Powers, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 592, 599-600 (1986) (asserting that
the American invention ofjudicial review was essential to maintain its limited Constitution
based on separation of powers).
145 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524 (Hamilton). Hamilton argued that "[Il] imitations of
this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of the courts
ofjustice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the
constitution void." Id. (emphasis added). This statement could be interpreted to mean
thatjudicial review would be warranted only to uphold those few constitutional provisions
that expressly prohibit Congress from infringing individual rights, i.e., the prohibitions
against ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, and suspension of habeas corpus. See Anderson,
supra note 106, at 154, 166 n.57.
Elsewhere, however, Hamilton repeatedly stressed that courts must "guard the consti-
tution and the rights of individuals." THE FEDERauST No. 78, at 527 (emphasis added); see
also id. at 529. This language suggests that some enforceable constitutional provisions do
not involve individual rights. See Theodore Y. Blumoff, Judicial Review, Foreign Affairs and
Legislative Standing, 25 GA. L. REv. 227, 256-58 (1991); cf. Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 13, at
1440 (The limitations on the national government consist of both express prohibitions and
finite delegations of power.). Moreover, nothing in the Constitution implies that only its
clauses protecting individual liberty-rather than its structural principles like separation of
powers-bind the political branches. On the contrary, the original Constitution consisted
almost entirely of structural provisions designed to prevent tyranny (and thus lacked a Bill
of Rights), which suggests that the Framers contemplated that judicial review would extend
to such structural matters. See RaDISH, supra note 7, at 83-84. See generally infranotes 457-64
and accompanying text (criticizing the modern Court's standing doctrine, which presumes
that the Constitution's structural provisions arejudicially unenforceable).
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Indeed, under the rule-of-law maxim that "no man ought cer-
tainly to be a judge in his own cause, or in any cause in.... which he
has the least interest or bias,"146 only courts could fairly adjudicate
cases challenging an act of Congress or the President's execution of
that statute. 147 Hamilton captured this rationale and foreshadowed
the political question doctrine:
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitu-
tional judges of their own powers and that the construction they put
upon them is conclusive upon the other departments, it may be an-
swered, that this cannot be the natural presumption, where it is not
collected from any particular provisions in the constitution.
48
Moreover, judicial review was perfectly consistent with popular sover-
eignty, for it
[does not] suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative
power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to
both; and that where the will of the legislature declared in statutes,
stands in opposition to that of the people declared in the constitu-
tion, the judges ought to be governed by the latter, rather than the
former. 49
146 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 538 (Hamilton); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 59
(Madison) ("[N]o man is allowed to be ajudge in his own cause.").
147 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524-25 (Hamilton); see also REDISH, Supra note 7, at 5,
81 (The rule of law dictates that the independentjudiciary have final interpretive authority
over the Constitution.); WiLLs, supra note 42, at 133, 148-50 (linking the rule of law to the
judiciary's power to review legislative acts); Verkuil, supra note 43, at 304, 308, 322 (assert-
ing that an impartial judiciary is the key to the rule of law). This rationale also required
independent courts-not the political departments-to decide controversies in which the
United States itself was a party. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 534, 540 (Hamilton).
The rule of law suggests that the Court cannot ultimately judge its own Article Il
powers. See Alfange, Marbury, supra note 142, at 431-33 (Because the Constitution limits all
the branches, giving unreviewable authority to any one department (e.g., the judiciary) to
interpret the entire Constitution would enable that branch to ignore the limits the Consti-
tution places on its power.). However, the rule of law recognizes a "necessity" exception,
and the need to ensure judicial independence might require not permitting the political
branches to have the final say on the constitutional limits to judicial power. See REDIsH,
supra note 7, at 82.
148 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524-25 (Hamilton). Thus, Hamilton acknowledged that
the rule-of-law presumption favoring judicial review of political branch acts can be rebut-
ted where the Constitution itself precludes judicial involvement-subjects that came to be
deemed "political questions." See generally infra part I.C.4 (describing the development of
the political question doctrine by FederalistJustices). Modem scholars have ignored this
passage in arguing that Hamilton advocated judicial review of the entire Constitution; on
the contrary, he recognized exceptions for certain provisions. See generally infra part II.B.4
(contending that the reintroduction of Hamilton's "rebuttable presumption" analysis
would clarify the political question doctrine).
149 THE FEDERALUST No. 78, at 525 (Hamilton).
No legislative act therefore contrary to the constitution can be valid. To
deny this would be to affirm that.., the representatives of the people are
superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers may
do not only what their powers do not authorise, but what they forbid ....
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Hamilton expressed the shared understanding about judicial
review.'
50
c. Limits on Judicial Power
Neither judicial review nor the power to interpret harsh statutes
equitably' 51 made federal courts omnipotent. Like all government
[T] he Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the
people to the intention of their agents.
Id. at 524-25; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 53, at 360-61 (Madison) (The Constitution is
"established by the people, and unalterable by the government," which is limited "by the
authority of a paramount constitution."); 2 FARRAND, supra note 77, at 78-74, 76, 78
(Madison) (approving judicial review and denying that it made judicial power supreme
over legislative); see also WiLLs, supra note 42, at 126-35, 156-61 (explaining Publius's argu-
ment that the direct, democratic legislative act of ratifying the Constitution prevailed over
the indirect act of statute-making); see generay ACKERmAN, supra note 13, at 191-94 (con-
tending that judicial review prevents Congress from changing the People's Constitution
through ordinary lawmaking).
Wilson had set forth a similar argument at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention-
that the power of the People expressed in the Constitution was superior to mere legislative
acts, and therefore independent federal judges had to invalidate laws that exceeded consti-
tutional boundaries. See 2 ELLiOr, supra note 17, at 445-46, 478, 489; see also 2 FARRAND,
supra note 77, at 73, 391 (Wilson); 1 WIuSON'S WORS, supra note 10, at 43, 186, 300, 329-
80; 2 id. at 455-56.
150 See supra notes 91-92, 149 (describing approval ofjudicial review by Madison and
Wilson). At the Convention, judicial review was accepted by delegates of all political
stripes. See Engdahl, supra note 91, at 283-84; Pushaw, supra note 36, at 492 (citing
sources). The only question was whether federal courts needed the additional power of
serving with executive officials on a Council of Revision to review the wisdom andjustice of
legislative bills. See Pushaw, supra note 36, at 482 n.178, 490-91; Sharp, supra note 72, at
424-25; see also WiL.s, supra note 42, at 151 (arguing that Madison Elearly accepted judicial
review at the time of the framing, but may have changed his mind later duringJefferson's
conflict with the federal courts). During Ratification, both sides agreed that the Constitu-
tion authorized judicial review. The dispute was whether this power was a reason to ratify it
(as the Federalists argued) or reject it (the Antifederalist position). See, e.g., Engdahl, supra
note 91, at 284 nn.9-10 and accompanying text. After the Constitution had been ratified,
however, it could not reasonably be argued that this power was not conferred. See WiLs,
supra note 42, at 130.
Significantly, no future Supreme CourtJustice who participated in either the framing
or ratification of the Constitution denied the power ofjudicial review, and many expressly
defended it. See, e.g., supra notes 16, 91 (Iredell); supra note 17 (Marshall); supra note 91
(Blair); supra note 129 (Jay); supra note 149 (Wilson); see also 2 ELLIOT, supra note 17, at
196 (Ellsworth).
In short, the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates the contemporaneous under-
standing that the Constitution included the power of judicial review. See BERGER, supra
note 102. The problem is not the existence of this power, but rather its exercise, which has
not conformed to the original understanding that it would be used only to negate clear
violations of the Constitution.
151 See, e.g., THE FEDERAUST No. 78, at 528 (Hamilton) (Where particular "classes of
citizens" were injured "by unjust and partial laws," judicial independence was "of vast im-
portance in mitigating the severity, and confining the operation of such laws."); 2 WsoN's
WoRuS, supra note 10, at 478, 486 (approving equitable interpretation of statutes); Rutgers
v. Waddington (N.Y. City Mayor's Ct. 1784) (unreported) (Duane, C.J.), reprinted in 1 Ju-
LIus GOEBEL, THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 393-419 (1964) (disregarding a
general statute the effect of which in a particular case was deemed unreasonable and unin-
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agents, judges were "limited" in the sense that they could exercise
only those powers delegated by the People. Article III granted federal
courts exclusively 'judicial" power, which imported two major restric-
tions. First, courts could act not on their own initiative but only at the
request of a party in a public "judicial" proceeding152 -for example, a
prerogative writ procedure, an informer or relator action, a private
law cause of action, an appeal, or any other recognizable judicial
form. 53 Second,judges had authority to expound existing law, not to
make new law.' 54 Thus, courts could only invalidate statutes that
tended by the legislature because it conflicted with both the law of nations and a treaty); see
also supra note 36 (describing equitable interpretation power in England).
152 During the Convention, a colloquy between Madison andJohnson over extending
federal jurisdiction to cases arising under the Constitution ended with the observation that
it was "generally supposed that the jurisdiction given was constructively limited to cases of a
Judiciary nature." 2 FARRAND, supra note 77, at 430. This comment suggests a shared un-
derstanding that constitutional adjudication would be restricted to familiar judicial forms.
153 "Judicial power" included not only private law disputes, but also public law actions
challenging allegedly illegal government conduct that did not affect a plaintiff's personal
interests. See supra notes 37-38. For example, English and pre-1787 American practice
permitted legislatures to authorize informer and relator suits. See supra note 38. Congress
has granted federal courts such jurisdiction since the beginning of the Republic without
any real question as to constitutionality. See generally Winter, supra note 33, at 1406-08 (dis-
cussing informer actions in early state and federal practice).
Prerogative writs (e.g., mandamus, certiorari, and quo warranto), however, raise the
more difficult issue of whether judicial power to use them is inherent or must be author-
ized by statute. The King's Bench, which assisted the Crown in exercising executive power,
had discretion to grant prerogative writs against executive officials and lower courts (as
opposed to Parliament or the king himself) who exceeded their legal authority or failed to
perform their duties. See supra note 33. Because America lacked royalty and severed the
judiciary from the executive, federal courts did not have an English-style "prerogative" to
issue writs. Thus, writs seemingly had to be authorized by Congress.
Such control raises potentially grave separation-of-powers problems because Congress
could violate the Constitution with impunity in many instances simply by withholding writ
power. In this vein, Professor Berger has argued that the Framers intended to retain all
traditional judicial mechanisms to check legislative oppression, including discretionary
prerogative writs. Berger, supra note 33, at 827-40. If Berger was suggesting that federal
courts have inherent "judicial power" to issue such writs directly to members of Congress,
that would have been a sharp break from the tradition that writs did not lie against legisla-
tors. But if he meant that a citizen should be able to obtain a prerogative writ against an
executive officer who is attempting to implement a statute that allegedly exceeds Con-
gress's enumerated powers, that would be consistent with both established practice and
Federalist separation-of-powers principles. The First Congress avoided constitutional con-
flicts on this issue by granting federal courts general prerogative writ authority. See infra
note 197.
154 See, e.g., 2 WILSON'S WORxS, supra note 10, at 502 (Ajudge's duty is "not to make the
law, but to interpret and apply it."). See generally Engdahl, supra note 91, at 294-96 (summa-
rizing statements of this concept); id. at 289-97 (maintaining that Federalists did not antici-
pate the difficulty of applying the law-interpretation model to the Constitution or how
politics would influence constitutional decisions).
Professor Redish has argued that the judicial function is further limited to the resolu-
tion of a live, adversary dispute. REDISH, supra note 7, at 5, 88-90, 104, 109. Although I
concur with Redish that a live dispute is a sufficient predicate for the exercise of judicial
power, I disagree that it is a necessary precondition. See Pushaw, supra note 36; see also supra
notes 33, 37-38, 153 and accompanying text.
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clearly conflicted with the Constitution.155 . Correspondingly, judges
had to construe laws to avoid constitutional questions 56 and could
not
on the pretence of a repugnancy,... substitute their own pleasure
to the constitutional intentions of the legislature .... The courts
must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to
exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would
equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative
body.' 57
As long as federal courts exercised only "judicial" power within
Article III's enumerated categories, 58 however, they were not "lim-
ited" in the sense of occupying an inferior position in the tripartite
system. On the contrary, the Constitution created, in Madison's
words, three "perfectly co-ordinate" branches. I' 9
2. Checking and Balancing the Federal Government's Power
Madison and his colleagues did not simply "mark with precision
the boundaries of the[ ] departments in the Constitution" and "trust
... these parchment barriers" to prevent one branch from exceeding
its limits or usurping another's authority.a60 Nor did they include in
the Constitution a provision requiring absolute separation of powers,
for Montesquieu and his model government, England, had recog-
155 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 525 (Hamilton) (stating that only an "irreconcilable
variance" between the Constitution and a statute would justify invalidation of the latter);
id. at 524 (Federal courts must "declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the consti-
tution void."); THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 543 (Hamilton) (Courts must void statutes that
are in "evident opposition" to the Constitution.). See Engdahl, supra note 91, at 289-90
(citing sources).
156 This interpretive canon reflects the general principle thatjudges should harmonize
two apparently conflicting laws "[s]o far as they can by any fair construction be reconciled
with each other." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 525-26 (Hamilton).
157 Id. at 526 (Hamilton). One means of inhibiting such judicial usurpation was the
requirement thatjudges provide reasons for their decisions. See supra note 39 and accom-
panying text.
158 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 560 (Hamilton)
(Federal courts are limited to "certain cases particularly specified."); THE FEDERALIST No.
80 (Hamilton) (same).
159 THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 339 (Madison). The foregoing discussion refutes the
contention that judicial review is illegitimate because "the theoretical and historical evi-
dence is that popular sovereignty and self-government have always been coincident with
legislative supremacy." Anderson, supra note 106, at 152. The modem justiciability doc-
trines pervert Madisonian ideas by positing a uniquely limited, rather than coordinate, role
for federal courts. See infra part II.
160 See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 332-33 (Madison); see also id. at 338 ("[A] mere de-
markation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments, is not a
sufficient guard against those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of




nized the "impossibility and inexpediency" of "totally separate and dis-
tinct" branches. 16' Rather, the Constitution
maintain [s] in practice the necessary partition of power among the
several departments... by so contriving the interior structure of the
government, as that its several constituent parts may, by their mu-
tual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper
places.' 6
2
This structure rests on each branch's independence and on their dif-
ferent constituencies, main functions, and modes of action.1 63
The Framers also gave each department the means to resist en-
croachments through checks-specific, limited rights to share in (or
interfere with) the functions of another branch. 64 The Federalists
adopted and modified the two classic English checks. First, like the
king, the President had discretion to veto legislation, but this power
161 THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324-27 (Madison). The First Congress's rejection of an
explicit constitutional provision requiring separation of powers reflects a desire to main-
tain flexibility in blending certain governmental functions. See infra notes 162-63, 170 and
accompanying text; Casper, supra note 72, at 221-22, 235-36. Consequently, there can be
no doctrine of separation of powers in the same sense as, for example, there is a doctrine
of due process. Rather, separation of powers is a structural principle based on a theory of
government. See Kurland, supra note 144, at 602-03; Verkuil, supra note 43, at 307; see also 1
KENNETH C. DAVIS & RicHARDJ. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATIsE 40 (3d ed. 1994);
E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence is So Abysmal 57 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 506 (1987).
162 SeeTHE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 347-48 (Madison); see also AcPRMAN, supra note 13, at
188-91, 224, 252 (explaining that the division of powers and checks and balances were
intended to prevent factions from subverting the general good of the People); VILE, supra
note 21, at 122, 134, 144, 153-54, 157, 160 (The Framers' achievement was the creation of a
practical system of government fusing separation of powers with checks and balances.).
163 See supra part I.B.1.a; see also HaroldJ. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of
Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. Rv. 1253, 1258-72 (1988) (arguing that the Founders pro-
moted accountability primarily by limiting each branch to a specific mode of action in
exercising its core function).
164 [T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in
the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each de-
partment, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist
encroachments of the others .... A dependence on the people is no doubt
the primary controul on the government; but experience has taught man-
kind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
[The Constitution's] policy of supplying.., opposite and rival interests
... aim[s] ... to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as
that each may be a check on the other ....
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (Madison); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 332 (Madison)
("[U]nless these departments be so far connected and blended, as to give each a constitu-
tional controul over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires as
essential to a free government, can never in practice, be duly maintained."); 4 ELLiOT,
supra note 17, at 74 (Iredell) (pointing out that separation of powers "would have very little
efficacy if each power had no means to defend itself against the encroachments of the
others"); 2 id. at 510-11 (Wilson) (same); 2 id. at 302 (Hamilton); see also WiLLS, supra note
42, at 119 ("Checks and balances have to do with corrective invasion of the separated
powers."); Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 13, at 1143-44 (describing the nature and purpose
of checks).
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could now be overridden by a two-thirds vote of Congress. 165 Second,
the Constitution incorporated British impeachment procedures, au-
thorizing the lower legislative house to impeach executive officials
and judges and the upper chamber to exercise judicial power by try-
ing these cases and rendering a final, unreviewablejudgment. 166 Un-
165 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; cf. supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing the
king's absolute veto). Federalists argued that this limited veto was more consistent with
separation of powers because Congress retained ultimate legislative authority; the Presi-
dent could merely force bills to be reconsidered, thereby improving their quality. See, e.g.,
2 ELLIOT, supra note 17, at 446-47 (Wilson) (The president's "qualified negative" helps to
restrain legislative power and produce better laws.); THE FEDERAuST No. 73 (Hamilton)
(contending that the limited veto protects the President against legislative usurpation and
promotes stable laws); 4 ELLIOT, supra note 17, at 74-75 (Iredell) (same); see also WOOD,
supra note 25, at 435-36, 452-53, 552-53, 587; infra note 552 and accompanying text (show-
ing that the President's exercise of the veto power is not judicially reviewable).
166 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; see also THE FEDERALIST No.
65, at 440 (Hamilton) (stressing the Framers' adoption of the English impeachment
model); id. at 440 (Dividing prosecutorial and judging functions between the legislative
houses promotes fairness.); supra note 52 (explaining British impeachment proceedings).
Impeachment was limited to "[o]fficers of the United States" accused of "Treason, Bribery,
or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 4.
Federalists viewed impeachments as inherently political and hence committed to the
complete discretion of the most political branch, the legislature. See, e.g., THE FEDERAIJST
No. 65, at 43940 (Hamilton) (Impeachments "may with peculiar propriety be denomi-
nated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself,"
and thus are left to Congress.); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrrUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES §§ 744-45, 748, 762-64, 783, 795, 798, 801 (1833); 1 WILSON'S WORKS,
supra note 10, at 324, 399; see also MichaelJ. Gerhardt, Rediscovering Nonjusticiability: Judicial
Review of Impeachments After Nixon, 44 Du'E LJ. 231, 255-57 (1994) (demonstrating the
Framers' consensus that impeachment was entrusted solely to Congress).
In impeachment proceedings, the Senate (like the House of Lords) acts as a "court"
exercising "judicial power": The Senate must "try" impeachments and can "convict[ ]" fed-
eral officers by rendering a "Judgment" in a "Case[ ]." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cls. 6-7; see
also CHARL.ES L. BLAcK, JR, IMPEAcHMENT 9-10 (1974) (arguing that the Senate functions as
ajudicial tribunal in impeachments); Fritz ScharpfJudicida Review and the Political Question:
A FunctionalAnalysis, 75 YALE LJ. 517, 539-40 (1966) (same). Federalists understood that a
court's judicial judgments are final and unreviewable, even where the tribunal happens to
be composed of legislators. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 398 (1798) (Ire-
dell,J.); see also 2 STORY, supra, § 803, at 273 ("[T]he final decision of [constitutional ques-
tions] . . . may be reasonably left to the high tribunal, constituting the court of
impeachment."); 2 id. § 809, at 277 ("[J]udgments upon impeachment.., when once
pronounced.., become absolute and irreversible."); Vik D. Amar, Note, The Senate and the
Constitution, 97 YALE LJ. 1111, 1114-15 (1988) (noting resjudicata effect of impeachment
court's judgment).
Finally, analysis of Article Ill reinforces the conclusion that the judiciary cannot inter-
fere with impeachment determinations. Section 2, Clause 1 grants "judicial Power" to fed-
eral courts in nine specified categories, which do not include impeachments;
impeachment is treated separately. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (excepting "Cases of
Impeachment" from the guarantee of a jury trial). Nor can the Court review impeach-
ments pursuant to its appellate jurisdiction over federal question "Cases, in Law and Eq-
uity," because impeachments fall into neither category. See BLAcK, supra, at 55-56 (arguing
that Article II grants the Supreme Court neither original nor appellate jurisdiction over
impeachments); Gerhardt, supra, at 234, 261, 272-73 (same).
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like the House of Lords, which could impose criminal penalties, the
Senate could only remove and disqualify a guilty official.
16 7
The Constitution also required the President to share with the
Senate certain powers formerly considered exclusively executive-for
example, appointing federal officers and judges168 and conducting
In short, there is no affirmative textual or historical evidence that the Framers ex-
pected federal courts to have any role in adjudicating impeachments. See Gerhardt, supra,
at 252-57; see also BLAcK, supra, at 28-24, 59-61.
Nevertheless, Professor Berger has argued that, in establishing judicial review as a
check on legislative abuses, the Framers intended no exception for impeachments. See
BERGER, supra note 52, at 103-20. He deems unreviewable congressional power over im-
peachments to be unthinkable under our Constitution's limited government based on sep-
aration of powers. Id. at 116-18. For example, Berger quotes Hamilton's statement that "it
,cannot be the natural presumption' that the 'legislative body are themselves the constitu-
tional judges of their own powers... It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were
designed... to keep the [legislature] within the limits assigned to their authority.'" Id. at
116 n.62 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78). Berger's ellipsis, however, deletes the crucial
qualifier that this "presumption" can be overcome by "particular provisions in the constitu-
tion." THE FEDERALuST No. 78, at 525 (Hamilton); see also supra note 148. Although Hamil-
ton did not specify which constitutional provisions he had in mind, the clauses from
Articles I, II, and Ill cited above suggest that impeachments were an obvious example-a
conclusion buttressed by Hamilton's analysis of impeachment elsewhere. See, e.g., THE FED-
ERAST No. 65, at 439-41; THE FEDERALiST No. 79, at 532-33; THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 545-
46 (explaining that lodging the power to impeach, try, and punish judges solely in Con-
gress constitutes an effective check against judicial misconduct).
Similarly, Professor Berger quotes Justice Iredell's statement that "'[t]he whole judi-
cial power of the government is vested in the judges of the United States... to themselves
it belongs to explain the law and the Constitution.'" BERGER, supra note 52, at 111 n.43
(citing Iredell'sjury instruction in a 1799 case). Elsewhere, however, Iredell recognized an
exception for impeachment. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 398 (1798) (Ire-
dell, J.); Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 413 n.(a) (C.C.D.N.C. 1792).
Thus, even those Federalists most committed to judicial review (e.g., Hamilton, Iredell,
and Story) understood that this practice did not include impeachments, and their practical
and theoretical arguments make as much sense today as they did two centuries ago. See
infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
167 U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. Impeachable conduct that also constituted a crime was
subject to a separate proceeding in an ordinary court. Id. This arrangement promoted the
rule of law by providing the accused official with two different decisionmakers, rather than
"making the same persons Judges in both cases." See THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 442
(Hamilton).
Another modification of English practice was that the Chief Executive could now be
impeached. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, supra
note 77, at 64-69, 551 (discussing the need to allow impeachment of the President); ef.
supra note 52 (noting the king's immunity from impeachment).
168 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cL. 2. Appointment was traditionally viewed as a core execu-
tive power intimately related to executing the laws, as leading Federalists acknowledged.
See 1 FARRAND, supra note 77, at 66 (Wilson) (The only powers "strictly Executive were
those of executing the laws, and appointing officers."); see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463
(Madison) (J. Gales ed., 1789). Nonetheless, they defended the Senate's role in appoint-
ments as fostering deliberative choices that in turn would lead to good administration. See,
e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 513 (Hamilton).
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foreign affairs.' 6 9 In short, the politically accountable branches
shared responsibility for policymaking. 70
By contrast, the Framers deliberately excluded judges from com-
pulsory participation in making or executing federal law.' 7 ' For ex-
169 For example, Congress was granted the traditional "executive" power to declare
war. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; see also Gwyn, Indeterminacy, supra note 26, at 266 n.16.
Congress also has the authority to create, fund, and regulate the armed forces and the
militia. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-16. The President, however, was made Commander-
in-Chief. U.S. CONSr. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. See THE FEDERALiST Nos. 69, 74 (Hamilton)
(describing the President's role as Commander-in-Chief).
Similarly, the President has the power to make treaties, but only with the Senate's
advice and consent and the concurrence of two-thirds of its members. U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 2. The Framers believed that involving the Senate in the treaty-making process
ensured its deliberativeness and promoted cooperation. See, e.g., THE FEDERALiST No. 75
(Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (Jay); 2 ELIOT, supra note 17, at 466, 505-07 (Wilson);
see also Casper, supra note 72, at 243-49, 256-57. See generally Blumoff, supra note 145, at
236-39 (demonstrating that the Founders defined foreign affairs powers in general terms
to ensure coordinated action).
The mingling of these functions reflected uncertainty about whether they were legisla-
tive or executive. SeeViLE, supra note 21, at 156-57. For example, although English treaty-
making had been committed to the king, it was really a legislative act of creating rules. See,
e.g., 1 FARRAND, supra note 77, at 65-66 (Wilson); 6 MADISON PAPERS, supra note 93, at 145;
Alfange, Normalcy, supra note 76, at 672. Moreover, this functional sharing expressed the
Framers' rejection of the English model of massive executive prerogative powers. See
Monaghan, Protective, supra note 109, at 17. See generally infra notes 559-67 and accompany-
ing text (arguing that the exercise of these former prerogative powers almost always
presents a political question).
170 See, e.g., Alan L Feld, Separation of Political Powers: Boundaries or Balance?, 21 GA. L.
Rv. 171 (1986) (The Constitution entrusts policy decisions to officers who are accounta-
ble through the democratic process.); see also REDISH, supra note 7, at 4-5, 9-29, 33, 45, 49-
50, 71-74. More precisely, the Framers gave Congress the ultimate power to determine
national policy, but enabled the President to stimulate the exercise of that power through
recommendations, the veto, and other devices. See Monaghan, Protective, supra note 109, at
20.
The Founders eschewed rigid definitions of governmental power in the Constitution
because of the need for some functional overlap and because of the practical difficulty of
classifying certain governmental activities (e.g., the exercise of discretion) as "legislative,"
"executive," or "judicial." See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 235 (Madison). For example,
if the Constitution had expressly defined "legislative power" as the authority to enact laws
and had given Congress only that power, that would have conflicted with its grant to Con-
gress of the "judicial" power of impeachment and the "executive" power to declare war.
These limited exceptions, designed to promote checks and balances, do not mean
that "separation of powers was abandoned in the framing of the Constitution," as some
have concluded. See, e.g., FoRRESr McDoNALD, Novus ORDo SECLORUM 258 (1985). On
the contrary, separation of powers is "entirely compatible with a partial intermixture of
th[e] departments for special purposes, preserving them in the main distinct and uncon-
nected." THE FEDERALIST No. 66, at 445 (Hamilton). See generally supra notes 161-62 (ex-
plaining why checks do not vitiate separation); Osgood, supra note 73, at 285-86 (The
Constitution "represents a serious commitment to separated powers, while also specifying
some obvious examples of sharing of powers.").
171 Although "courts" in the exercise of their "judicial" power can have no interaction
with the political branches, judges acting in their individual capacities could voluntarily
perform extrajudicial services if doing so would not threaten their basic function of decid-
ing cases impartially. See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, supranote 17, at 514 (Wilson); Wheeler, supra note
113, at 126-31.
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ample, the Convention rejected the Council of Revision-a judicial-
executive committee authorized to review and amend legislative
bills-on the grounds that judges should avoid partisan policymaking
and possible "improper bias from having given a previous opinion in
their revisionary capacities" on a law they then had to interpret. 172
Similar separation-of-powers concerns doomed two other propos-
als: first, a suggested Privy Council composed of executive department
heads and the ChiefJustice, from whom the President could demand
written opinions and other assistance;' 73 second, a provision authoriz-
ing the political departments to require advisory opinions from the
Court.174 Finally, the judiciary was the only branch given no true
check (i.e., a share in a function it did not inherently possess), but
rather could thwart unconstitutional conduct by Congress or the Pres-
ident only by exercising 'judicial" power. 175 Conversely, the political
172 THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 499 (Hamilton); see also THE FEDERALIsr No. 81, at 543-
44 (Hamilton) (arguing that the Constitution comports better with separation of powers
than the English system, in which the House of Lords has supreme power to interpret laws
it had assisted in enacting); 1 WILsoN's WORICS, supra note 10, at 324. See generally Pushaw,
supra note 36, at 491 nn.222-23 (discussing why the Convention rejected the Council of
Revision); Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 29, at 632 (same).
173 Ellsworth, Morris, and Pinckney recommended such a Council. See 2 FARRAND,
supra note 77, at 328-29, 342-44; see also 2 id. at 342 (proposing that the ChiefJustice also be
able to suggest alterations to federal laws). The Committee of Detail endorsed an advisory
Privy Council with a similar membership, but added the House Speaker and the President
of the Senate. 2 id at 367. This provision for a Council was later deleted in favor of a
clause authorizing the President to obtain opinions from his executive department heads.
See 2 id. at 495.
Although no explanation accompanied this change, it appears to reflect two separa-
tion-of-powers concerns. First, participation in the Council would have threatened not
only the ChiefJustice's independence from the executive but also the impartiality of his
exposition of laws on which he had previously written an opinion. 2 it. at 329 (recounting
Gerry's opposition to the Chief Justice's membership on the Council because it would
cause political entanglements and neglect ofjudicial duties); see also PAUL M. BATOR r AL.,
HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SySTEM 7-8 (3d ed. 1988)
[hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]. Second, by requiring the President to get opinions from
executive officials only, the Opinions Clause of Article II promotes the independence and
unity of the executive branch and the President's accountability. See Calabresi & Prakash,
supra note 29, at 584, 628-29, 631-34.
174 See 2 FAmRaD, supra note 77, at 334 ("Each Branch of the Legislature, as well as the
supreme Executive shall have authority to require the opinions of the supreme Judicial
Court upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions."). See generally infa
part I.C.2 (arguing that the Federalist Court's 1793 decision declining to give advice to
President Washington reflected the Convention's rejection of a Council of Revision, a Privy
Council, and advisory opinion practice).
175 SeeAnderson, supra note 106, at 153-54; supra notes 164, 171-74 and accompanying
text. Judicial review was a "check" in the broader sense of being a mechanism for re-
straining excesses by other government branches and preventing their encroachment on
the judiciary. See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 17, at 196 (Ellsworth) (referring to judicial
review as "a constitutional check"); 2 id. at 445 (Wilson) ("[T]he legislature may be re-
strained, and kept within its prescribed bounds, by the interposition of the judicial depart-
ment."); THE FEDERALiST No. 78, at 524-26 (Hamilton) (to similar effect); Viii, supra note
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branches could not interfere with judicial power over a particular mat-
ter (for instance, by revising a court's final order).176
Nonetheless, the Constitution does impose several political con-
straints on the judiciary.177 For example, Congress can (1) remove
federal judges for misconduct; 78 (2) control federal court personnel
and jurisdiction; 79 and (3) spearhead amendments to overturn
21, at 157-58 (Judicial review relates to the idea that one branch has a limited right to
interfere with another's function to keep it within its bounds.).
Professor Paulsen has argued that, consistent with the Federalist Constitution's separa-
tion of powers among coordinate, independent branches, the authority to interpret federal
law is not specifically delegated to the judiciary, but rather is implied as a necessary inci-"
dent of each department's discharge of its function within the sphere of its enumerated
powers. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch. Executive Power to Say What the
Law Is, 83 GEO. LJ. 217 (1994). Thus, he contends that the President has independent
interpretive authority while exercising his Article II powers-including the right to decline
to enforce ajudicial decree rendered in a case within a court's jurisdiction. Id. at 222-23,
226, 241-63, 276-82, 294-300, 303-06, 343-44.
I disagree. Article III gives federal courts "the judicial power," which in 1789 was uni-
versally defined as the authority to interpret and apply the law in specific cases. See supra
notes 35-36, 39, 112-13, 143, 154, 172 and accompanying text. In contrast to this express
grant of interpretive power to the judiciary, any such authority in the political branches
can only be implied as incidental to performance of their core functions-Congress's "leg-
islative power" to make law and the President's "executive power" to administer it. See
supra notes 27-32, 106-11 and infra notes 193-94, 205-06 and accompanying text. Similarly,
Paulsen's claim that the executive can refuse to execute a court's judgment conflicts with
overwhelming evidence that the Framers understood "judicial power" to require that an
order in a particular case be treated as final and unreviewable by the political organs. See
supra notes 45, 99, 116, 146-48, 176 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 209-11 and
accompanying text.
176 See, e.g., THE FEIERAusr No. 81, at 545 (Hamilton) (Neither British nor American
constitutions "authorise[ I the revisal of a judicial sentence, by a legislative act .... A
legislature without exceeding its province cannot reverse a determination once made, in a
particular case. . . ."); id. at 544 (decrying the "absurdity in subjecting the decisions of men
selected for their knowledge of the laws, acquired by long and laborious study [i.e.,
judges], to the revision and control of men, who for want of the same advantage cannot
but be deficient in that knowledge [i.e., legislators]"). See generally supra note 45 (describ-
ing the importance of the finality of judicial orders); infra notes 209-10 (discussing the
Court's adoption of this principle in 1792).
177 One obvious control is that the President appoints federal judges with the advice
and consent of the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. But the judges, once confirmed,
become independent. See THE FEDERALiST No. 51, at 348 (Madison). Thus, additional
checks were needed.
178 Hamilton identified impeachment as an "important constitutional check"-in-
deed, "a complete security" againstjudicial usurpation. THE FEDERALiST No. 81, at 545-46.
179 Congress has the power to make "Exceptions" and "Regulations" to the Supreme
Court's appellatejurisdiction. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. It also may establish inferior
federal courts. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONSr. art. III, § 1. The Court and most schol-
ars have interpreted these provisions as giving Congress plenary power over federal court
jurisdiction, although some have argued that Congress's control over jurisdiction is not
absolute. See Amar, Neo-Federalist, supra note 13.
Professors Levit and Redish have contended that separation of powers prohibits
judges from creating discretionary doctrines such as abstention and justiciability to avoid
exercising jurisdiction conferred on them in a constitutionally valid statute. See Nancy
Levit, The Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional Restraint and the Manipulation ofJurisdiction, 64
NonTR DAME L. REv. 321, 361 (1989); REDisH, supra note 7, at 4-7, 17-20, 64, 73-88.
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Supreme Court decisions. °80 These checks, and the very nature ofju-
dicial power (especially its inability to impose decisions by force),
eliminated any danger of encroachment on the political branches.' 8 '
3. Popular Sovereignty, Separation of Powers, Checks and Balances,
and the Reconciliation of Liberty and Efficiewy
The Constitution enables each department to exercise its core
function and its checks independently, but allows the results of each's
proceedings to be "examined and controlled" by the other
branches.' 8 2 For example, a statute must be (a) passed by both
houses of Congress; (b) approved by the President; and (c) adjudged
constitutional by the courts.'83 Such structural mechanisms minimize
the likelihood of oppressive laws, thereby promoting liberty.'84 At the
same time, however, the process is not so byzantine as to make the
passage, execution, and adjudication of laws unduly onerous. 8 5 On
the contrary, the Federalists strove to create a vigorous, competent
government that operated smoothly. 8 6 Most importantly, they reaf-
firmed the "efficiency" principle of separation of powers by uniting
executive power in one person who could act with speed, energy, and
Although that proposition is generally true, federal courts can refrain from proceeding
when other separation-of-powers considerations outweigh the need for deference to Con-
gress. See infra part I.C (discussing the Federalist Court's rules for declining jurisdiction).
180 See WiLs, supra note 42, at 128.
181 See THE FEDERAIrST No. 81, at 545-46 (Hamilton). Assuming courts stayed within
those limits, they would be "the least dangerous branch," "the weakest of the three." THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 523 (Hamilton); see also THE FEDERAuIsr No. 81, at 545 (Hamilton).
182 See 1 WILsoN's WOPuS, supra note 10, at 299.
183 See 1 id. at 299-300; see also 2 ELLIOT, supra note 17, at 447 (Wilson); THE FEDERALIST
No. 73, at 495-96 (Hamilton) (subjecting laws to examination by different departments
decreases the likelihood of bad or oppressive laws). Treaties emerge from a similarly com-
plicated process requiring negotiation by the President with the Senate's advice and con-
sent, approval by two-thirds of the Senate, and interpretation by the courts. See supra note
169.
184 See, e.g., 2 ELuOT, supra note 17, at 348 (Hamilton) (The Constitution's "organiza-
tion is so complex, so skillfully contrived, that it is next to impossible that an impolitic or
wicked measure should pass the scrutiny with success."); see also Amar, Sovereignty, supra
note 13, at 1504 (The Constitution's structure reflects a "libertarian bias" because it "en-
ables each national branch to thwart a national law it deems unconstitutional."); Redish &
Cisar, supra note 106, at 467, 477-78 (Separation of powers prevents rash government
action.).
185 See, e.g., 1 Wi.soN's WoRKS, supra note 10, at 800 (Checking does not cause paraly-
sis, but merely requires government branches to move "in concert" and in a way that maxi-
mizes liberty.).
186 See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 17, at 301-02 (Hamilton) (emphasizing the need for
strength, stability, and vigor in government); THE FEDER6eusr Nos. 37-88 (Madison)
(stressing energetic government); 2 ELLIOT, supra note 17, at 428-29 (Wilson) ("The aim of
the Convention was to form a system of good and efficient government."); Louis Fisher,
The Efficiengy Side of Separated Powers, 5J. Am. STuD. 113 (1971) (The Federalists sought to
establish a national government with energy and efficiency.); WOOD, supra note 25, at 474
(same).
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firmness.'87 The Constitution's strong national government would
not threaten liberty, however, because it was founded on the Peo-
ple,188 who separated, checked, and balanced its powers: 8 9
Political power was thus disembodied [from social classes] and be-
came essentially homogeneous. The division of this political power
now became (in Jefferson's words) "the first principle of a good gov-
ernment," the "distribution of its powers into executive, judiciary,
and legislative, and a sub-division of the latter into two . . .
branches." Separation of powers, whether describing executive, leg-
islative, and judicial separation or the bicameral division of the leg-
islature (the once distinct concepts now thoroughly blended), was
simply a partitioning of political power, the creation of a plurality of
discrete governmental elements, all detached from yet responsible
to and controlled by the people, checking and balancing each
other, preventing any one power from asserting itself too far. The
libertarian doctrine of separation of powers was expanded and
exalted by Americans to the foremost position in their
constitutionalism .... 190
187 SeeU.S. CONsT. art. II. See, e.g., 1 WILSON'S WORKS, supra note 10, at 296 ("If... the
executive power of government is placed in the hands of one person, who is to direct all
the subordinate officers of that department; is there not reason to expect, in his plans and
conduct, promptitude, activity, firmness, consistency, and energy?"); 2 ELLIOT, supra note
17, at 524 (Wilson) (A single executive will "secure strength, vigor, energy, and responsibil-
ity."); see also 2 id. at 480, 510-11 (Wilson); THE FEDERAUiST No. 70, at 471-80 (Hamilton); 1
FARRM.D, supra note 77, at 63-75, 109-14 (Madison); Sharp, supra note 72, at 385, 387, 397,
398, 413; Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 29, at 545 nn.4 & 6 (listing articles adopting
'unitary executive" thesis).
188 See, e.g., 2 WitsoN's WORKS, supra note 10, at 791 ("To render government efficient,
powers must be given liberally- to render it free as well as efficient, those powers must be
drawn from the people.... ."); 2 ELLIOT, supra note 17, at 316 (Hamilton) ("There are two
objects in forming systems of government-safety for the people, and energy in the
administration.").
189 See supra text accompanying note 105 (citingJay to this effect).
This great source of free government, popular election, should be perfectly
pure, and the most unbounded liberty allowed. Where this principle is ad-
hered to; where, in the organization of the government, the legislature, ex-
ecutive, and judicial branches are rendered distinct; where, again, the
legislature is divided into separate houses, and the operations of each are
controlled by various checks and balances .. .- to talk of tyranny, and the
subversion of our liberties, is to speak the language of enthusiasm.
2 ELuOT, supra note 17, at 257 (Hamilton).
Indeed, far from menacing liberty, government was necessary to preserve it. See, e.g., 4
id. at 95 (Iredell); 3 id. at 226 (Marshall); see also ViLE, supra note 21, at 4-5 (Where sover-
eignty is located in the People, government can actually increase liberty.); WOOD, supra
note 25, at 544, 608-09 (making a similar argument).
190 See WOOD, supra note 25, at 604.
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C. Early Supreme Court Decisions on Justiciability and
Separation of Powers
Nearly all the early justices had been instrumental in drafting the
Constitution, ratifying it, or both, 191 and their judicial opinions ad-
hered to the consensus that had been reached about the appropriate
role of federal courts in the constitutional system of separated pow-
ers. 192 Most importantly, the Court reaffirmed the Federalist axiom
that the Constitution created three functionally coextensive branches:
"The object of the constitution was to establish three great depart-
ments of government; the legislative, the executive, and the judicial
departments. The first was to pass laws, the second to approve and
execute them, and the third to expound and enforce them." 93 The
Justices' repeated assertions that the 'Judicial power" to interpret the
191 The contributions of Jay (ChiefJustice from 1789-95), Wilson (Justice from 1789-
98), and Iredell (Justice from 1790-99), have been detailed in the previous section. John
Marshall (ChiefJustice from 1801-35) ardently supported ratification. See supra note 17.
John Blair (justice from 1790-96), while serving as a Virginia judge, was one of the first to
approve the doctrine ofjudicia review. See supra note 91. Blair submitted a draft judiciary
article at the Convention, see 2 FARRAND, supra note 77, at 432-33, and he supported ratifica-
tion. See 1 DOCUMENTARY HisroRY, supra note 15, at 54.
Oliver Ellsworth was ChiefJustice between Jay and Marshall. At the Convention, Ells-
worth proposed a bicameral legislature to protect small states, supported a strongjudiciary,
and worked with Wilson on the Committee of Detail that crafted the Constitution. He also
helped persuade Connecticut to ratify it. See 1 id. at 117-18. Furthermore, as a Senator,
Ellsworth was the primary draftsman of the Judiciary Act of 1789. 1 id. at 118. Like Ells-
worth, Paterson (justice from 1793-1806) had been a small-states advocate at the Conven-
tion, as manifested in his influential NewJersey Plan. See 1 id. at 85. He helped Ellsworth
write the Judiciary Act and became a "staunch federalist." 1 id. at 86.
192 Conventional wisdom holds that the Framers roughly outlined separation of pow-
ers in the Constitution and expected details to be worked out in practice. See Kurland,
supra note 144, at 601-03; Casper, supra note 72. Most relevant here is the thesis that the
early Justices developed, on an ad hoc basis, a separation-of-powers approach that distin-
guished the Court as an institution (which was strictly limited to the exercise of "judicial
power" to decide Article Im matters) from the Justices acting as individuals, who could
perform a range of nonjudicial activities. Maeva Marcus, Separation of Powers in the Early
National Period, 30 WM. & MARY L Riv. 269 (1989); see also Wheeler, supra note 113 (The
early Justices exercised discretion to perform certain tasks outside the litigation context
that involved the exercise of "judicial" skills when they concluded that doing so would not
violate separation of powers.). Although the Framers left government officials flexibility in
defining the precise contours of separation of powers (especially the line between legisla-
tive and executive action), I hope to show that the Court's early decisions on judicial re-
view and justiciability had firm roots in previously stated Federalist principles.
As my focus is on the Court's exercise ofjudicial power, I will not consider theJustices'
individual performance of clearly nonjudicial tasks, such as the foreign affairs service of
Chief Justices Jay, Ellsworth, and Marshall. See Alfange, Normacy, supra note 76, at 680
n.79.
193 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 329 (1816). See Wayman v.
Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825) ("The difference between the departments
undoubtedly is, that the legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary con-
strues the law.... ."); see also Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738,
808 (1824); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 384-99 (1821); Hayburn's Case, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 411-14 n.(a) (1792).
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law included determining whether the political branches clearly had
exceeded their constitutional bounds likewise reflected shared under-
standings. 194 So did the Court's assumption of all jurisdiction con-
ferred by Congress that was consistent with Article III's grant of
"judicial power,"195 which could be exercised in a variety of proceed-
This coextensiveness principle preserved the rule of law, which was encapsulated in
two maxims. First, "[t]he government of the United States has been emphatically termed a
government of laws and not of men." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163
(1803). Second, "[no] man [can be] ajudge in his own cause." Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386, 388 (1798). See supra notes 42-45, 99, 116, 146-48 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing these maxims).
194 See Marbuiy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173-80. Before Marbury, the Court often had
measured the validity of congressional acts against the Constitution, but had upheld them
because they did not plainly violate the Constitution. See, e.g., Hylton v. United States, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 173-75 (1796) (ruling that a federal tax on carriages was not a "direct
tax" required to be apportioned among the states by Article I); Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3
DalI.) 321 (1796) (sustaining a congressional restriction of appellate jurisdiction to ques-
tions of law against a claim that Article III prohibited this limitation); Turner v. Bank of N.
Am., 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 8 (1799) (upholding a statutory limit on diversityjurisdiction against a
constitutional challenge). Similarly, the Court asserted the right to review allegedly uncon-
stitutional state laws. See, e.g., Calder, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 386 (concluding that Article I's bar
on ex post facto laws does not prevent a state from retroactively setting aside a probate court
judgment). See generally DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE
FIRsr HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 4-5 (1985) (summarizing 14 cases before Marbwuy in
which the Court interpreted statutes in light of the Constitution); CHARLES WARREN, CON-
GRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT 95-127 (1925) (demonstrating that,
before Marbuyy, both the Court and Congress acknowledged the power ofjudicial review);
Engdahl, supra note 91, at 285-89 (same).
The Justices emphasized that they would invalidate a statute only in a case of "a clear
and unequivocal breach of the constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative applica-
tion." Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14,19 (1800); accord Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 175;
see also Calder, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 398-99 (Iredell,J.) (Laws could be struck down only if they
conflicted with the Constitution's text, not with the judge's view of natural justice or wise
policy.); Alfange, Marbuy, supra note 142, at 342-44 (summarizing the Court's statements
of this "doubtful case" rule before Marbuy). See generally GOEBEL, supra note 66, at 662-773
(analyzing the early Court's constitutional and jurisdictional opinions).
195 [T]he legislature... unquestionably possess [the power] ... of establishing
courts in such manner as to their wisdom shall appear best, limited by the
terms of the constitution only; and to whatever extent that power may be
exercised, or however severe the duty they may think proper to require, the
judges ... owe implicit and unreserved obedience to it.
Hayburn; Case 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 412 n.(a) (C.C.D.N.C.) (Iredell,J., and Sitgreaves, D.J.);
see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) ("We have no more right to
decline the exercise ofjurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.
The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.").
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ings-for instance, private suits,1 96 prerogative writs, 9 7 and informer
and relator actions. 198
Constitutional separation of powers did not, of course, contem-
plate an unbounded judiciary. Rather, separation principles led the
Court to adopt three rules of self-restraint, all previously articulated by
Federalists. First, the Justices would not render decisions that were
subject to legislative or executive review. Second, the Court would not
issue public advisory opinions. Third, it would decline to exercise ju-
dicial power if necessary to avoid unduly encroaching upon the consti-
tutional spheres of Congress or the President.
1. Hayburn's Case, Judicial Review, Finality, and Standing
A 1792 statute required federal circuit courts to determine the
pension eligibility of disabled veterans and authorized review by the
Secretary of War and Congress. 99 In Hayburn's Case,200 three circuit
courts, each headed by a distinguished Federalist-Wilson,
201 Jay,202
196 See, e.g., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793) (holding that a state
could be a defendant pursuant to Article III's extension of jurisdiction to "controversies
between a state and a citizen of another state" in a breach of contract action).
197 The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Star. 73, 81-82, authorized the Supreme
Court to issue writs of prohibition and mandamus in cases otherwise within its jurisdiction.
Section 14 of that Act empowered all federal courts to grant prerogative writs "necessary
for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions."
The early Court frequently entertained mandamus petitions. See, e.g., Fitzbonne &
Allard v. Judge of the District Court for the District of New York (U.S. unpublished 1800),
reprinted in I DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 15, at 328 (granting motion to show cause
regarding a writ of mandamus to a district court judge to decide a naturalization case);
United States v. Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 42 (1795) (declining to issue mandamus to
order a district courtjudge to change his decision about an arrest warrant); United States
v. Hopkins (U.S. unpublished 1794), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HIsroRy, supra note 15, at
226-28, 494 (denying motion for a writ of mandamus to compel an executive commissioner
to take action on a loan assertedly authorized by Congress); Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2
DalI.) 409 (1792); see also infra note 215 (discussing mandamus actions in 1793-94 against
the Secretary of War). The Court also granted writs of prohibition. See, e.g., United States
v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dal].) 121, 129 (1795). See generally GOEBFL supra note 66, at 784-93
(describing the early Court's exercise of its supervisory authority).
198 See, e.g., Winter, supra note 33, at 1407-09 (citing cases).
199 See Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11; 1 Stat. 243.
200 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
201 See id. at 411-12 n.(a) (C.C.D.Pa. 1792) (Wilson and Blair,JJ., and Peters, D.J.); see
also supra note 10 (summarizing Wilson's career); supra notes 91, 191 (discussing Blair).
202 See2 U.S. (2 Dail.) at 410 n.(a) (C.C.D.N.Y. 1791) (Jay, C.J., CushingJ., and Duane,
DJ.); see also supra note 15 (describing Jay's contributions to Federalist thought); supra
note 151 (noting that Duane, while serving previously as a state judge, had been one of the
first to articulate the argument for judicial review).
Jay encapsulated Federalist political theory in the first charge he gave to his Circuit
Court's grand jury:
[It is] of the last importance to a free people, that they who are vested with
executive, legislative, and judicial powers should rest satisfied with their re-
spective portions of power, and neither encroach on the provinces of each
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and Iredell203-advised President Washington in separate opinion let-
ters that this law was unconstitutional. These similarly reasoned opin-
ions contain the early Court's most lucid analysis of the constitutional
connections between separation of powers and judicial indepen-
dence, judicial review, and justiciability.
Each opinion began with a summary of fundamental Federalist
principles. "The People of the United States" established a supreme
Constitution creating a national government 204 "divided into three dis-
tinct and independent branches ... [with] the duty... to abstain
from, and oppose, encroachments on either."205 Congress alone
could exercise Article I legislative powers; the President had the duty
to faithfully execute the law; and only courts could exercise federal
"judicial power."206 Because this separation could be maintained only
through judicial independence, 207 "neither the legislative nor the ex-
ecutive branches, [could] constitutionally assign to the judicial any
duties, but such as are properly judicial."208
Contrary to these basic constitutional tenets, the Pension Act re-
quired federal courts to exercise nonjudicial power (and arrogated
judicial power to the political branches) because their judgments
could be
revised and controlled by the legislature, and by an officer in the
executive department. Such revision and control we deem[] radi-
other, nor suffer themselves to intermeddle with the rights reserved by the
Constitution to the people.
3 JAY PAPERS, supra note 20, at 389.
208 See 2 U.S. (2 DalL.) at 412-13 n.(a) (C.C.D.N.C. 1792) (Iredell, J., and Sitgreaves,
DJ.). See supra note 16 (recounting Iredell's achievements).
204 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 411 n.(a) (C.C.D.Pa.). Not surprisingly, Wilson's opinion con-
tains repeated references to popular sovereignty. See, e.g., id. ("An important part of [legis-
lative] power was exercised by the people themselves, when they 'ordained and established
the constitution.'").
205 Id. at 410 n.(a) (C.C.D.N.Y.); see also id. at 412 n.(a) (C.C.D.N.C.) ("[T]he legisla-
tive, executive and judicial departments are each formed in a separate and independent
manner; ... the ultimate basis of each is the constitution only, within the limits of which
each department can alone justify any act of authority.").
206 See id. at 411 n.(a) (C.C.D.Pa.).
207 In the words of the Pennsylvania Circuit Court:
It is a principle important to freedom, that in government, the judicial
should be distinct from, and independent of, the legislative department. To
this important principle, the people of the United States, in forming their
constitution, have manifested the highest regard. They have placed their
judicial power, not in congress, but in "courts." They have ordained that the
"judges of these courts shall hold their offices during good behavior," and
that "during their continuance in office, their salaries shall not be
diminished."
Id. at 411 n.(a); see also id. at 413 n.(a) (C.C.D.N.C.). See generally supra notes 34, 43-45, 55-
58, 64, 86, 117, 122-24, 138-48, 171-76 and accompanying text (describing the core Anglo-
American principle that the rule of law depends upon the insulation of the judiciary from
the political branches, especially the legislature).
208 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 410 n.(a) (C.C.D.N.Y.); accord id. at 412-13 n.(a) (C.C.D.N.C.).
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cally inconsistent with the independence of that judicial power
which is vested in the courts; and consequently, with that important
principle [i.e., separation of powers] which is so strictly observed by
the constitution .... 209
Indeed, the finality ofjudicial orders was a cornerstone of both Ameri-
can and English constitutionalism. 21 0 Because the Act conflicted with
the Constitution-"the supreme law," the Justices had the "painful"
duty of invalidating the statute.
21'
Although two circuits declined to enforce the Act in their capac-
ity as 'Judges," they decided to do so individually as "commission-
ers."212 However, the Pennsylvania Circuit Court refused to consider
the application of Hayburn, a veteran. The Supreme Court granted
209 Id. at 411 n. (a) (C.C.D.Pa.). The North Carolina Circuit Court stated:
[The Act does not confer judicial power] inasmuch as the decision of the
court is not made final, but may be at least suspended in its operation, by the
secretary at war... [which] subjects the decision of the court to a mode of
revision, which we consider to be unwarranted by the constitution; .... [N] o
decision of any court of the United States can, under any circumstances...
agreeable to the constitution, be liable to a revision, or even suspension, by
the legislature itself, in whom no judicial power of any kind appears to be
vested, but the important one relative to impeachments.
Id. at 413 n.(a) (C.C.D.N.C.); see also id. at 410 n.(a) (C.C.D.N.Y.).
The Pennsylvania Circuit Court apparently believed that the statute assigned duties
that were executive in nature-a constitutional violation distinct from the political
branches' reservation of power to revise court orders. See id. at 411 n.(a); see also Wheeler,
supra note 113, at 137-38 (arguing that congressional authorization for judges to fix any
pension rate they deemed "just" required the exercise of "political" administrative discre-
tion rather than "judicial" determination of a rate by applying specific statutory standards).
By contrast, the North Carolina Circuit declined to reach that question. See 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
at 413 n.(a).
210 See supra notes 45, 99, 116, 146-48, 176 and accompanying text.
Moreover, where the "court" exercising "judicial" power consisted of legislators, its
orders were also final and could not be reviewed by judges or executive officials. For exam-
pIe, in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), the Court upheld the Connecticut legisla-
ture's exercise of its longstanding power to set aside ajudgment of its state court and grant
a new trial. The Justices agreed that, if the legislature's action was characterized as judi-
cial," its decision had to be final. See id. at 395 (Paterson, J.); id. at 400 (Cushing, J.).
Justice Iredell compared the legislature's power to superintend its courts to the House of
Lords' powers of appellate review and impeachment, and he suggested that the exercise of
such authority was "judicial" rather than "legislative" and thus entitled to finality. Id. at 398
(Iredell, J.); see also supra notes 52-53 (discussing finality of Lords' judicial orders); supra
notes 166-67 (describing Federalists' recognition that the Senate's exercise of judicial
power over impeachments could not be reviewed by federal courts).
211 See 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 411 n. (a) (C.C.D.Pa.); id. at 412 n. (a) ("To be obliged to act
contrary either to the obvious directions of congress, or to a constitutional principle, in
ourjudgment equally obvious, excited feelings in us, we hope never to experience again.");
accord id. at 412 n.(a) (C.C.D.N.C.).
212 Id. at 410 n.(a) (C.C.D.N.Y.); id. at 414 n.(a) (C.C.D.N.C.). See Marcus, supra note
192, at 272-73 (citing these statements as evidence of the early distinction between the
Court as an institution and the Justices acting as individuals in performing nonjudicial
tasks).
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Attorney General Randolph standing to assert Hayburn's rights213 and
considered the merits,214 but never issued a decision because a statu-
tory revision mooted the case.2 15
Haybum's Case uniquely illuminates Federalist thought. Riding
circuit, every Justice agreed that the Constitution's scheme of sepa-
rated powers requires judicial review and bars political branch revi-
sion of judicial orders. Moreover, some Justices believed that equity
could occasionally justify the issuance of opinions "extrajudicially."216
Finally, the Court granted standing to a party (the Attorney General)
who sought to vindicate public rights, not his own personal interests.
Unfortunately, the modern Court has inverted Haybum's Case to
stand for the proposition that judicial review thwarts separation of
powers and therefore should be strictly limited through the jus-
ticiability doctrines-specifically, by restricting standing to plaintiffs
who can show an individualized injury to a private law interest.2 17
213 Initially, Randolph sought a writ of mandamus ordering the Pennsylvania court to
act. See Haybum s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 409. The Supreme Court split 3-3 on the issue of
whether Randolph could "proceed ex offiio" (i.e., solely in his capacity as Attorney Gen-
eral) and denied his petition. Id. at 408-09. See Maeva Marcus & Robert Teir, Hayburn's
Case: A Misinterpretation of Preceden 1988 Wis. L. REv. 527, 534-39 (demonstrating that the
Court decided only this narrow procedural question). Randolph then changed his ap-
proach and claimed that he was proceeding on behalf of Hayburn. See 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at
409.
214 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 409. If the Court had concluded that the matter were nonjusti-
ciable, it would have dismissed the case for want ofjurisdiction, not considered the merits.
See, e.g., CURmE, supra note 194, at 8 ("[I]t is by no means clear that the Justices meant to
invoke what we now know as the constitutional dimension of the law of standing...
Marcus & Teir, supra note 213, at 539-46.
215 See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 409-10 (citingAct of Feb. 28, 1793, ch. 17, § 3,
1 Stat. 324 (removing requirement that federal judges determine pension applications)).
The Court later invalidated pension-claim determinations made before February 1793 by
judges sitting as commissioners. In 1793, the Court denied Randolph's request for a writ
of mandamus to compel the Secretary of War to place on the pension list a veteran whose
application had been approved by the judge-commissioners. See Susan L. Bloch & Maeva
Marcus, John Marshall's Selective Use of History in Marbury v. Madison, 1986 Wis. L. Rsv. 301,
306-07. A similar mandamus request by new Attorney General Bradford was also rejected.
See United States v. Chandler (U.S. 1794) (unpublished), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTARY HIs-
TORY, supra note 15, at 222-23, 226; see also Bloch & Marcus, supra, at 307-08, 314-15 (dis-
cussing Chandler). Finally, the Court held that the Pension Act granted federal judges no
authority to act as commissioners. See United States v. Yale Todd (U.S. 1794) (unpub-
lished), reprinted in United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 52-53 (1851); see also
Bloch & Marcus, supra, at 308-09, 316 (analyzing Yale Todd).
Even after the Pension Act litigation, however, federal judges performed duties that
entailed the exercise of "judicial" functions outside the context of specific, adversarial
"Cases" and "Controversies." Pursuant to congressional requests, federal judges found
facts in considering petitions for naturalization, claims of customs violations, and contested
elections. See Wheeler, supra note 113, at 132-36. Such judicial duties have continued to
the present. See infra note 309.
216 Haybrums Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 414 n.(a) (C.C.D.N.C.).
217 See infra notes 330-31, 338, 368-74, 381-97, 405-25, 451-65 and accompanying text.
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2. The Correspondence of the Justices and Advisory Opinions
England and many states permitted courts to render "advisory
opinions" on legal questions submitted by the political branches
outside the litigation context. Consistent with this practice,218 Secre-
tary of State Jefferson sought answers to "abstract questions" about in-
ternational law, treaties, and statutes related to the war between
England and France.2 19 Jefferson acknowledged, however, a possible
preliminary issue about the "propriety" of the Court giving "advice on
these questions."220 In a letter, the Justices responded that his request
implicated
the lines of separation drawn by the Constitution between the three
departments of the government. These being in certain respects
checks upon each other, and our being judges of a court in the last
resort, are considerations which afford strong arguments against the
propriety of our extra-judicially deciding the questions alluded to,
especially as the power given by the Constitution to the President, of
calling on the heads of departments for opinions, seems to have
been purposely as well as expressly united to the executive
departments.
22'
Contrary to conventional wisdom, this letter did not state that Article
III prohibits advisory opinions.222 Rather, the Justices said that issuing
opinions "extrajudicially"223 would be improper under the Constitu-
218 See supra notes 78, 113, 174 and accompanying text (describing advisory opinion
practice). Confirming Washington's understanding that this practice would continue, Jay
had given him private advice on several occasions before 1793. See Wheeler, supra note
113, at 145-48; see also supra note 216 (noting tentative approval of advisory opinions by
some Justices in Hayburn Case).
219 See Letter from ThomasJefferson to ChiefJusticeJay and AssociateJustices (July 18,
1793), reprinted in 3JAY PAPERS, supra note 20, at 486-87.
220 3 id. at 487.
221 Letter from ChiefJustice Jay and Associate Justices to President Washington (Aug.
8, 1798), reprinted in 3 JAY PAPERS, supra note 20, at 488-89.
222 The Court and most scholars have failed to recognize that Article III says nothing
about advisory opinions, and that its general reference to "judicial power" does not neces-
sarily foreclose them because at the time of the framing judges often issued such opinions.
See supra notes 78, 113, 174. Nonetheless, the lack of specific constitutional authorization
to render advisory opinions militates against doing so, for federal courts are created by a
written Constitution that enumerates their powers, and therefore they should be reluctant
to imply further powers. Cf Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 29, at 632 (Absent an express
constitutional grant to render advisory opinions, the ChiefJustice had no inherent "judi-
cial power" to do so.).
223 I previously construed this letter narrowly to mean that the Court must render its
decisions only in a "judicial" proceeding on its regular docket, not "extra-judicially" in the
form of a private opinion letter to the President. Pushaw, supra note 36, at 516-17. Upon
further reflection, I have concluded that the latter point conflicts withJefferson's language
inquiring "whether the public may, with propriety, be availed of [the Court's] advice on
these questions." See 3JAY PAPERS, supra note 20, at 487 (emphasis added); see also Wheeler,
supra note 113, at 146-56 (arguing that theJustices, who had given the President confiden-
tial private advice before, feared that rendering advice publicly would threaten the in-
dependent exercise ofjudicial power if the same questions arose later in litigation).
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tion's scheme of "separation" and "checks," which severs the executive
andjudiciary. Most importantly, Article II "expressly" and "purposely"
empowers the President to require written opinions from his executive
subordinates 224 (and, by implication, not from federal judges). Only
after the President acts on this advice and executes the law would the
Court be available "in the last resort."225
As an interpretation of the Constitution's text, the Justices' con-
clusion is reasonable but not inescapable.226 However, the Constitu-
tion's drafting history (which could not be cited because it had been
kept secret) 227 overwhelmingly supports this outcome. The delegates
rejected proposals to require the Justices to render advisory opinions,
give the President written opinions, and join with executive officials in
reviewing statutes.228 These measures failed for two reasons. First, the
ideal of an independent, apolitical judiciary would be undercut if
judges expressed an opinion about a law that might later come before
them in a lawsuit. 229 Second, the autonomy and unity of the executive
branch demanded that the President execute the law without consult-
ingjudges. 230 Those same separation-of-powers concerns explain the
Justices' prudential refusal to issue opinions outside the adjudicatory
context.2
31
Nonetheless, I remain convinced that the Justices may have issued an opinion if the
executive branch had initiated a lawsuit and given England and France (or other inter-
ested parties) notice to argue the issues raised. See Henry P. Monaghan, ConstitutionalAdju-
dication: The Who and When, 82 YALE LJ. 1363, 1373 n.65 (1973) [hereinafter Monaghan,
Adjudication].
224- U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
225 CURRIE, supra note 194, at 13.
226 This textual vagueness explains the Court's tentative language-that "considera-
tions" (not rules) "afford[ed] strong arguments" (not legal imperatives) against the "pro-
priety" (not constitutionality) of issuing advisory opinions. 3 JAY PAPEs, supra note 20, at
488. See CURRIE, supra note 194, at 13-14; Wheeler, supra note 113, at 154. Thus, the
Justices' letter reflects prudential considerations guided by general separation-of-powers
notions. Nonetheless, Joseph Story later concluded that the Justices had established an
absolute constitutional bar against any "extrajudicial interpretations of law." 3 STORY, supra
note 166, § 1771, at 651. Story's view has gained widespread acceptance. See, e.g., Muskrat
v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 354 (1911); Wheeler, supra note 113, at 145, 157-58.
227 See 1 FARRAND, supra note 77, at xi-xii (noting that the Convention debates were
secret and that its records were not published until 1819).
228 See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
229 See Wheeler, supra note 113, at 153-56.
230 See supra note 173. The letter says nothing about Congress, and Article I has no
analogue to Article IH's provision for written opinions by department heads: Advisory opin-
ions to the legislature, however, raise the same danger of compromising the Court's
impartiality.
231 Professor Wheeler has argued thatJay did not mean to prohibit all formal advisory
opinions; rather, he would have allowed advice on a specific question that could not later
arise in an ordinary lawsuit. SeeWheeler, supranote 113, at 149-56. Furthermore, Wheeler
points out that the Justices' correspondence remained unpublished for nearly a century
and therefore may not have been widely known, and that some Justices apparently ren-
dered advisory opinions in 1802 and 1822. See id. at 145 n.98, 157-58. Nonetheless, after
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In this century, however, the Justices' letter has been misinter-
preted as establishing an Article III prohibition against rendering a
decision in a litigated case because of standing, ripeness, or mootness
concerns.2
3 2
3. Marbury, Separation of Powers, and Judicial Power Over the
Coordinate Branches
Marbury v. Madison2 3 3 simultaneously reaffirmed and undermined
the Federalist approach to separation of powers and justiciability.
Consistent with Federalist doctrine, the Court asserted that it could
judge the legality of executive and congressional actions in the course
of exercising judicial power. Unfortunately, ChiefJustice Marshall ig-
nored the very principles he articulated, for most of his pronounce-
ments about the coordinate branches were nakedly political and
unnecessary to the resolution of the case.234 The paradoxes of Mar-
bury become evident upon examining the two parts of the opinion-
one directed at the executive, the other at Congress.
a. Judicial Control Over the Executive Branch
Adams made the last-minute appointment of Marbury to be ajus-
tice of the peace, an office created by federal statute. Madison, the
1793 the Court as an institution never again issued a formal advisory opinion, and none of
the five Justices who had signed the letter ever did so in their personal capacities. How-
ever, their successors continued to give certain advice individually-especially on matters
that directly affected federal courts, such as jurisdictional and procedural rules. See Mar-
cus, supra note 192, at 273-75; Wheeler, supra note 113, at 147.
A related point is that Congress has always authorized federal courts to make rules
governing their own practices and procedures. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 17,
1 Stat. 73. The Marshall Court held that such provisions did not impermissibly delegate
legislative power to courts. See, e.g., Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 41-50
(1825) (Marshall, C.J.). Although the Wayman Court did not fully explain this result, itwas
probably influenced by longstanding Anglo-American practice. See supra note 36. Such
procedural rulemaking does not seriously threaten separation-of-powers values, for two
reasons. First, in contrast to legislative acts, such rules do not govern general out-of-court
conduct. Second, ajudge's application of uniform, pre-existing procedural rules is unlike
her creation of a substantive legal rule to decide a particular case-the sort of arbitrary
judicial tyranny the Framers feared. See supra note 140. See generally Linda S. Mullenix,
judicial Power and the Rules Enabling Act, 46 MERCER L. REV. 733 (1995) (contending that
Congress's interference with the federal courts' procedural rulemaking undermines judi-
cial independence).
232 See infra notes 332-33 and accompanying text.
233 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
234 See infra notes 242-50 and accompanying text. For the political background of Mar-
buy, see James M. O'Fallon, Marbury, 44 STAN. L. Rxv. 219 (1992); Alfange, Marbuiy, supra
note 142, at 349-72. I do not mean to imply that, before Marbuy, political considerations
never influenced judicial decisions. For example, Federalist judges had vigorously en-
forced the Alien and Sedition Acts against strong constitutional claims. See, e.g., Engdahl,
supra note 91, at 297-304. But while those decisions arguably could be justified as embody-
ing appropriate deference to the political branches, Marbuy could not.
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new Secretary of State, refused to deliver Marbury's commission, so
Marbury sought mandamus to compel its conveyance. 23 5
Initially, the Court distinguished an executive official's perform-
ance of a ministerial duty specified by the legislature, which was 'judi-
cially examinable," from his exercise of discretionary political power,
which was "only politically examinable." 23 6 The Chief Justice deter-
mined that delivery of the commission was a ministerial statutory obli-
gation; hence, the matter was justiciable.23 7
The Court then held that Madison's actions had violated Mar-
bury's right to his commission-a property right, implied from the
statute, that had vested at the time of his appointment.238 Marshall
thereby alchemically transformed a public law action into a suit at
common law. Under established practice, Marbury (or any citizen)
could have requested mandamus to force an executive officer to com-
ply with the law, even if that official's conduct had not affected his
individual rights.23 9 The Court, however, suggested that (1) a writ
seeker had to show invasion of a private law right;2 40 and (2) the par-
ties involved had a dispute about property rights-even though Mar-
bury had no real interest in his petty office, and Madison cared so
little that he refused to participate in the proceedings.2 41
235 Marbuiy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137-38, 154-55.
236 Id. at 158, 162, 164-67, 169-71. The Court insisted that it alone could make the
difficult distinction between a "judicial" question of statutory duty and a "political" ques-
tion involving the exercise of discretion. Id. at 165, 167, 170-71. See Bloch & Marcus, supra
note 215, at 336; O'Fallon, supra note 234, at 250; see also infra notes 266-68 and accompa-
nying text (analyzing Marbuy's "political question" doctrine).
237 See Marbuy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 167-68. But see id. at 172-73 (conceding that the
statute nowhere "expressly" specifies that the Secretary of State must deliver the
commission).
238 The statute providing for justices of the peace gave those judges a contractual or
property right in their offices. Id. at 154-55, 162, 164-65. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, Marbury,
Section 13, and the OriginalJurisdiction of the Supreme Cour 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 443, 447 (1989)
[hereinafter Amar, Section 13]; O'Fallon, supra note 234, at 232-33, 247. That right vested
at the time of appointment-not, as Jefferson contended, on delivery or receipt of the
commission. See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 155-62, 167-68; see also O'Fallon, supra note 234, at
246-47.
Arguably, the most important part of Marbury was the Court's assertion of broad
power to compel the executive branch to comply with statutes (as authoritatively inter-
preted by the Court), thereby ensuring that the President faithfully executed the laws. 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163-73. SeeAlfange, Marbuy, supra note 142, at 375, 377-79, 384; see also
Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610-14 (1838) (holding that Congress may
impose duties on executive officers who are not subject to the President's direction and
that Article H's "Take Care" Clause does not give the President discretion to decline to
execute legislation). See generally supra note 110 (discussing the Take Care Clause).
239 Although the petitioner for a prerogative writ often had been personally affected
by the challenged official action, such a direct stake was not required. See supra note 33.
240 Marbuay, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163 (emphasizing the "right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury"); id. at 166, 169-71, 172-73.
241 See Pushaw, supra note 36, at 500-01.
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The Chief Justice's odd characterization of rights and remedies
did, however, enable him to chastise the executive branch gratuitously
for violating individual rights.2 42 Because the Court eventually held
that it lacked jurisdiction to issue mandamus, 243 it should not have
declared that mandamus ordinarily would have been a proper remedy
or discussed what it would have done if it had possessed
jurisdiction. 244
b. Judicial Review to Invalidate Acts of Congress
Marshall's desire to assert the power of judicial review best ex-
plains Marbury's holding that Section 13 of the Judiciary Act245 vio-
lated Article III, because his interpretations of both the statutory and
constitutional provisions are so unconvincing.2 46
Read most sensibly, Section 13 has two distinct parts: the first
grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in proceedings involv-
ing either ambassadors or states; the second empowers it to issue writs
of mandamus in appropriate cases where it already has jurisdiction. 247
Section 13 simply did not apply because the Court had no independ-
ent basis ofjurisdiction, given that Marbury was neither a foreign min-
ister nor a state.2 48 The foregoing interpretation is certainly
reasonable, and therefore should have been adopted to avoid consti-
tutional questions.2 49 Instead, the Court ruled that Section 13 pur-
242 See Bloch & Marcus, supra note 215, at 319 n.70 (Marshall's statements "arguably
constituted advisory opinions.").
243 Marbuy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173-80.
244 See id. at 168-73. The rule that a court must decide jurisdictional questions before
considering the merits was already well-established. See, e.g., Alfange, Marbuy, supra note
142, at 390-91; Amar, Section 13, supra note 238, at 449-50 n.39; see also CHARLES WARREN,
THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HisToRY 249-51 (rev. ed. 1926). Indeed, Marshall
himself invoked it. See United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 172 (1805). There-
fore, Jefferson properly assailed Marbuy as a "'gratuitous opinion,'" an "'obiter disserta-
tion.'" See WARREN, supra, at 244-45 (citation omitted). Modern commentators have
agreed. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 194, at 66-67; Alfange, Marbuiy, supra note 142, at 369-
70, 372, 375, 384, 387-88, 390-91, 410; William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v.
Madison, 1969 DUxE LJ. 1, 6-7.
Perhaps anticipating such criticism, Marshall argued that the "delicacy," "novelty," and
"difficulty" of the issues in the case "require[d] a complete exposition of the principles on
which the opinion to be given by the court is founded." Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 154.
But courts are not "required" to explicate the law merely because new or difficult questions
arise; rather, such exposition must be necessary to decide the case.
245 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80-81.
246 See CURRIE, supra note 194, at 67-74; Alfange, Marbuiy, supra note 142, at 366, 368,
384-85, 393-408; O'Fallon, supra note 234, at 252; Van Alstyne, supra note 244, at 14-16, 30-
33.
247 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 81. See Alfange, Marbuy, supra note
142, at 393-94; Amar, Section 13, supra note 238, at 456-63.
248 See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 194, at 68; Alfange, Marbuy, supra note 142, at 366;
Amar, Section 13, supra note 238, at 455-56.
249 This canon of statutory construction was already entrenched. See, e.g., Mossman v.
Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 12, 14 (1800) (Section 11 of the Judiciary Act "can and must
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ported to confer original jurisdiction on it to issue writs of
mandamus.25
0
The Court then held that the statute, so construed, was unconsti-
tutional. Once again, the ChiefJustice accurately set forth Federalist
principles, then disregarded them. Marshall's defense of judicial re-
view reiterated the classic Hamiltonian argument: Because judges
have the duty to decide "particular cases" 251 by expounding the law,
and because the Constitution is fundamental and supreme law, the
Court must apply the Constitution instead of a clearly repugnant legis-
lative act-such as a bill of attainder or ex post facto law.252 Conversely,
absent such an unambiguous constitutional breach, Congress's will
had to be enforced.
25 3
Marshall, however, did not carry his burden of demonstrating
that Section 13 plainly violated the constitutional provision at issue-
Article III, Section 2, Clause 2, which states:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
suls, and those in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court
shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before men-
tioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as
to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations
as the Congress shall make.
The Chief Justice asserted that this language had a single obvious
meaning: Congress could not add mandamus actions (or anything
else) to the Court's original jurisdiction, because such jurisdiction was
limited to the two categories listed (i.e., foreign minister and state-
party proceedings).254 Although that interpretation is logical, others
receive a construction consistent with the constitution."); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 525-26
(Hamilton); CuRuE, supra note 194, at 55; Alfange, Marbury, supra note 142, at 395-97;
Amar, Section 13, supra note 238, at 449-50 n.39.
250 Marbuiy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173.
251 Id. at 178. In his passage on judicial review, Marshall repeatedly used phrases such
as "particular case," "that case," or "the case." See id. at 177-79. This repetition underscores
thatjudicial review is legitimate only when necessary to decide a specific case. Cf Engdahl,
supra note 91, at 325-26 (construing this language as suggesting that the judiciary's deter-
mination of a constitutional question binds only the parties in the case decided).
252 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176-80; see also id. at 176 (The principles ofjudicial
review are "long and well-established."). Marshall's argument and his illustrative examples
tracked THE FEDERAuST No. 78, at 525-26 (Hamilton). See supra notes 141-49 and accompa-
nying text (analyzing Hamilton's reasoning); supra note 150 (examining similar arguments
of other Federalists); supra note 194 (setting forth similar opinions by early Justices).
Others have noted that the ChiefJustice's justification for judicial review was not original.
See, e.g., ROBERT L. CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON ANDJUDIcIAL REvrEw 79 (1989) (Marbuy
"was based on sound constitutional doctrine and existing legal precedent."); CURRIE, supra
note 194, at 69-72; O'Fallon, supra note 234, at 227 n.30, 235-36, 249, 256, 258-59.
253 Marbuiy, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 176-79; see also supra notes 154-57 and accompanying
text (describing Hamilton's limitation ofjudicial review to clear constitutional violations);
supra note 194 (citing pre-Marbury opinions to similar effect).
254 Marbuy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174-75.
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also seem plausible: for example, that Congress must include these
two matters in the Court's original docket as a minimum but can aug-
ment this jurisdiction.2 55 Thus, Marshall's "plain meaning" argument
did not suffice. 256 Rather, he had the duty to persuasively justify strik-
ing down the statute based on further analysis of the Constitution's
text, structure, history, and precedent.257 In failing to do so, Marshall
"transformed judicial review from the enforcement of explicit funda-
mental law against conceded violation into the open-ended exposition
of supreme written law."258 Correspondingly, the Court abandoned
the Federalist postulate that a law could be declared unconstitutional
only when necessary to decide a case.
Overall, Marbuy captured the Federalist doctrine that the judici-
ary could examine the actions of the coordinate branches, but ig-
nored key limits on such review. Most importantly, the Court should
not have resolved any legal questions involving government officials
when it lacked jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court should have con-
strued Section 13 to avoid the constitutional issue, or at least upheld
the statute as based upon a reasonable interpretation of Article III.
Oblivious to what Marshall actually did, the modem Court has cited
255 See Amar, Section 13, supra note 238, at 464. Another possible meaning is that Arti-
cle Ill merely establishes a starting point from which Congress can depart by either adding
or deleting cases. Id. But see id. at 463-78 (arguing that these alternative constructions are
incorrect).
256 See id. at 464, 469 (acknowledging that the mere words of Section 13 do not clearly
convey the meaning Marshall attributes to them). Further doubt about the ChiefJustice's
reading arises because he ignored numerous cases in which the Court had considered
petitions for writs under Section 13 without suggesting any constitutional problem. See
supra note 197. Marshall was aware of these decisions, for Marbury's counsel had cited
them. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 148-49. But seenAmar, Section 13, supra note 238, at
461-62 (distinguishing all but one of these cases as arguably involving the Court's appellate
(not original) jurisdiction and noting that the remaining decision did not specifyjurisdic-
tional grounds for dismissal).
Moreover, Marshall distorted precedent. To support the key holding in the first part
of his opinion that mandamus could lie against the Secretary of State without infringing
executive prerogatives, the Chief Justice described and relied on an unnamed case. See
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 171-72. This "case" actually was a composite of three unre-
ported decisions. See Bloch & Marcus, supra note 215, at 311-18 (discussing cases cited
supra note 215). Marshall then ignored that same trio of cases (and several others) in the
second part of his opinion because they undercut his argument that the Court could not
constitutionally issue mandamus under Section 13. See id. at 303, 310-11, 318, 322-23, 326-
33, 336-37.
257 Such a detailed examination of Article 'Is language, structure, and surrounding
history has recently been provided by Professor Amar, who convincingly demonstrates that
Congress cannot enlarge the Court's original jurisdiction. SeeAmar, Section 13, supra note
238, at 459-78. Amar's impressive evidence, however, is completely absent from the Mar-
buy opinion. Thus, the Court did not justify its invalidation of a federal statute.




Marbury as exemplifying the judicial restraint embodied in the jus-
ticiability doctrines.2
59
4. The Development of the Political Question Doctrine
Federalist separation-of-powers theory recognized certain excep-
tions to judicial review. For instance, Hamilton argued that federal
courts could examine the constitutionality of statutes based on the
"natural presumption" that Congress could not be the final judge of
its own powers, but acknowledged that "particular provisions in the
constitution" might rebut this presumption.2 60 These few areas of to-
tal legislative and executive discretion gradually became known as
"political questions."
The Jay and Ellsworth Courts often simply reviewed majoritarian
branch actions, 26' thereby concluding sub silentio that they did not
present political questions. For example, in Hollingsworth v. Vir-
ginia,262 the Court rejected the claim that the adoption of the Elev-
enth Amendment violated the Constitution because it had not been
submitted to the President for approval under Article I, Section 7.
The Court held that the veto power applied only to ordinary legisla-
tion, not to constitutional amendments. 263 The decision nowhere in-
timated that the amendment process raised political issues outside the
judiciary's competence.2 64
The Marshall Court made more explicit that some questions were
exempt from the otherwise broad reach of judicial power. Most im-
portantly, in Marbury the Court asserted authority to examine whether
executive officers had violated specific statutory duties, 265 but recog-
nized that "questions in their nature political, or which are by the con-
stitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in
this court."266 Examples of the latter included nominations of execu-
259 See infra notes 420-25, 428 and accompanying text.
260 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524-25, discussed supra note 148 and accompanying text.
261 See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text. The Court declined to decide only
matters affecting international relations. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199
(1796) (allowing the elected branches to determine whether a foreign nation had broken
a treaty and whether a hostile act amounted to war).
262 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 378 (1798).
263 Id. at 381 n(a).
264 See CURRIE, supra note 194, at 22.
265 Marbury claimed that these statutory violations had deprived him ofaprpety right,
not that his constitutionalrights had been infringed. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 154-
55, 162-66, discussed supra notes 238-42 and accompanying text; see also Alfange, Marbuy,
supra note 142, at 407 n.349 (noting that Marshall's discussion of political questions in the
context of the executive's statutory duties was unrelated to his later discussion of whether
the congressional act violated the Constitution).
266 Marbuiy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170. Marshall's use of the disjunctive "or" might
suggest that a question could be nonjusticiable for two separate reasons. First, an issue
could be inherently "political." See PETER W. Low &JOHN C. JEFF Es, JR., FEDERAL COURTS
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tive officers and foreign affairs decisions that did not violate individual
rights.267 Marshall indicated that in such matters the President's exer-
cise of discretion is necessarily "legal" and thus cannot violate any-
one's "rights"-not that certain infringements of legal rights have no
remedy.26
8
Following similar logic in Martin v. Mott,2 69 the Court upheld a
statute authorizing the President alone to determine whether exigen-
cies warranted calling forth the militia to repel an invasion.2 70 The
Court ruled that the President's judgment was subject only to political
scrutiny because ajudicial proceeding would interfere with his Article
II powers as Commander-in-Chief and might jeopardize national se-
curity interests. 2 71 Finally, Gibbons v. Ogden272 stressed that judicial re-
view of Congress's exercise of its Commerce Clause power was limited
to assuring that it did not try to regulate purely internal state eco-
nomic affairs:2 73
[P]ower over commerce... is vested in congress ... absolutely ....
The wisdom and the discretion of congress, their identity with the
people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elec-
tions, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example,
of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to
secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the
people must often rely solely, in all representative governments.
2 74
AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 12 (3d ed. 1994) (arguing that this language
might justify the Court's declining to exercise judicial review based simply on its determi-
nation that a matter is "political"). Second, a question might be "submitted to the execu-
tive" by law. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170; see also id. at 164-67, 170-71 (repeatedly stating that
the Constitution commits many political decisions to the President's sole discretion).
Any such distinction should not be pushed too far, however. Marshall's initial refer-
ence to "[q]uestions in their nature political" might have been intended either (1) to
cover issues that the Constitution does not expressly commit to the President but that
nonetheless implicitly fall within his purview (e.g., the power to withdraw recognition from
a foreign government); or (2) to indicate that certain political questions were submitted
not to the President but to Congress.
267 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166-67. Ifa government official did invade a person's
vested legal right, the Court could remedy that injury despite political repercussions. Id. at
154-73; see also Blumoff, supra note 145, at 259-62, 266-74, 283-92, 304-05, 326-27 (demon-
strating that the Court, during the first century of its existence, always decided cases impli-
cating international relations when individual rights were at stake, although it often
applied as the rule of decision the legal determination previously made by the political
branches).
268 See CuRE, supra note 194, at 67 n.19.
269 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
270 Id. at 28-29 (upholding Congress's power to enact this statute under U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cI. 15).
271 Id. at 29-32.
272 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
273 Id. at 194-96 (citing U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cI. 3).
274 Id. at 197; see also United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 633 (1818)
(holding that Congress's treaty interpretation and its decision about the rights of foreign-
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In short, the early Court followed Federalist separation-of-powers
principles by holding that the presumption favoring judicial review
could be rebutted only by a showing that the Constitution committed
a question entirely to the political branches-for example, the Presi-
dent's decisions about nominations, foreign affairs, and the militia,
and Congress's power to declare war and regulate interstate com-
merce. This Federalist understanding is the key to unlocking the mys-
teries of the current political question doctrine.
27 5
D. The Federalist Approach To Separation of Powers, Judicial
Review, and Justiciability: A Summary
The early Court implemented Federalist theory about the judici-
ary's proper role in the constitutional system. The basic premise was
that federal courts had a duty to exercise all jurisdiction constitution-
ally granted by Congress. Thus, standing was a straightforward matter
of ascertaining whether a statute, the Constitution, or the common
law gave the particular claimant a right to sue. This approach pro-
moted separation of powers in two ways. First, it deferred to the legis-
lature's policy judgment as to which person(s) could most effectively
vindicate federal law-even if the designated plaintiffs did not have a
personal stake in the outcome.276 Second, it ensured that laws en-
acted by Congress and executed by the President would ultimately be
interpreted by federal courts.
Consistent with the latter coextensiveness principle, its rule-of-law
rationale, and the overriding separation-of-powers goal of preventing
tyranny, the Court asserted judicial power to determine the lawfulness
of political branch conduct. Most importantly, when necessary to de-
cide a case, courts could invalidate government actions that clearly
violated the Constitution.277 Judicial review could be declined only if
the Constitution itself gave Congress or the President final decision-
making authority because of the paramount need for efficiency (in
foreign affairs, for example). Furthermore, separation of powers pro-
hibited the political branches from obtaining judicial opinions under
ers at war raised questions "political rather than legal in character"); Talbot v. Seeman, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801) (affirming Congress's sole power to declare war).
275 See infra part ll.B.4.
276 For example, Congress authorized enforcement of federal law through prerogative
writs that were available to any citizen. See supra note 197; see also supra notes 213-14 and
accompanying text.
277 By voiding a law that was not plainly unconstitutional, Marbury indicated that the
Court might begin to exercise judicial review against the coordinate branches more fre-
quenty. However, the Court refrained from doing so for over half a century. See infra
notes 280-81 and accompanying text.
The Justices occasionally gave opinions on federal questions even when this was not
essential to decide a case. See discussion of Haybum's Case and Marbury, supra notes 216,
234, 244, 258 and accompanying text.
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circumstances that would threaten the judiciary's independence.
Most significantly, the majoritarian departments could not (1) review
a court's final order, or (2) require a judge to issue an advisory
opinion.
E. Judicial Adherence to the Federalist Paradigm Throughout
the Nineteenth Century
The Federalist approach to separation of powers, judicial review,
and justiciability proved durable.278 The Civil War transformed feder-
alism, as the People reallocated power from states to the national gov-
ernment. The federal government's enlarged authority made
separation of powers more critical, with the locus of power shifting
from the Presidency during the War to Congress during Reconstruc-
tion.2 79 During this era the Supreme Court, which had unwisely cho-
sen Dred Scott280 as its first exercise of coordinate-branch judicial
review since Marbury, resumed its deference to the actions of the polit-
ical departments.281
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, however, judicial
power began to expand. The 1875 statute granting general federal
question jurisdiction greatly increased federal court dockets.28 2 Fur-
thermore, the Court gradually loosened traditional restraints on judi-
278 The following analysis oversimplifies enormously complicated events. For an excel-
lent discussion of the Court's jurisprudence from the Taney Court to the late 19th century,
see CURRIE, supra note 194, at 201-455.
279 See AcERtmtA, supra note 13, at 45-46, 48-49; Amar, Sovereignty, supra note 13, at
1450-66. Although the national government asserted its new authority to guarantee the
labor, property, and contract rights of all citizens, it remained a government of enumer-
ated powers. See, e.g., The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (striking down federal
statutes regulating trademarks, copyrights, and patents as exceeding Congress's Article I
powers). Moreover, its authority over economic and social regulation was still limited. See,
e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (invalidating a congressional act that barred
racial discrimination in private inns, theatres, and railroads because the Fourteenth
Amendment was limited to state action); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1873); see also AcrKRMAN, supra note 13, at 81-103.
280 Dred Scotty. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (holding that no descendant
of slaves could be a citizen of the United States or a state for jurisdictional purposes and
that Congress's "Missouri Compromise" was unconstitutional). See CURRIE, supra note 194,
at 264 (characterizing Dred Scott as "bad law," "bad policy," and "bad judicial politics").
281 See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869) (upholding a federal stat-
ute that stripped the Court ofjurisdiction to review the habeas corpus petition of an impris-
oned editor who had challenged the constitutionality of the Reconstruction Acts).
Although the Court generally kept a low profile during Reconstruction, the expansion
of the national government's power inexorably increased the scope of federal court juris-
diction. See William M. Wiecek, The Reconstruction ofFederaIJudidalPower, 1863-1876, 13 AM.
J. LEoAL HisT. 333 (1969).
282 See Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, §§ 1-2, 18 Stat. 470-73 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)). See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 173, at
37-38 (describing the explosion of the federal court caseload in the late 19th century);
Winter, supra note 33, at 1452-53 (same).
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cial review, as reflected in its growing willingness to strike down
progressive social and economic legislation on substantive due process
grounds.2
83
Although the Court created newjurisdictional devices to limit the
federal caseload,28 4 it left the justiciability doctrines largely intact.
First, the Court reaffirmed that the political branches could not revise
judicial decisions.28 5 Second, advisory opinions ceased. Third, stand-
ing remained primarily a question of substantive law-whether the
plaintiff asserted a right for which a statute or the Constitution pro-
vided a remedy.28 6 Fourth, the Court exercised discretion to dismiss
moot cases.2 87 Finally, the political question doctrine was reaffirmed
in Luther v. Borden,288 which held that the judiciary must defer to Con-
gress's prior determination that a state government has satisfied Arti-
cle IV's guarantee of "a Republican Form of Government."28 9 In sum,
283 This approach took root during Chief Justice Fuller's tenure (1888-1910), most
famously in Lochner v. NewYork, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITU-
TION IN THE SUPREME COURT. THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, at 3-83 (1990) [hereinafter
CURRIE, SECOND]. This jurisprudence continued through the mid-1930s. See infra notes
295-97 and accompanying text. Some decried this invalidation of laws that did not com-
port with the Justices' views of the Constitution's abstract meaning, and they urged the
Court to return to the practice of upholding any rational political branch action that was
not clearly prohibited by the Constitution. An early and influential statement of this posi-
tion wasJames B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope ofthe American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARv. L. REv. 129 (1893).
284 See, e.g., Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875) (establishing
the "adequate and independent state ground" doctrine).
285 See, e.g., Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1865) (no opinion), 117
U.S. 697, 703 app. (1885) (reprinting opinion of Taney, C.J., citing Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) 409 (1792)).
286 See generally Winter, supra note 33, at 1378, 1418-25 (citing cases). A claim could
also be grounded in the common law or equity.
287 See, e.g., Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895). Cf Haybumrn Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at
409-10 (holding that a statutory revision mooted the case).
288 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
289 Borden was a sheriff of the Rhode Island government that had existed from colo-
nial times under a charter. The state declared martial law in the early 1840s to thwart a
new government that had been formed pursuant to a convention. Borden broke into the
home of Luther, an official of the new regime. Luther sued for trespass and alleged that
Borden had lacked lawful authority to act because the charter government violated Article
IV, Section 4 of the Constitution, which guarantees every state "a Republican Form of
Government." Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 34-38.
The Court held that the Guarantee Clause did not authorize it to decide indepen-
dentiy which of the competing state regimes was legitimate, but rather required acquies-
cence to Congress's determination that the charter government was lawful and
'republican." Id. at 42. Furthermore, the Justices emphasized that Congress had granted
the President exclusive discretion to decide when the militia was needed to quell an insur-
rection and that, in exercising this power, he had also recognized the charter government.
Id. at 43-45. The Court yielded to the President's judgment, comparing it to his judicially
unreviewable recognition of a foreign government. Id. at 44. Finally, the Court found
Borden's break-in justified even though he had acted under military orders, because
Rhode Island (like any state) had power to declare temporary martial law to meet threats
to its very existence. Id. at 45-46. The Court deemed it unnecessary "to inquire to what
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the Court did not appreciably alter the Federalist approach to jus-
ticiability and separation of powers for more than a century.
II
JUSTICIABILITY AND SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY-. A NEO-FEDERAUST CRITIQUE
During this century, the Court has purported to adhere to the
Framers' conception ofjusticiability and separation of powers but has
gradually eviscerated it. The result is a patchwork ofjusticiability doc-
trines that are unsound in theory and unworkable in practice.
This Part traces the disintegration of the Federalist approach and
recommends its reintegration. I will begin by considering the jus-
ticiability doctrines as a whole,290 identifying their common theoreti-
cal and historical rationales and setting forth a general Neo-Federalist
critique. After surveying the justiciability "forest," I will examine its
"trees"-standing, mootness, ripeness, and political questions-and
suggest ways that each doctrine could be improved by reintroducing
Federalist ideas.
extent, nor under what circumstances, that power may be exercised by a State" before a
Guarantee Clause violation would occur. Id. at 45.
Overall, Luther acknowledged the unique-but not exclusive-role of the President
and Congress in implementing the constitutional guarantee of a republican government.
Only recently, however, has the Court rediscovered that (1) Luther "limited [its] holding"
of nonjusticiability to the situation where the political branches already had determined
which of two contending state governments was the established one; and (2) the Court
addressed the merits of several Guarantee Clause claims for over halfa century after Luther.
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 184-85 (1992) (citing cases). The Court con-
ceded that it had long misinterpreted Luther as creating an absolute political question bar
on all Guarantee Clause suits. Id. at 184-85 (citing cases from 1912 through 1980). It
mentioned many scholars who had shown the error of that approach. Id. at 185, citing,
inter alia, WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (1972);
Arthur E. Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional
Desuetude, 46 MxNN. L. REv. 513 (1962); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and
State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988). Although the
Court did not resolve the issue of which Guarantee Clause claims were justiciable, it indi-
cated a willingness to entertain such matters. 505 U.S. at 184. See generally infra note 575
(setting forth a Neo-Federalist view of this provision).
290 Others have suggested a similar approach. See, e.g., Lee A. Albert, Justiciability and
Theories offudicial Review: A Remote Relationship, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 1139 (1977) [hereinafter
Albert, Justiciability] (arguing that all the justiciability doctrines are not procedural devices
for determining whether to exercise jurisdiction under a particular concept of judicial
review, but rather are mechanisms for resolving substantive legal questions about whether
a plaintiff has a cause of action); Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case; 42 STAN. L. REv. 227
(1990) (recommending that the standing, ripeness, moomess, and political question doc-
trines be revised to reflect the Court's role as protector of constitutional values); Erwin
Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach toJusticiability, 22 CONN. L. REv. 677 (1990) (contending
that the individual justiciability doctrines should be replaced by a unified approach that
focuses on four policy questions: whether the plaintiff is legally entitled to relief; whether a
judicial ruling will have some practical effect; whether a litigant should be permitted to
raise the claims of third parties; and whether the complaint is based on a constitutional
provision that the judiciary should enforce).
[Vol. 81:393
1996] SEPARATION OF P0 WERS 455
A. The Modem Approach to Justiciability and Separation of
Powers: An Overview
The modem Court has treated all justiciability doctrines as "con-
stitutional" in two related senses. The first is textual: Article III's lan-
guage extending "judicial Power" to "Cases" and "Controversies" has
been construed as limiting federal courts to the adjudication of live
disputes between parties with private interests at stake.2 91 The second
is structural: Judicial restraint preserves separation of powers by avoid-
ing interference with the democratic political branches, which alone
must determine nearly all public law matters. 292
The Court's conception ofjusticiability promotes one traditional
purpose of separation of powers-governmental efficiency-but sacri-
fices its countervailing goals: protecting liberty, guaranteeing the rule
of law, and checking and balancing power. The Court has neglected
the Founders' idea that federal judges represent the People by reme-
dying the unlawful conduct of political branch officials in both private
and public judicial actions.
Why did the Court forsake Federalist thought? The answer lies in
complex political, social, economic, and legal developments during
the first half of the twentieth century.
1. The New "Wilsonian" Democracy
By the turn of the century, leading Progressive thinkers (most
prominently Woodrow Wilson) had concluded that the Federalist
model of a decentralized government based on popular sovereignty,
separation of powers, and federalism was inadequate to run a govern-
ment of increasingly national scope.293 They urged America to adopt
291 I have previously challenged this interpretation. See Pushaw, supra note 36.
292 The Court's rigid formalism injusticiability resembles its approach in one line of its
general separation-of-powers cases, which strike down government actions that do not
strictly conform to the Constitution's assignment of "legislative power" to Congress, "exec-
utive power" to the President, and "judicial power" to federal courts. See, e.g., Northern
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (invalidating a statu-
tory provision conferring Article III judicial power on Article I bankruptcy court judges).
The Court's formalism purports to adhere to the Constitution's text and original
meaning, but fails to account for the richness of Federalist political theory. See Gwyn, Inde-
terminacy, supra note 26, at 265, 267. For example, Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986),
held that separation of powers prohibits Congress from conferring "executive" power on
the Comptroller General while retaining authority to remove him as if he were part of the
"legislative" branch. The Court ignored the larger structural issue-whether Congress
could abdicate its core legislative function of making budgetary decisions to the executive.
See Paul Gewirtz, Realism in Separation of Powers Thinking, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 343, 348-49
(1989); see also Symposium, Bowsher v. Synar, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 421 (1987).
293 See WooDRow WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (1885) and CONSTITUTIONAL
GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1907). For a perceptive analysis of Wilson's work, see
AcuE.MAN, supra note 13, at 11, 34-35, 84-86, 222, 257-61; see also ELDONJ. EISENACH, THE
LOST PROMISE OF PROGRESSIVISM (1993) (examining the relationship of Progressive polit-
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a British-style "monistic democracy," in which elected officials have
plenary lawmaking authority and the legislature carries out the execu-
tive's political program, thereby promoting decisive, responsible gov-
ernment 294 Furthermore, the absence of judicial review in England
appealed to Americans who had watched courts undermine Progres-
sive legislation. 2
95
When Wilson became President in 1912, he tried to put his the-
ory into practice. Wilson failed, and Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover
did not share his vision.296 Moreover, most social and economic legis-
lation that did emerge was invalidated on substantive due process
grounds by the Taft Court (1921-1930).297 Although Wilson lost the
battle, he won the war. His idea that America requires a centralized
government with vast executive power was implemented by Franklin
D. Roosevelt and has become entrenched.298 In a nutshell, Americans
have substituted the constitutional democracy of one Wilson (Wood-
row) for that of another (James).
2. The New Deal
a. Fundamental Constitutional Changes in the 1930s
FDR spearheaded passage of economic and social legislation that
rested on a very broad reading of Article I and granted the executive
immense authority by creating many administrative agencies.2 99 The
New Deal challenged the fundamental constitutional idea of a limited
ical thought to constitutional issues). Although Progressivism implicated separation of
powers, it focused mainly on recharacterizing federalism by advocating increased national
power and deemphasizing localism and individual rights.
Rejection of the Federalists' principles was also justified on the ground that they were
driven not by their professed ideals but by economic interests. See CHARLES A. BEARD, AN
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913). Beard's
thesis held sway for over 50 years.
294 See AcxERMAN, supra note 13, at 7-8, 222, 252-57. Ackerman contrasts "monistic
democracy" with the Framers' "dualist Constitution," which distinguishes two democratic
decisionmakers: the People, who engage in transformative constitutional lawmaking at cer-
tain critical junctures; and their government, which controls the law during periods of
normal politics. See id. at 6-10, 17-23, 31-32.
295 See supra note 283 and accompanying text. This reactionary trend continued under
Chief'Justice White's tenure from 1910-1921. See CuRuE, SECOND, supra note 283, at 88, 93-
115, 126-30.
296 See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 84-86.
297 See CURIE, SECOND, supra note 283, at 133-69, 173.81, 199-201.
298 See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 105-08; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional-
ism After the New Dea, 101 HARV. L. REv. 421, 422-25, 437-46 (1987) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Constitutionalism] (tracing the incorporation of Progressivism into New Deal philosophy).
299 The trickle of administrative agencies that had begun in 1887 with the Interstate
Commerce Commission turned into a flood in the 1930s. See HenryJ. Friendly, Federalism:
A Foreword, 86 YALE L.J. 1019, 1022-25 (1977).
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federal government divided into three branches exercising enumer-
ated powers.3 00
The Court under Chief Justice Hughes (1930-1941) struggled
with these changes. After initial deference,30' the Court in 1935 inval-
idated the crucial National Industrial Recovery Act3 0 2 on the ground
that Congress had impermissibly delegated its Article I "legislative
power" to the President by giving him unlimited discretion to make
basic law and policy decisions.3 03 The 1936 elections gave FDR a man-
date. He announced his plan to pack the Court in 1937, and the Jus-
tices capitulated.30 4 The Court proceeded to uphold New Deal
legislation,30 5 eviscerate the non-delegation doctrine,306 and abandon
substantive due process.
307
300 See AcKE.RmmN, supra note 13, at 105-08; Sunstein, Constitutionalism, supra note 298,
at 422-46.
301 See CURRiE, SECOND, supra note 283, at 208-15 (citing decisions in the early 1930s
relaxing limitations on progressive legislation).
302 Act ofJune 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195.
303 See A.LA Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); see also CuMuE, SECoND, supra note 283, at 216-
20, 222-26.
304 See CuRRIE, SECOND, supra note 283, at 235; see also AcKERMAN, supra note 13, at 47-
49 (describing how FDR's election decisively broke the deadlock between the reformist
executive and the conservative judiciary, thereby persuading the Court to end its resistance
and ratify fundamental constitutional change).
305 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (minimum wage law);
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (National Labor Relations Act);
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (Social Security Act); see also CURRME, SECOND, supra
note 283, at 236-38.
306 Even in its 1935 cases, the Court emphasized that the problem was not delegation
per se, but rather Congress's abdication of its legislative power. See, e.g., Panama Refining,
293 U.S. at 415, 430; Schechter, 295 U.S. at 529-37. In theory, the Court still requires Con-
gress to make the basic policy decision and articulate intelligible legal standards before
delegating discretion in applying those standards to the executive branch. In practice,
however, the Court has given the legislature unlimited latitude, for it has never again
struck down a statute as an unconstitutional delegation. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 371-75 (1989).
307 The death knell was United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938),
which announced that economic regulations would be upheld unless they lacked any "ra-
tional basis." Id. at 152. See Acr, ERmAN, supra note 13, at 119-29 (arguing that Carolene
Products preserved the Founders' commitment to liberty in the post-New Deal world by
emphasizing the Court's duty to enforce specific prohibitions of the Bill of Rights instead
of general constitutional provisions concerning property and contract rights).
The Court resurrected its practice of upholding political branch action absent a clear
constitutional violation. See Alfange, Marbury, supra note 142, at 346 n.86 and accompany-
ing text (noting that, between 1937 and 1955, the Court sustained all but three federal
statutes). This deference, however, found its justification not in Federalist theory but in
Legal Realism. The Realists redefined adjudication as the process of balancing competing
interests and thus urged courts to yield to the judgment of legislatures, which were better
suited to weighing conflicting policy goals. SeeJ. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political
Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 97, 134-43 (1988). Correspondingly, the Realists re-
jected Marbnuy's formalist model of the judicial function as the deductive application of
determinate, pre-existing legal rules to the facts -the methodology used by the Court in
its substantive due process jurisprudence. Id.
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b. A "New Deal" forJusticiability: From Brandeis's Prudentialism
to Frankfurter's Constitutionalism
In the quarter century before 1937, the Court adapted jus-
ticiability concepts to keep dockets manageable in light of the increas-
ing scope of federal law and the appearance of novel forms of action
(e.g., declaratory judgments) .308 The primary architect of these modi-
fications wasJustice Brandeis, who urged the Court, as a matter of self-
governance and in view of its role of superintending the exposition of
federal law, to exercise equitable discretion in applying justiciability
and similar doctrines to avoid needless decision of constitutional
questions.3 09
Brandeis's disciple Felix Frankfurter, who became a Justice in
1939, led a rapidly emerging majority of FDR appointees in fostering
the New Deal by minimizing judicial interference with the political
departments through the justiciability doctrines.31 0 For example, the
Court embraced the Brandeisian strategy of invoking justiciability to
shield progressive legislation from conservative substantive due pro-
308 The earliest modem justiciability decision was Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S.
346 (1911), which involved a statute that reduced the value of earlier congressional allot-
ments of land to Indians, but authorized the affected grantees to sue the United States.
The Court invalidated the jurisdictional provision on the ground that Congress was seek-
ing an advisory opinion on the statute's validity, primarily because the United States had
no personal interest adverse to that of the Indian plaintiffs. Id. at 352-61. The Court's later
approval of declaratory judgments, described infra notes 490-92 and accompanying text,
undercut Muskrat. See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE LJ. 221,
281 (1988).
309 The culmination of this theory was Brandeis's famous concurrence in Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341-56 (1936). Brandeis's earlierjusticiability opin-
ions include Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 605-23 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that plaintiffs had alleged no violation of their legal rights but were
merely seeking a general declaration that a state statute was unconstitutional); Fairchild v.
Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922) (denying plaintiff standing to challenge the validity of proce-
dures for ratifying the 19th Amendment).
Brandeis did not, however, reflexively contract federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., The Chi-
cago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1924) (allowing suit by railroad companies seeking to
reverse an agency order on the ground that a federal statute conferred on those compa-
nies an enforceable legal interest). His gradual acceptance of declaratory judgments re-
flects his open-mindedness. See infra note 492. Furthermore, Brandeis deferred to
longstanding precedent that conflicted with the modem idea that Article M courts can act
only if presented with an adversarial dispute. See, e.g., Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568
(1926) (upholding traditional federal court jurisdiction over naturalization proceedings,
despite their ex parte format).
For an excellent discussion of Brandeis's prudential approach to justiciability and his
accompanying goal (not always achieved) of shielding progressive legislation from consti-
tutional attacks in court, see Winter, supra note 33, at 1376-78, 1422-24, 1443-48, 1454-57;
see also supra notes 283, 295-97 (describing substantive due process jurisprudence, which
Brandeis opposed).
310 See Maxwell L. Steams, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L.
REv. 309, 366-71, 375, 395-96 (1995) [hereinafter Steams, Historicalj.
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cess challenges.31' Furthermore, under Frankfurter's influence, new
rules of standing and ripeness were formulated to prevent disruption
of administrative agency processes.312 Finally, the Court deferred to
Congress's determination as to which parties-the government, di-
rectly affected individuals, and/or citizens generally-should have
standing to enforce the novel types of legal rights being created by
regulatory statutes.3 13
Unfortunately, neither Frankfurter nor his colleagues acknowl-
edged that they were exercising judicial discretion to fashion a differ-
entjusticiability scheme to address the radical changes wrought by the
New Deal. Instead of following Brandeis's prudential approach,
Frankfurter persuaded the Court to characterize justiciability as re-
quired by the Constitution's text, history, and political theory. In real-
ity, however, Frankfurter replaced Federalist constitutional principles
with those of "monistic democracy."3 14 He based justiciability on the
sovereignty of elected officials (rather than the People) and on the
correspondingly limited (rather than coequal) role of courts in a gov-
ernment of separated powers.315 The Court's understandable desire
to promote the New Deal (e.g., by protecting agency autonomy and
barring substantive due process claims) metamorphosed into a hostil-
ity toward any constitutional claims, except in rare cases presenting
well-developed complaints of individualized, common law harm with-
out significant political overtones.
311 See id. at 368-70, 375, 394-9.
312 See, e.g., Winter, supra note 33, at 1374-76, 1449-57 (describing Frankfurter's devel-
opment of standing doctrine); infra notes 490-502 and accompanying text (analyzing the
evolution of ripeness to protect the integrity of agency processes).
313 The Court recognized standing if either a statute or the Constitution created a
cause of action or if a common law right had been invaded. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 151-53 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Tennessee
Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939). Most importantly,
the Court upheld express congressional grants of standing to any citizen to enforce the
public interest protected by legislation, even if the statutory right had no common law
analogue. See, e.g., Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14-15 (1942) (Frank-
furter,J.). For analysis of the development of this jurisprudence, seeJosEPH VINING, LEGAL
IDENTMrr 36-37 (1978); Fletcher, supra note 308, at 225-27; Steams, Historica4 supra note
310, at 393-94, 399-400; see also infra notes 434-38 and accompanying text (criticizing the
Court's recent reversal of its position that judicial separation-of-powers concerns with citi-
zen standing are removed when Congress explicitly authorizes such broad standing).
314 Woodrow Wilson's ideas influenced Frankfurter. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter &
Adrian S. Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Terms, 1935 and 1936,51 HARv.
L. REv. 577, 577-78 n.2 (1938) (citing with approval Wilson's letter lauding Brandeis's ef-
forts to restrain the Court's "reactionary" invalidation of the liberal political program); see
also HELEN S. THOMAS, FELIX FRANKFURTER: SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH 285-86 (1960).
315 See, e.g., AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 555-56 (1949) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (Because judicial review is "oligarchic" and thwarts "the will of the
people," the "power of the non-democratic organ of our Government [must] be exercised
with rigorous self-restraint.").
. CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Frankfurter's seminal opinion appeared in Coleman v. Miller.316
Coleman involved an appeal by Kansas legislators who had voted
against a federal constitutional amendment and claimed that their
legislature's ratification of it violated Article V.317 Seven Justices
agreed that the Court should not reach the merits, but for different
reasons.318 The three-member plurality and two dissenters upheld the
legislators' standing because they had a "direct" and "adequate" legal
interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes, regardless of
whether they had sustained any private injury.319 The plurality and
four concurring Justices ruled, however, that the validity of the legisla-
ture's ratification of the amendment was a "political question" within
Congress's sole authority.320 This holding conflicted with Article V's
text32 1 and with precedent both recent
322 and venerable.3 23
316 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
317 Specifically, they alleged that the amendment had not been ratified within a rea-
sonable time after its proposal in 1924, and had lost its vitality because their legislature had
rejected it in 1925. Id. at 435-36.
318 Chief Justice Hughes wrote a plurality opinion, joined by two others, concluding
that the legislators had standing but that their claims should be dismissed on political
question grounds. Id. at 434-56. Four Justices joined two separate concurring opinions
which agreed with the plurality that the case raised political questions, but disagreed that
the plaintiffs had standing. See id. at 456-60 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 460-70 (Frank-
furter, J., concurring). Two dissenters argued that the legislators had standing and that
they did not present a political question. Id. at 470-74 (Butler, J., dissenting).
319 See id. at 438, 445-46.
320 See id. at 450-55 (Hughes, C.J.); id. at 456-60 (Black,J., concurring) (disavowing any
implication in the plurality opinion that courts might ever have authority to review Con-
gress's exercise of its Article V power over the amendment process).
321 Article V provides that Congress "shall propose Amendments" on a two-thirds vote
or "shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments" on application of two-thirds of the
states, with the amendments becoming part of the Constitution if ratified by three-fourths
of the states or their Conventions. Article V nowhere precludes judicial review of the
amendment process, including the validity of ratification. See Walter Dellinger, The Legiti-
macy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARv. L REv. 386 (1983)
(contending that judicial abstention from the amendment process is not based on Article
V's text, history, or precedent and subverts the certainty that is essential for legitimate
constitutional change).
322 Coleman, 307 U.S. at 471-74 (Butler, J., dissenting) (citing Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S.
368 (1921), which held that Article V impliedly required ratification of amendments within
a "reasonable time" after their proposal, and that Congress's seven-year limit for ratifying
the 18th Amendment was reasonable).
323 Curiously, the dissent did not mention Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.)
378 (1798) (deciding questions about the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, which
had overturned Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793)). See supra notes 262-64
and accompanying text (discussing Hollingsworth); see also Dellinger, supra note 321, at 403-
17 (demonstrating the long history ofjudicial review of the amendment process).
A rule-of-law objection arises concerning judicial scrutiny of those few amendments
designed to overcome the Court's constitutional decisions. See Dellinger, supra note 321, at
414 (acknowledging this argument, but noting that only four amendments have fallen into
this category). Two considerations blunt the force of this point. First, from a historical
perspective, the FederalistJustices who decided Hollingsworth did not regard this potential
conflict of interest as disabling. Moreover, Hollingsworth and other cases show that the
Court can render impartial opinions about the legality of amendments-even those whose
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Furthermore, the concurring Justices, in an opinion written by
Justice Frankfurter, concluded that the legislators lacked standing be-
cause they had a mere "political" interest in voting procedures shared
by all citizens, rather than a "specialized interest of their own to vindi-
cate."3 24 Instead of forthrightly admitting that he was dismantling the
traditional structure of standing and political questions, however,
Frankfurter asserted that his position was compelled by Article III's
text and history:
In endowing this Court with 'Judicial Power" the Constitution
presupposed an historic content for that phrase and relied on as-
sumption by the judiciary of authority only over issues which are
appropriate for disposition byjudges. The Constitution further ex-
plicitly indicated the limited area within which judicial action was to
move-however far-reaching the consequences of action within that
area-by extending 'Judicial Power" only to "Cases" and "Contro-
versies." Both by what they said and by what they implied, the fram-
ers of the Judiciary Article gave merely the outlines of what were to
them the familiar operations of the English judicial system and its
manifestations on this side of the ocean before the Union. Judicial
power could come into play only in matters that were the traditional
concern of the courts at Westminster and only if they arose in ways
that to the expert feel of lawyers constituted "Cases" or "Controver-
sies." It was not for courts to meddle with matters that required no
subtlety to be identified as political issues. And even as to the kinds
of questions which were the staple ofjudicial business, it was not for
courts to pass upon them as abstract, intellectual problems but only
if a concrete, living contest between adversaries called for the arbit-
rament of law.3as
Frankfurter relied on Haybum's Case for the proposition that "[t]he
scope and consequences of our doctrine ofjudicial review over execu-
tive and legislative action should make us observe fastidiously the
bounds of the litigious process within which we are confined."3 26 He
purpose is to overturn its own rulings. See id. at 415-17. Second, Congress also has a bias in
judging amendments, whether proposed by Congress (in which case it would be predis-
posed to uphold their validity) or by a national convention where the federal legislature
has been unwilling to act (in which case Congress would be inclined to find invalidity). See
id. at 398-99, 416; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should be
Justiciable, 65 U. CoLo. L. Ray. 849, 854 (1994) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Guarantee
Clause]. See generally infra notes 569-71 and accompanying text (arguing that the Court
should reverse Coleman).
324 Coleman, 807 U.S. at 464 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also id. at 464-70
(Although a private citizen's claimed deprivation of his right to vote was judicially enforce-
able, an alleged violation of a political representative's voting rights could be resolved only
by the legislature.). Frankfurter characterized standing as a "preliminary question" of Arti-
cle I jurisdiction, which limited access to plaintiffs who had suffered "private damage."
Id. at 468-70.
325 Id. at 460 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
326 Id. at 463-64 & n.5 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
1996]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
also cited the Correspondence of the Justices as establishing that "it is be-
yond our power . . . to give legal opinions, however solemnly re-
quested and however great the national emergency."3 27 Frankfurter
acknowledged that the Court had sometimes departed from this his-
torical view by resolving political disputes "clothed in the form of pri-
vate litigation," but he urged rigorous judicial restraint.3 28
Justice Frankfurter's claim that 'judicial power" in the eighteenth
century had only one component-private common law actions
brought by a plaintiff who had suffered a personal injury inflicted by
an adverse defendant-ignored English practices such as advisory
opinions and public actions (e.g., prerogative writs) that permitted any
citizen to challenge government conduct as unlawful regardless of
personal injury.3 29 Nor was Frankfurter's reliance on early case law
persuasive. Indeed, Hayburn's Case contradicts his theory: The Court
there upheld the standing of a third party with no personal stake in
the outcome3 3 0 and emphasized that it could alter English practice in
response to changing circumstances.3 31 Furthermore, the Correspon-
dence of the Justices, which concerned a true advisory opinion-a formal
political branch request for legal advice from the Court-is not rele-
vant to Coleman, which involved claims that had already been liti-
gated.3 32 Frankfurter cleverly co-opted the historical term "advisory
opinion" and gave it a new meaning: a judicial decision in a litigated
case when a party lacked standing, presented an unripe or moot
claim, or raised a political question.333
In short, Frankfurter's assertions of historical continuity masked
the novelty of his vision of justiciability. He further refined his ap-
proach in Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath.334 There five Justices,
each writing separately, upheld the plaintiffs' right to bring constitu-
tional claims against the Attorney General, who had designated them
327 Id. at 462 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
328 Id. at 461 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
329 See supra notes 33, 37-38 and accompanying text.
330 See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792), discussed supra part I.C.1.
331 Id. at 414. Moreover, a fewJustices suggested that equity might sometimes warrant
an advisory opinion. Id. at 413 n.(a) (U.S.C.C.D.N.G.).
382 See supra part I.C.2.
333 See William A. Fletcher, The "Case or Controversy" Requirement in State Court Adjudica-
tion of Federal Questions, 78 GAs.. L R v. 263, 272, 275-76, 279, 284-86 (1990).
334 341 U.S. 123, 150-60 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.). In the 12 years between Coleman and
McGrath, the Court did not significantly change its approach to justiciability, and Frank-
furter issued no major opinions on the subject, although he continued to preach judicial
restraint. See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 319-20, 329-30 (1946) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (arguing that the majority should have avoided deciding the consti-
tutional question in light of the need for "scrupulous observance. .. of the professed limits
of this Court's power ... ").
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Communists without notice or a hearing.33 5 Justice Frankfurter
agreed that the plaintiffs could proceed because they had suffered a
substantial injury cognizable at common law (defamation),336 but cau-
tioned that he was not loosening justiciability rules.337 Indeed, Frank-
furter reiterated that Article III power was confined to eighteenth-
century forms, as evidenced by Haybum's Case and its progeny.338 He
argued that restricting federal courts "to issues presented in an adver-
sary manner" reflected "[r]egard for the separation of powers" and
"the importance to correct decision of adequate presentation of issues
by clashing interests."33 9
Frankfurter emphasized that these "general[ ]" Article III limits
had "myriad applications" to both "'standing to sue"' and the "more
comprehensive[ ]" idea of "justiciable" disputes.340 For example,
Frankfurter's "standing" analysis included not only the familiar re-
quirements of "adverse personal interest" and "legal injury,"341 but
also political question concems 2 and factors that today would fall
under the ripeness rubric (e.g., the need to avoid "coming prema-
turely or needlessly in conflict with the executive or legislature").343
Justice Frankfurter's opinions in Coleman and McGrath have be-
come the foundation of the modern justiciability doctrines.3 44
335 All these Justices agreed that plaintiffs had standing and presented justiciable
claims. See McGrath, 341 U.S. at 131, 135, 140-41 (Burton,J.); id. at 142-43 (Black,J.); id. at
174-75 (Douglas, J.); id. at 183-87 (Jackson, J.).
336 Id. at 157-60 (Frankfurter, J.).
337 See id. at 149-50 (Frankfurter, J.) ("[Ifn a case raising delicate constitutional ques-
tions it is particularly incumbent first to satisfy the threshold inquiry whether we have any
business to decide the case at all. Is there, in short, a litigant before us who has a claim
presented in a form and under conditions 'appropriate for judicial determination?'").
338 See id. at 150 (Frankfurter, J.) (citations omitted).
339 Id. at 151 (Frankfurter, J.)
340 Id. at 150 (Frankfurter, J.) (citation omitted).
341 Id. at 151-52 (Frankfurter, J.). Absent an express congressional grant of standing,
plaintiff had to show not merely an individual adverse interest, but also the existence of a
"legal injury" (i.e., that the government's action had directly affected plaintiff's interest
rooted in the common law, the Constitution, or a statute). Id. at 151-54 (Frankfurter, J.).
342 See, e.g., id. at 149-50 ("The more issues of law are inescapably entangled in political
controversies... the more the Court is under [a] duty to dispose of a controversy within
the narrowest confines that intellectual integrity permits.").
343 Id. at 155; see also id. at 155-57 (examining the finality of challenged action, another
element of ripeness).
344 Frankfurter's position that justiciability is an Article IH jurisdictional requirement
was accepted by the Court at different times for different doctrines. See, e.g., Doremus v.
Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952) (standing); Liner v.Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3
(1964) (mootness); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 458 (1974) (ripeness). Likewise,
over the past 25 years, the Court has gradually adopted, and expanded, Frankfurter's sepa-
ration-of-powers rationale for these doctrines. See infra part lI.B.
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3. The Warren Court's Liberalization ofJusticiability
The Warren Court paid lip service to the notion thatjusticiability
was ajurisdictional "limitation" based on Article II1345 and separation
of powers,3 46 but in reality increased judicial access dramatically to
effectuate both its activist interpretation of the Constitution and Great
Society legislation.347 The Court pretended to honorjusticiability pre-
cedent while effectively reversing it,348 and correspondingly failed to
set forth candidly its new separation-of-powers theory: that vigorous
checking of the political branches to protect individual liberty was
more important than efficiency.349 Indeed, the Court based its jus-
ticiability decisions not on a reinterpretation of political theory and
judicial history,350 but rather on a vague "blend of constitutional re-
quirements and policy considerations."351 As the Warren Court never
expressly repudiated the Frankfurterian analytical framework, the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts could easily revivify it.
345 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968) ("The jurisdiction of federal
courts is ... limited by Article III ... to questions presented in an adversary context and in
a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process."); id. at 99,
101.
346 See, e.g., id. at 94-95 (Article III "define[s] the role assigned to the judiciary in a
tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas
committed to the other branches of government."); id. at 97 ("Federal judicial power is
limited to those disputes which confine federal courts to a role consistent with a system of
separated powers .... .").
347 See, e.g., VINING, supra note 313, at 46; Stearns, Historical, supra note 310, at 350-52,
373-74, 383-85.
348 See, e.g., Fast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (granting federal taxpayers standing
despite 45 years of contrary case law); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (upholdingjus-
ticiability of voters' challenge to state apportionments in the face of solid precedent refus-
ing to resolve such political questions). See generally infra notes 387-88, 396 (examining
Flast); infra notes 510-15, 524-33, 575 and accompanying text (analyzing Baker).
349 The novelty of this approach can best be appreciated by recalling two bedrock
principles of Federalist separation-of-powers theory. First, federal courts can legitimately
exercise judicial review only to check majoritarian branch actions that clearly violate the
Constitution-a rule followed by the Supreme Court throughout most of its first century
(with notable exceptions like Marbury and Dred Scott) and revived after the New Deal. See
supra notes 150, 155-57, 194, 211, 254-59, 280-81, 283, 295-97, 305 and accompanying text.
By contrast, the Warren Court struck down numerous laws that did not clearly (or even
arguably) violate any discernible constitutional principle. Second, classical theory held
that the combination ofjudicial and legislative power destroys liberty by subjecting citizens
to decisions based arbitrarily on the judge's personal opinion rather than pre-existing law.
See supra notes 45, 57-58, 99, 116, 138-40, 146-48, 176 and accompanying text. Thus, Feder-
alists would have found ironic the Warren Court's repeated assumption of legislative power
under the guise of promoting individual liberty.
350 The Court did recognize justiciability's "uncertain historical antecedents." F/ast,
392 U.S. at 95-96. Specifically, it questioned Frankfurter's premise that the justiciability
doctrines reflected traditional English practice, because the earliest justiciability doctrine
(the ban on advisory opinions) had departed from English custom. Id. However, the
Court did not develop a competing historical account.
351 Id. at 97; see also id. at 98-99.
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4. Bickel: The Justiciability Doctrines As Unprincipled Devices to
Avoid Constitutional Decisions
In the middle of the Warren Court era, Justice Frankfurter's pro-
tege Alexander Bickel set forth a theory that would have a lasting im-
pact on the Court.352 Bickel argued that the Court should manipulate
the "passive virtues" (justiciability and other abstention devices) to en-
sure that its substantive constitutional decisions are principled.353 Ac-
cording to Bickel, judicial review is "counter-majoritarian" and thus a
"deviant institution in the American democracy,"3 54 but can be justi-
fied as instilling enduring constitutional values into representative
government.3 55 If the Court cannot reasonably find such fundamen-
tal principles to invalidate a law356 but does not wish to uphold it for
political reasons,3 57 Bickel urged the unprincipled use ofjusticiability
to evade decision 358-a prudentialism radically different from that of
Brandeis.3 59
Bickel perhaps accurately described the Court's actual practice,
but that does notjustify his thesis normatively. Bickel not only failed
352 BICKEL, supra note 5. Although the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have never offi-
cially endorsed Bickel's thesis, as a practical matter they have followed his approach by
developing malleable justiciability doctrines that enable the Court to exercise or decline
jurisdiction based largely on unarticulated pragmatic considerations. See infra parts HA5.
and I.B. SeveralJustices have cited Bickel with approval. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States,
506 U.S. 224, 253 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166, 188 n.8 (1974) (Powell, J. concurring); see also 3 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 161, at 27,
48, 95 (contending that Bickel's ideas have greatly influenced the Court).
353 See BICKEL, supra note 5.
354 Id. at 16, 18; see also id. at 17 ("[J]udicial review is undemocratic."); id. at 16-17
("[W] hen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an
elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people .... "); id. at 19-
23, 235 (to similar effect).
355 Id. at 24-28, 51, 58-59, 63, 69-70, 141, 188, 199, 203.
356 Bickel rejected Warren Court-style invalidation of a law the Justices perceive as un-
fair, even though it violates no constitutional principle. See id. at 54-55, 59, 69; see also
Kurland, supra note 144, at 610 (decrying "judicial arrogance" in imposing personal policy
preferences instead of applying constitutional text, history, and precedent); supra notes
348-49 (questioning Warren Court jurisprudence).
357 Bickel argued that the public mistakenly assumes that a decision upholding a law's
constitutionality signifies the Court's approval of its wisdom, thereby legitimating it.
BICKEL, supra note 5, at 29-31, 69-70, 129-32, 205. Bickel's thesis contradicts itself because if
citizens equate anything less than invalidation as judicial endorsement, then Bickel's pro-
posed solution-refusing to decide-will also be perceived as legitimation. See Gerald
Gunther, The Subtle Vies of the "Passive Vtrtues--A Comment on Principle and Expediency in
Judicial Rview, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1964).
358 See BICKtEL, supra note 5, at 68-71, 111-98, 200-01; see also id. at 112-13, 132, 205-07
(conceding that the suggested use ofjusticiability and similar techniques is unprincipled,
unlike constitutional decisions on the merits).
359 Whereas Bickel advocated abstaining entirely, Justice Brandeis recognized his duty
to decide cases but sought to avoid considering constitutional questions unnecessarily. See
supra notes 308-09 and accompanying text (discussing Brandeis's approach); see also Gun-
ther, supra note 357, at 9-10, 15-17, 20, 25.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
to offer such a defense, he conceded that his approach was not based
on the Constitution's text, history, or precedent.3 60 Indeed, Bickel's
theory turns American constitutionalism on its head. His central
premise-that judicial review is undemocratic-assumes that elected
officials are sovereign and that therefore any checks on them are pre-
sumptively illegitimate.3 61
On the contrary, in our democracy all government branches rep-
resent the sovereign People, and the judiciary's exercise of judicial
review is not "deviant" but a vital check.3 62 Moreover, Bickel's thesis
subverts the rule of law and encourages tyranny by giving judges abso-
lute discretion. When Congress, pursuant to its constitutional powers,
grants jurisdiction consistent with Article III, the Court cannot decline
to exercise it on grounds of expediency.3 63 Finally, Bickel's approach
disrupts governmental efficiency because officials do not know when
360 BICKEL, supra note 5, at 16, 24, 39, 98-110.
361 See AcKERMAN, supra note 13, at 8, 261-62. Bickel believed the Court had to con-
serve its fragile legitimacy. See BICKEL, supra note 5, at 201-68. This was also Frankfurter's
view:
Disregard of inherent limits in the effective exercise of the Court's "judicial
Power"... may well impair the Court's position as the ultimate organ of "the
supreme Law of the Land" in that vast range of legal problems, often
strongly entangled in popular feeling, on which this Court must pronounce.
The Court's authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the sword-ulti-
mately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); accord Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464,
474 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.).
The Court's authority, however, is based not on transient public opinion, but on Arti-
cle III of the super-majoritarian Constitution. Furthermore, the Court's legitimacy is
hardly fragile, despite-or maybe because of-its willingness to make hard decisions. See,
e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 262 (Clark, J., concurring) ("National respect for the courts is more
enhanced through the forthright enforcement of [constitutional] rights rather than by
rendering them nugatory through the interposition of subterfuges."). In any event, pre-
serving credibility should be secondary to enforcing the Constitution. See, e.g., CHFmERiN-
SKY, INTERPRETING, supra note 7, at 104-07, 133-38.
362 See supra notes 150, 155-57, 175, 194, 211, 254-59 and accompanying text; see also
REDISH, supra note 7, at 6, 76-78 (deeming "nonsensical" Bickel's characterization ofjudi-
cial review as "deviant" because the Constitution itself creates a government that is "un-
democratic" in that it imposes mandatory limits on the powers of the elected branches).
363 See, e.g., supra notes 108, 179, 195 and accompanying text; Gunther, supra note 357,
at 15-16, 19, 21-22 (arguing that jurisdictional rules are based on the Constitution and
statutes, not merely the Court's wishes); id. at 13 (criticizing the "law-debasing effects of
Bickel's prudential considerations").
In 1988, Congress repealed the Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction. See 28
U.S.C. § 1257 (1988). Nonetheless, the Court does not claim that its discretion is unlim-
ited; rather, it has set forth rules to guide its decision to grant review (e.g., the importance
of the question and the need to resolve an inter-circuit conflict). See Wechsler, supra note
142, at 9-10 (discussing an earlier version of these rules). Furthermore, as Bickel recog-
nized, the Court's justiciability doctrines bind the lower federal courts, whose jurisdiction
is mandatory. See BICREL, supra note 5, at 198.
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or how the constitutionality of their actions will be determined.364 In
short, Bickel's proposed use ofjusticiability frustrates every aim of sep-
aration of powers.
5. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts and the Frankfurterian Revival
Chief Justice Burger, assisted by Justices Stewart, Powell, and
Rehnquist, revitalized Frankfurterian restraint by applying jus-
ticiability rules strictly, adding requirements for each doctrine, and
explaining more fully their separation-of-powers basis.3 6 5 The Rehn-
quist Court, under the intellectual leadership of Justice Scalia, has
continued this trend.3 66 Justice O'Connor has perfectly summarized
the Burger/Rehnquist Court approach:
Article HI of the Constitution confines the federal courts to ad-
judicating actual "cases" and "controversies." ... [T] he "case or con-
troversy" requirement defines with respect to the Judicial Branch
the idea of separation of powers on which the Federal Government
is founded. The several doctrines that have grown up to elaborate
that requirement are "founded in concern about the proper-and
properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."
"All of the doctrines that cluster about Article rn-not only
standing but mootness, ripeness, political question, and the like-
relate in part, and in different though overlapping ways, to an idea,
which is more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit
theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers
of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of
government."3 6
7
6. Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A General Neo-Federalist
Critique
The above-quoted passage compresses several distinct but related
ideas. The basic proposition is that federal judicial power is "limited,"
in the sense of being inferior to other types of governmental power.
364 Bickel claimed, on the contrary, that his theory would promote efficiency. See
BIcKEr, supra note 5, at 173 ("Nor is it justice in a democracy to enlarge authoritarian
judicial power at undue cost in the effective and responsible functioning of the political
institutions.").
365 See infra part ll.B. The Burger Court used the justiciability doctrines to contain the
explosion of litigation to enforce public (especially constitutional) rights. See Fletcher,
supra note 308, at 227-28; see also C. Douglas Floyd, TheJustiability Decisions of the Burger
Court, 60 NoRE DAME L. REv. 862 (1985) (defending this restrictive approach as consistent
with separation of powers).
366 See infra notes 405-10, 416-19, 435-49, 457-58, 471-72, 481, 504, 516-17, 556-57 and
accompanying text.
367 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). The second paragraph of the cited pas-




Because federal judges are unelected and thus "unrepresentative,"
they are especially limited in their ability to examine the actions of the
"democratic" political branches. Accordingly, the justiciability doc-
trines must be designed to restrict federal court adjudication (espe-
cially judicial review) to those rare instances when the government's
conduct violates an individual's private law, nonpolitical rights.3 68
368 The Court's formalistic approach to justiciability conflicts with its "functional" line
of general separation-of-powers decisions, which apply a "pragmatic, flexible" test: Separa-
tion of powers is violated only by actions that either "accrete to a single Branch powers
more appropriately diffused among separate Branches or that undermine the authority
and independence of one or another coordinate branch." See Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 381-82 (1989).
Mistretta upheld a statute that established the U.S. Sentencing Commission, an in-
dependent agency within the judicial branch (three of whose seven members were federal
judges) authorized to promulgate criminal sentencing guidelines. The Court recognized
that the justiciability doctrines "ensure[d] the independence of the Judicial Branch by
precluding debilitating entanglements between the Judiciary and the two political
Branches, and prevent[ed] the Judiciary from encroaching into areas reserved for the
other Branches by extendingjudicial power to matters beyond those disputes 'traditionally
thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.'" Id. at 385 (citations
omitted). But the Court emphasized historical exceptions to these principles when Con-
gress had assigned to judges rulemaking or administrative functions necessary for the effi-
cient fulfillment of their central responsibilities (e.g., promulgation of rules concerning
procedure and evidence). Id. at 387-90 (citing Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1
(1825)). The Court compared such rulemaking to the Commission's issuance of sentenc-
ing guidelines and held that the greater political judgment involved in the latter did not
render the Act unconstitutional. Id. at 390-97. Nor did requiring judges to serve under-
mine the integrity or impartiality of the judiciary, because (1) judges had historically ren-
dered extra-judicial services as individuals (rather than as a "court"); and (2) they were
applying their expertise to formulate rules that would govern only the judiciary in exercis-
ing their exclusive function of sentencing criminals. Id. at 397-408. Finally, the Court
concluded that empowering the President to appoint and remove judge-commissioners
did not affect their independence in exercising their judicial function of "fairly adjudicat-
ing cases and controversies." Id. at 411.
The Court did not grasp that Congress's commandeering of federal judges into an
independent agency along with non-judges, and its granting of appointment and removal
power to the President, posed a far graver threat to separation of powers than its request-
ing the Court qua Court to exercise procedural rulemaking authority ancillary to the exer-
cise ofjudicial power (as in Wayman). See id. at 413-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra
note 231 (explaining why the Court's procedural rulemaking does not violate separation of
powers).
Similarly, in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), the Court acknowledged that
Article III prohibits imposing on federal judges executive or administrative duties of a
nonjudicial nature, but upheld a statute that granted a "Special Division" court of three
federal judges the executive power to appoint, monitor, and terminate independent coun-
sel charged with investigating and prosecuting executive branch wrongdoing. The Court
relied on Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677 n.15. It
is unclear why Congress's grant of non-adjudicatory functions to a federal court in
Haybumrn's Case was unconstitutional, yet bestowing such powers on the Special Division
"court" was permissible.
In short, the Court has failed to explain how separation of powers allows federal
judges to perform tasks that are purely "legislative" (Mistretta) and "executive" (Morrison),
but prohibits them from vigorously exercising "judicial" power-as the justiciability deci-
sions hold. See MARIN H. REDISH, FEDERALJURISDICrION 15-22 (2d ed. 1990); Krent, supra
note 163, at 1298-1322.
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Far from "defin[ing] with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea
of separation of powers on which the Federal Government is
founded, 3 69 the current justiciability doctrines have inverted it.
Under Federalist theory, the sovereign People delegated certain pow-
ers to their agents in the national government-legislative, executive,
and judicial. Although the judiciary is limited by the Constitution, so
are the other two departments. And federal courts have power coex-
tensive with-not inferior to-that of the political branches. 37
0
Moreover, federal judges are not "unrepresentative" because they
are "unelected." Rather, the People chose to remove judges from the
electoral process to ensure their independence in vindicating federal
law-especially upholding the Constitution against transient
majoritarian pressures. 371 Because constitutional violations can be
committed only by government actors, federal courts inevitably will
have to "interfere" with (i.e., check) the majoritarian branches when
the latter exceed their constitutional bounds.372
In short, separation of powers in our democracy is frustrated by
justiciability doctrines that permit courts to abdicate their role of en-
forcing federal law.3 73 Federalist principles require federal judges to
exercise all their statutory jurisdiction unless (1) the political
branches have attempted to obtain legal advice outside the litigation
context; (2) Congress or the President has disregarded the finality of
369 Allen, 468 U.S. at 750.
370 See supra notes 88-92, 96-97, 101, 105, 115-16, 125-37, 143-59, 182-90, 193-98, 204-11,
277 and accompanying text. Cf. George D. Brown, Article RI as a Fundamental Value-The
Demise of Northern Pipeline and Its Implications for Congressional Power, 49 OHio ST. LJ. 55,
80-82 (1988) (contending that the Court's belief in the federal judiciary's inferior status
explains both its curtailment of standing and its approval of legislative schemes that re-
move federal law matters from Article III tribunals).
371 See supra notes 122-32, 136-50, 171-76, 205-11, 228-31, 277 and accompanying text.
372 See id.
373 Scholars who have made this point include AcKxaamaN, supra note 13, at 261-65;
CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRM NG, supra note 7, at 1-2, 5-24, 86-105; RFmISH, supra note 7, at 4-7,
75-88; Wayne McCormack, TheJusticiability Myth and the Concept of Law, 14 HASTnNGS CONST.
L.Q. 595, 599-602, 612, 629-30, 634 (1987) [hereinafter McCormack, justiciability]; and
Winter, supra note 33, at 1381, 1503, 1508-13.
For contrary views, see, e.g., Jonathan Entin, Separation of Powers, the Political Branches,
and the Limits ofJudicial Review, 51 OHIo ST. LJ. 175 (1990) (contending that the judiciary
should allow Congress and the President to resolve disputes over constitutional allocation
of power through political negotiation, except in rare cases when the action of the elected
branches contradicts an express constitutional provision); Charles Silver, Book Review,
American Political Theory Reconsidered, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 562, 578-82 (1992) (arguing
that political accountability and the good-faith efforts of officials to comply with the Consti-
tution are as important as judicial enforcement in ensuring obedience to limited, demo-
cratic constitutional rule); James G. Wilson, American Constitutional Conventions: The
Judicially Unenforceable Rules that Combine with Judicial Doctrine and Public Opinion to Regulate
Political Behavior, 40 Burr. L. REv. 645 (1992) (claiming that the exercise of many constitu-
tional powers, including impeachment and foreign affairs, should be governed not by legal
standards enforced by courts, but rather by political conventions developed by the
majoritarian branches and citizens).
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judicial orders, especially by reserving power to revise them; or (3) a
political question has been presented.
74
The foregoing critique assumes that Federalist ideas are still rele-
vant, for two reasons. First, the Court has claimed that its justiciability
doctrines incorporate them. Second, the Framers' tenets remain use-
ful in understanding the theory and practice of modem American
govemment 37 5 Specifically, the mushrooming of the federal govern-
ment has made separation of powers the most effective mechanism to
diffuse power and thereby safeguard liberty. 376 Indeed, this Federalist
structural principle applies today with undiminished force to the rela-
tionships among the three departments named in the Constitution
374 Consistent with Federalist precepts, the Court has rejected all congressional at-
tempts to tamper with the final judgments of federal courts, most recently in Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995). However, the Court has twisted the Fram-
ers' understanding of advisory opinions and political questions to rationalize its current
approach to justiciability. See supra parts I.C, I.D, and HA
The standing, ripeness, mootness, and political question doctrines all rest on the erro-
neous assumption that minimizing review of political branch actions constitutes judicial
restraint. In reality, exercising too little judicial power offends separation of powers as
much as exercising too much power. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING, supra note 7, at
55; Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disintegration of Article L774 CA. L. Rnv. 1915, 1940-
41 (1986) [hereinafter Nichol, Injury]. Moreover, the Court's justiciability doctrines have
done little to assure its restraint in fashioning substantive constitutional rules. See REDSH,
supra note 7, at 94-96.
375 See, e.g., supra note 13; ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 19-20, 35, 260-61, 304 (Histori-
cal constitutional principles must be the starting point for modem American self-
definition.).
For example, popular sovereignty helps explain the dramatic changes wrought by Re-
construction and the New Deal: The People exercised their right to (1) reallocate power
from states to the national government; and (2) redistribute power among the latter's
three branches. Obviously, the New Deal shattered the Founders' belief that federalism
would limit the central government. See supra part IIA2. Furthermore, the likeliest source
of tyranny has shifted from the legislature (the Federalists' bete noire) to the executive. See,
e.g., Alfange, Normacy, supra note 76, at 721. Despite these changes, however, Federalist
ideas-especially popular sovereignty and separation of powers-remain important. See,
e.g., Sunstein, Constitutionalism, supra note 298, at 421-52, 483-510 (contending that reinvig-
oration of the Framers' separation-of-powers theory can ameliorate problems of the mod-
em administrative state, even though we cannot revert to their conceptions of limited
government and exclusively common law definitions of legal entitlements).
376 See VILE, supra note 21, at 2, 7, 11; see also AcKEtMAN, supra note 13, at 259-61
(Separation of powers is still a sensible governing principle, although it must be modified
to reflect the modem dominance of the Presidency vis-a-vis Congress.); Redish & Cisar,
supra note 106, at 452-53, 472-73 (arguing that the fear of government tyranny thatjustified
separation of powers in 1787 remains strong today); AcKEImaAN, supra note 13, at 259-61.
While liberty increasingly has been protected through judicial vindication of individ-
ual constitutional rights, it does not necessarily follow that it cannot also be safeguarded
through separation of powers, as some have argued. See, e.g., Kurland, supra note 144 at
611-13; see also Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. Rnv.
1513, 1513-17 (1991) (Separation-of-powers analysis should focus not on structural con-
cers but on "ordered liberty-the protection of individual rights, especially due process,
against the government's arbitrary conduct.).
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(Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court).377 Those institu-
tions, in turn, must control the administrative agencies that conced-
edly combine governmental functions.3 78 In fact, the huge growth of
executive agencies has not resulted in tyranny primarily because of
congressional oversight and judicial review.3 79
As the Court has abetted the government's expansion by gener-
ously construing Articles I and II, it must correspondingly interpret
Article III so that judicial power remains coordinate with legislative
and executive authority. °80 This Federalist coextensiveness principle
377 Although the Framers could not have envisioned this century's expansion of fed-
eral governmental power and the particular overlaps among the branches that have devel-
oped, the classical distinctions between, the core functions of each department remain
meaningful. First, Congress has retained the basic legislative power to enact general laws,
and it can revoke any delegations of partial rulemaking authority. Thus, executive agen-
cies do not control both the making and execution of federal law. See Samuel W. Cooper,
Note, Considering "Power" in Separation of Powers, 46 STAN. L REV. 361, 388-93 (1994). Sec-
ond, the President still has the authority to execute the laws, although the results of his
administration may be scrutinized by the other branches. See infra notes 378-80 and accom-
panying text. Third, federal courts have continued to exercise the power to interpret fed-
eral law definitively in litigated cases. See infra note 380; see also Stephen L. Carter, From Sick
Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and Subsequent De-Evolution of the Separation of Powers, 1987
B.Y.U. L REV. 719 (Judicial interpretation of separation of powers can legitimately focus
only on ascertaining and enforcing the Constitution's original meaning, and if that mean-
ing cannot be determined then courts should abstain under the political question
doctrine.).
378 Two commentators have provided especially illuminating studies of this problem.
First, Professor Sunstein has described the administrative failures caused by the New Deal's
rejection of constitutional checks and balances in favor of swift, centralized administration
by a powerful President and independent technocratic agencies. Sunstein, Constitutional-
ism, supra note 298, at 421-22, 446-52. He praises recent efforts by all three branches to
assert a more forceful supervisory role over previously autonomous agencies. Id. at 452-83.
Sunstein argues that a system of aggressive, coordinated review of the administrative pro-
cess can replicate the structural safeguards and goals of the original constitutional de-
sign-promoting the rule of law, accountability, efficiency, and deliberativeness-while
preventing self-interested representation and factionalism. Id. at 421-22, 430-37, 446-52,
483-510.
Second, Professor Strauss has emphasized that the Constitution vests power in three
political heads (Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court) and gives each ultimate
authority over a distinct type of governmental power, by contrast, the Constitution leaves
the creation and structuring of administrative organs to Congress's discretion. Peter L.
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84
COLUM. L. Rnv. 573 (1984). Therefore, he contends that separation-of-powers analysis
should focus on ensuring that each of the three actors named in the Constitution has
retained meaningful functional control over every administrative agency. Id. at 575-81,
639-69.
379 See, e.g., id.; see also Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law
Litigation and the Burger Cour4 96 HARv. L. Rxv. 4, 60 (1982) (observing that courts have
become partners with the legislature in ensuring executive compliance with the law).
380 Although Congress may employ legislative courts and executive agencies for initial
adjudications, only appellate review by an independent Article IMI court can preserve sepa-
ration of powers by checking these political tribunals when they aggrandize power, make
arbitrary decisions, or pursue a political agenda not authorized by law. See Richard H.
Fallon,Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article HI, 101 HARv. L. Rzv. 915
(1988) [hereinafter Fallon, Article Il]; see also Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Admin-
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has been weakened by modem justiciability rules, which leave most
public law unchallengeable in order to promote governmental effi-
ciency. The justiciability doctrines must be reevaluated to account for
the judiciary's coequal role in maintaining checks and balances and
the rule of law.
B. Reformulating the Justiciability Doctrines According to Neo-
Federalist Principles
The standing, mootness, ripeness, and political question doc-
trines could be clarified significantly by applying Neo-Federalist prin-
ciples of separation of powers.
1. Standing and Separation of Powers
a. The Injuy, Causation, and Redressability Requirements
The Court's current teaching is that separation of powers
requires
a party seeking to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction [to] demon-
strate three things: (1) "injury in fact," by which we mean an inva-
sion of a legally protected interest that is "(a) concrete and
particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypo-
thetical"... ; (2) that the injury "fairly can be traced to the chal-
lenged action of the defendant" ... ; and (3) a likelihood that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision .... 381
These injury, causation, and redressability requirements have evolved
over seven decades.
The earliest modem standing decision, Frothingham v. Mellon,38 2
rejected a taxpayer's constitutional challenge to a federal statute be-
cause she had not suffered a "direct injury": Her interest was "shared
with millions" and thus "minute and indeterminable," and statutory
administration was "a matter of public and not of individual con-
cem."3 83 The Court stressed that its holding preserved the total sepa-
ration of powers required by the Constitution.384 In 1937, the Court
denied a citizen standing to claim that Hugo Black was ineligible to
serve as a Justice, citing Frothingham for the proposition that
istrative State; 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Monaghan, Marbuy] (contending
that the Marbury Court's assertion ofjudicial power to exercise independent judgment in
enforcing the statutory duties of executive officials is essential to the legitimacy of the mod-
em administrative state).
-81 Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jackson-
ville, 508 U.S. 656, 663 (1993) (citations omitted).
382 262 U.S. 447 (1923). For an excellent summary of standing before Frothingham, see
Winter, supra note 33, at 1417-44.
383 262 U.S. at 487-88.
384 Id. at 488-89.
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to entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to deter-
mine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that
he has sustained... a direct injury as the result of that action and it
is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all
members of the public.
38 5
Subsequently, Justice Frankfurter persuaded the Court to justify its
limited role in public affairs on historical grounds.3 86
The Warren Court deemed separation of powers irrelevant to
standing3 87 and accordingly repudiated Frothingham.3 8 8 The Burger
Court, after initially following this approach,3 8 9 reaffirmed the separa-
385 ExparteLevitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam). Levitt argued that Black had
been a member of a Senate that had helped enact a statute to increase judges' compensa-
tion, thereby making him ineligible to hold judicial office under Article I, § 6 of the
Constitution.
386 See supra part I.A.2.b.
387 The Warren Court held that Article M standing analysis should focus solely on
whether a plaintiff was the "proper party" to bring an action, as evidenced by his "personal
stake in the outcome" sufficient to assure the "concrete adverseness" needed to decide
legal questions properly. East v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-101 (1968) (citing Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). By contrast, separation of powers did apply to the political
question and advisory opinion doctrines, which considered the substantive legal questions
presented. F/a4, 392 U.S. at 95, 97, 99-101. The Court acknowledged that the distinction
between the standing of the party and the justiciability of the issues had been unclear in
previous cases. dE at 100 n.21; see also Scalia, supra note 6, at 892 (pointing out that this
distinction makes little sense, because if all persons who can raise an issue lack standing,
then the issue itself is excluded).
388 See last v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (granting taxpayers standing to claim that
congressional spending for religious schools violated the Establishment Clause). The
Court created a new test for taxpayer standing and found it had been satisfied: Plaintiffs
had shown a nexus between their taxpayer status and (1) the type of statute attacked (one
enacted under Article I's taxing and spending clause); and (2) the nature of the constitu-
tional infringement alleged (the Establishment Clause-a specific constitutional protec-
tion against the abuse of legislative power). Id. at 102-06. The Court weakly distinguished
Frothingham on the ground that it did not meet the second criterion. Id. at 103-06. But see
id. at 116-29 (Harlan,J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court had "reduc[ed] standing to a
word game played by secret rules" by relabeling public interests held by all citizens as per-
sonal/proprietary rights in tax funds).
The Court permitted a similarly broad class (voters) to raise constitutional claims in
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), discussed infra notes 510-15, 525-31 and accompanying
text.
389 For example, the Court rejected the separation-of-powers argument that plaintiffs
with generalized grievances lacked standing: "To deny standing to persons who are in fact
injured simply because many others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious
and widespread Government actions could be questioned by nobody." United States v.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973).
The Burger Court also recharacterized "injury" as primarily a factual inquiry, whereas
previously it had always been defined as harm to a plaintiff's legal interest (i.e., a right
arising under the common law, a statute, or the Constitution). See, e.g., Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151-55 (1970); 3 DAVIs & PIERCE, supra note
161, at 3-13 (applauding this shift, which responded to Professor Davis's call for the appli-
cation of a looser "injury in fact" requirement for standing under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 702(a)). But see Steams, Historica4 supra note 310, at 400-03
(showing that Camp erroneously interpreted the APA). The Court recognized Congress's
power to grant standing generally to citizens to vindicate rights under broad public laws,
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tion-of-powers rationale for standing in two 1974 decisions. First,
United States v. Richardson90 held that a taxpayer had no standing to
allege that a statute authorizing secret CIA expenditures violated Arti-
cle I's requirement that Congress provide a "Statement and Account"
of all expenses.39' The Court characterized the claim as a "'genera-
lized grievance[ ] about the conduct of government"' and thus be-
yond judicial cognizance.3 92 Second, in Schlesinger v. Reservists
Committee to Stop the War,393 the Court denied citizens standing to as-
sert that Congressmen's service in the military reserves violated the
Constitution-an abstract claim about government operations that af-
fected all citizens equally:3 94
To permit a complainant who has no concrete injury to require
a court to rule on important constitutional issues would create the
potential for abuse of the judicial process, distort the role of the
Judiciary in its relationship to the Executive and the Legislature,
and open the Judiciary to an arguable charge of providing "govern-
ment by injunction."3 9 5
Applying similar logic in the 1982 Valley Forge case, the Court rejected
the standing of taxpayers to bring an Establishment Clause challenge
against the federal government's grant of property to a religious insti-
tution.3 96 The Court did, however, emphasize the traditional rule that
and accordingly expanded the categories of cognizable "injury" to include noneconomic
interests such as aesthetic enjoyment of the environment. See, e.g., SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 683-
90; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732-40 (1972).
The Court gradually transformed this statutory "injury in fact" test into an Article H
requirement for standing to raise any claims-including those arising under the Constitu-
don. See, e.g., Warth-v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-501 (1975); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 58-60 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (decrying this shift). Di-
vorcing the injury standard from the underlying legal claim caused the standard to become
incoherent and manipulable. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 308, at 223-24, 229-34, 248-50,
256-64, 268-70; Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standin& and Public Law Litigation, 42
DuKE LJ. 1141, 1154-62 (1993) [hereinafter Nichol, Justice Scalia]; Cass R. Sunstein, What's
Standing After Lujan ? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries, " and Article 1Z, 91 MICH. L REv. 163, 166-67,
183-92, 222-23, 235-36 (1992) [hereinafter Sunstein, Lujan].
390 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
39' See id. at 166-70 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7).
392 Id. at 175 (citation omitted); see also id. at 176-78 (citing Exparte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633
(1937)); Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179 ("It can be argued that if [plaintiff] is not permitted to
litigate this issue, no one can do so. In a very real sense, the absence of any particular
individual or class to litigate these claims gives support to the argument that the subject
matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political pro-
cess."); id. at 188 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[Aillowing unrestricted taxpayer or citizen
standing would significantly alter the allocation of power at the national level, with a shift
away from a democratic form of government.").
393 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
394 Id. at 209-28 (citing U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 prohibition against members of
Congress from simultaneously holding office in the executive branch).
395 Id. at 222 (citation omitted).
396 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982). The Court explained:
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its unwillingness to hear such generalized grievances (either constitu-
tional or statutory) reflected merely "prudential" concerns for main-
taining separation of powers, which Congress could overcome by
expressly granting standing.8 97
Finally, the Burger Court created two new Article III standing re-
quirements-causation and redressability398-and asserted that they
also had to be applied in light of the "fundamental notion of separa-
tion of powers": "[Flederal courts may exercise power only 'in the last
resort' ... and only when adjudication is 'consistent with a system of
separated powers and [the dispute is one] traditionally thought to be
capable of resolution through the judicial process... ,,,'99 For exam-
ple, in Allen v. Wright,400 parents of black public-school children
claimed that the IRS had unlawfully failed to deny tax-exempt status
to racially discriminatory private schools. 41 The Court conceded that
the plaintiffs had suffered an injury-their children's diminished abil-
ity to get an education in integrated public schools.42 Notwithstand-
ing this fact, it held that this harm was not directly caused by the
challenged government conduct (the tax exemptions), as distin-
The exercise of the judicial power also affects relationships between the coe-
qual arms of the National Government... Proper regard for the complex
nature of our constitutional structure requires... that the Judicial Branch
... [not] accept for adjudication claims of constitutional violation by other
branches of government where the claimant has not suffered cognizable
injury.
Id. at 473-74. Valley Forge eviscerated Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), discussed supra
notes 387-88.
397 See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474-75; see alsoAllen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01, 512-14 (1975); supra note 313 and accompanying
text (describing the New Deal Court's deference to broad statutory conferrals of standing).
398 See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617-19 (1973). Before the mid-
1970s, the Court had never articulated a separate "redressability" component and had
mentioned "causation" only in passing in Fast, 392 U.S. at 102; ExparteLevitt, 302 U.S. 633,
634 (1937); and Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923). These requirements
are best illustrated by Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976). In
Simon, poor patients who had been refused service by tax-exempt hospitals challenged an
IRS rule that did not require such hospitals to provide care for indigents. The Court de-
nied standing because the plaintiffs had failed to show that (1) the defendant IRS-as
opposed to the hospital-had caused the plaintiffs' injury; and (2) the requested relief
(invalidating the IRS ruling) would remedy the injury, because the hospitals might still
deny medical services to the poor for some non-tax reason. Id. at 40-46.
399 Allen, 468 U.S. at 752 (citations omitted). The Court conceded that injury, causa-
tion, and redressability could not be precisely defined, but asserted that application of
these concepts to specific cases in light of separation of powers would clarify the law. See id.
at 751-52; see also id. at 752 ("[T]he law of Art. In standing is built on a single basic idea-
the idea of separation of powers."). But see Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing. A Com-
ment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. RE.v. 635, 636-37, 641-49, 652 (1985) (criticizing the
Allen Court for treating separation of powers as part of the Article Ill inquiry rather than as
one minor, prudential rationale for standing).
400 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
401 Id. at 739-46.
402 Id. at 756.
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guished from the independent actions of third parties (i.e., parents of
private-school children and those schools' officials).403 The Court
concluded that the plaintiffs were making a general complaint about
an agency's internal programs-a matter best left to the elected
branches. 4
04
The Rehnquist Court further constricted standing in Lujan v. De-
fenders of Wildlife,40 5 which concerned a statute that requires govern-
ment agencies to consult the Secretary of the Interior to ensure that
their projects do not threaten endangered species.40 6 In an opinion
by justice Scalia, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' standing under the
Act's provision that "any person" could sue to enjoin agency violations
of the law, holding that Congress could not create a generally enforce-
able procedural right to have executive officials follow the statutory
consulting guidelines.
40 7
Justice Scalia made the novel assertion that the bar against decid-
ing such generalized grievances was an Article III requirement, not
merely a prudential rule.408 He conceded that the cases he relied
upon had involved alleged constitutional (rather than statutory) viola-
tions, but concluded:
[IT] here is absolutely no basis for making the Article III inquiry turn
on the source of the asserted right. Whether the courts were to act
on their own, or at the invitation of Congress, in ignoring the con-
crete injury requirement .... they would be discarding a principle
fundamental to the separate and distinct constitutional role of the
Third Branch-one of the essential elements that identifies those
"Cases" and "Controversies" that are the business of the courts
rather than of the political branches.40 9
403 Id. at 757. The Court deemed it "speculative" whether withdrawal of the tax ex-
emptions would affect public school integration-for example, by causing private school
officials to change their policies or white parents to transfer their children to public
schools. Id. at 758-59. The dissenters argued that tax exemptions to private schools consti-
tuted financial support that directly resulted in the promotion of unlawful segregation in
public schools. See id. at 766-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 783-95 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
404 Id. at 760-61.
405 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
406 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 7, 87 Stat. 892 (1973) (codi-
fied as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1994)). A federal agency had interpreted this re-
quirement as not applying to projects outside the United States. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558-
59 (citing statutory and regulatory provisions).
407 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571-73 (citing 16 U.S.C. §1540(g)). The Court also denied
standing on the ground that plaintiffs-including scientists who studied endangered spe-
cies abroad-had not personally suffered any injury because they had not been directly
affected by the extinction of species allegedly caused by the regulation. Id. at 566-67.
408 Id. at 573-76. Justice Scalia relied on a series of cases (e.g., Frothinghamn, Levitt Rich-
ardson, Schleinger, and Valley Forge) that had prohibited judicial resolution of such genera-
lized claims on prudential grounds. See supra notes 382-85, 390-97 and accompanying text.
409 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576.
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The Court stressed that its role was solely to vindicate individual
* rights, whereas the political departments addressed majoritarian con-
cerns-including the public interest in the government's observance
of the law.
410
b. The Court's Historical Justification for Standing and Separation
of Powers
The Court has failed to articulate a persuasive historical rationale
for its view of standing. Indeed, it often simply makes unsupported
assertions about the Framers' understanding,41' such as Chief Justice
Burger's justification for restricting citizen standing:
Any other conclusion would mean that the Founding Fathers in-
tended to set up something in the nature of an Athenian democracy
or a New England town meeting to oversee the conduct of the Na-
tional Government by means of lawsuits in federal courts. The Con-
stitution created a representative government with the representatives
directly responsible to their constituents.... [T]hat the Constitu-
tion does not afford a judicial remedy does not.., completely dis-
able the citizen... [who has] the right to assert his views in the
political forum or at the polls .... [O]ur system provides for chang-
ing members of the political branches when dissatisfied citizens con-
vince a sufficient number of their fellow electors that elected
representatives are delinquent in performing duties committed to
them.
4 1 2
410 Id. at 576-78. Lujan implemented Scalia's 1983 scholarly argument that standing
promotes separation of powers by (1) restricting courts to their traditional role of protect-
ing individual and minority rights against majoritarian tyranny; and (2) preventing the
judiciary from hearing generalized grievances that the government has violated the law,
which implicate the majority's interests and thus can be addressed only by the political
branches. See Scalia, supra note 6, at 894-97.
411 See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 476 (1982) (Standing limitations are "part of the basic
charter promulgated by the Framers of the Constitution of Philadelphia.").
412 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974). Justice Powell argued that
citizen suits should be disallowed for the same reason the Framers had declined to create a
Council of Revision: The people's rights must be protected primarily by the political
branches, with the judiciary acting only in the last resort. See id. at 189-91 (Powell, J.,
concurring); see also Logan, supra note 14, at 63-64 (to similar effect).
This analogy is unpersuasive. The Convention rejected the Council of Revision, ajudi-
cial-executive committee charged with reviewing legislative bills, to prevent judges from
making policy and from rendering biased judicial opinions on laws they had previously
reviewed. See supra notes 172-74, 228-29 and accompanying text. The Founders shielded
judges from such political activities to ensure their independence in exercising judicial
power, which in the 18th century included the adjudication of citizen suits. See supra notes
33, 37-38, 197 and accompanying text; see also Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing; 72
CAL. L. REV. 68, 93-94 (1984) [hereinafter Nichol, Rethinking] (arguing that the Framers'
rejection of a Council of Revision, which had been proposed to examine the wisdom of
legislation during the enactment process, does not support narrowing judicial review of
the constitutionality of political branch action already taken).
1996]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Burger failed to grasp that "the Founding Fathers," far from trusting
"the political forum" and "the polls" to remedy constitutional viola-
tions, removed certain issues from the political process precisely be-
cause it might not sufficiently protect constitutional values.
413
Indeed, he ignored basic Federalist principles: that elected officials
possess only the power delegated to them by the Constitution, and
that courts represent the People by remedying political branch ac-
tions that exceed constitutional limits.
4 14
The Court's use of standing to avoid judicial review reflects its
belief that "neither department may invade the province of the other
and neither may control, direct or restrain the action of the other."
415
The notion that the Constitution requires total separation of powers,
however, conflicts with its system of checks and balances-including
judicial review.416 To be sure, an overemphasis on checking can ob-
scure the Constitution's basic structural apportionment of different
primary functions to each branch. Thus, the Court has properly em-
phasized that the Founders' conception of separation of powers re-
flected their "common understanding" about the nature of legislative,
executive, and judicial power.
417
The law of standing, however, frustrates this shared understand-
ing. In particular, the Court's claim that the Federalists created a
supreme Congress, a restrained Presidency, and an even-more circum-
scribed judiciary inverts their true purpose: to neutralize legislative
power by greatly strengthening executive and judicial authority.418
413 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING, supra note 7, at 28-29, 99-100; Doernberg,
supra note 25, at 99-102; Joseph J. Giunta, Comment, Standing, Separation of Powers, and the
Demise of the Public Citizen, 24 AM. U. L. REv. 835, 840-43, 875-76 (1975); Winter, supra note
33, at 1381.
414 See supra part I.B.
415 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
416 For example, Justice Scalia began his essay on standing by quoting with approval
the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, pt. I, art. 30, which mandated absolute separation
of powers-a principle assertedly incorporated into the federal Constitution. See Scalia,
supra note 6, at 881. Apparently, he does not realize that our Constitution does not re-
quire total separation and that a proposed 1789 amendment modeled on the Massachu-
setts provision was rejected. See supra notes 73, 93, 161-62, 170 and accompanying text.
417 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; see also Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 488 ("The functions of gov-
ernment under our system are apportioned. To the legislative department has been com-
mitted the duty of making laws; to the executive the duty of executing them; and to the
judiciary the duty of interpreting and applying them in cases properly brought before the
courts.").
418 Justice Scalia has cited Madison for the proposition that the Framers considered
legislative power to be plenary, "whereas 'the executive power [is] restrained within a nar-
rower compass' and. .. 'the judiciary [is] described by landmarks still less uncertain.'"
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 256). He then argues that one
such "landmark" limiting the judiciary is standing. Id.
However, the sentence Scalia quotes simply acknowledges that legislative power has an
inherent primacy because it must be exercised before a law exists for the executive and
judiciary to act upon. See supra notes 28, 115 and accompanying text. Madison's theme is
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That is not to say that Article III's reference to "judicial power" did
not impose certain restrictions on federal courts, but only that those
limits are not maintained by current standing requirements.
419
The only plausible historical support for standing is the first part
of Marbury, wherein ChiefJustice Marshall indicated that an executive
official's performance of his statutory duty was judicially examinable
only if a plaintiff had been injured thereby.420 The modem Court's
invocation of this language as exemplifying judicial deference to the
executive is ironic because Marshall actually issued a gratuitous polit-
ical broadside against the President. 42' Moreover, the second part of
the Marbury opinion justified judicial review not as incidental to reme-
dying a private injury, but rather as necessary to uphold the supreme
Constitution against inconsistent legislation.42 2 Indeed, the Court rec-
ognized that its decision had ramifications far beyond redressing Mar-
bury's injury.42
3
that America's pre-1788 governments had distorted this idea by granting legislatures nearly
all power, and that the Constitution would avoid legislative tyranny by creating strong exec-
utive and judicial departments. See THE FEDERALisT No. 48; see also supra part I.B. More-
over, Madison endorsed the related concept that if Congress enacts a statute, it must be
executed by the President and interpreted definitively by the courts. See supra notes 115-
16, 159 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia's approach to standing subverts the Madis-
onian coextensiveness principle.
419 Such limits include acting solely at the request of an outside party in a public judi-
cial proceeding, interpreting (rather than making or executing) the law, and providing
reasoned opinions. See supra notes 35-39, 112-14, 152, 154, 157, 175 and accompanying
text; see also REDISH, supra note 7, at 89-90, 104 (contending that the injury requirement is
unnecessary to ensure that the judiciary respects its bounds). Cf Louis L.Jaffe, The Citizen
as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv.
1033, 1040-41 (1968) (asserting that standing doctrine imposes arbitrary restrictions that
bear little relation to the Court's capacity to issue substantive decisions that have broad or
negative effects, or both).
420 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 154-73 (1803), cited in Lujan, 504
U.S. at 576; Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, 454 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1982); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 171
(1974). Two other frequently cited Federalist Court opinions-Hayburn Caseand the Cor-
respondence of theJustices-undermine rather than support modern standing doctrine, for
reasons already detailed. See supra notes -199-232, 330-33 and accompanying text.
421 See supra notes 242-44, 258-59 and accompanying text.
422 See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text; see also Monaghan, Adjudication,
supra note 223, at 1370-71. The Court did state that its exercise of judicial review was
necessary to decide the "particular case." Marbuy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178. It did not
hold, however, that all such specific cases required an individual injury. Again, modern
standing decisions that cite Marbury tojustify limitations on judicial review are ironic, given
Marshall's willingness to reach the constitutional question through a strained statutory
construction and his invalidation of a law that rested on a reasonable interpretation of the
Constitution. See supra part I.C.3.b.
423 For example, the Court justified its opinion on the ground that the "delicacy,"
"novelty," and "difficulty" of the issues "require [d] a complete exposition of the principles"
involved. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 154. See REDISH, supra note 7, at 91-92; Winter,
supra note 33, at 1416.
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Marbury thus requires a personal injury only when a plaintiff
claims that an executive officer has failed to comply with a statute.
However, Marshall suggested that such an injury can be found fairly
easily, 424 and he did not foreclose the possibility that Congress could
grant broader standing. Moreover, Marbury nowhere held that a
showing of an individual, private law injury is necessary to allege a viola-
tion of the Constitution, although it is undoubtedly sufficient.425
Unlike injury, the "causation" and "redressability" requirements
have little historical pedigree.426 The Court's attempt to justify its re-
fusal to redress certain injuries on classical separation-of-powers
grounds427 is especially ironic in view of the Blackstonean maxim that
the violation of every legal right must have ajudicial remedy-a prin-
ciple Federalists considered essential to the preservation of liberty and
the rule of law.
428
In short, standing has become theoretically incoherent because
the Court has invoked vague, ahistorical "separation-of-powers" no-
tions to guide the application of malleable concepts like injury, causa-
tion, and redressability. Standing can, however, be clarified by
focusing directly on genuine Federalist postulates.
424 Marshall manufactured an injury by implying a quasi-property right from a vague
statute. See supra notes 238-42 and accompanying text. Thus, Marbury illustrates that the
manipulability of the "injury" concept is not a recent phenomenon.
425 See REDISH, supra note 7, at 90-94, 102. The adequacy of an individual injury to
establish standing is implicit in Marshall's emphasis on the maxim that every harm to a
legal right must have a remedy. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 162-69. Although Mar-
shall was focusing on statutory and common law rights, this remedial imperative seems
equally applicable to rights derived from the Constitution.
426 Causation arguably promotes separation of powers after the New Deal. As modem
regulations have such a broad scope, requiring a plaintiff to show that the government's
action has directly harmed her forecloses a huge pool of potential claimants and prevents
federal courts from becoming permanent monitors of executive conduct. See Poisner,
supra note 14, at 346-48; see also Logan, supra note 14, at 44-46, 78-77 (maintaining that
causation serves separation of powers by preventing advisory opinions). Unfortunately,
proof of causation is nearly impossible in complex regulatory schemes. See Cass R. Sun-
stein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 CoLuM. L. REv. 1432, 1458, 1463-69
(1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Privatization); see alSOVINING, supra note 313, at 32, 45, 51, 85-
86, 89, 9--94, 101, 113, 139-43 (Causation analysis ignores "the Donne effect"-i.e., that all
events are interdependent.).
Furthermore, the "causation" determination depends on how the Court characterizes
the injury, and is thus subject to similar manipulation. See Nichol, Rethinking supra note
412, at 79-82. Indeed, causation is an even more nebulous concept than injury, as any first-
year torts student knows. See Chayes, supra note 379, at 19.
427 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751-61 (1984).
428 See, e.g., Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 162-69. Moreover, because the modem
Court treats standing as a threshold determination based on the pleadings, it is improper
at that stage to ascertain redressability-the last item a court considers after all the facts
and arguments have been presented. See, e.g., ERwIN CHEMsaM'Ks, FEDERALJUI5sDICrION
76 (1994); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., OfJusticiability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes
on the Jurisprudence ofLyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7, 74-75 (1984). I do agree, however, that
judicial remedies must not exceed "judicial" bounds and should not interfere unnecessa-
rily with legislative and executive functioning. See Pushaw, supra note 36, at 525 n.365.
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c. Standing and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Synthesis
Under a Neo-Federalist approach, standing would be granted
whenever a statute or the Constitution authorizes a plaintiff to sue,
unless a federal court would thereby be required to render legal ad-
vice or to issue an order that could be revised by the political
branches. Somewhat different separation-of-powers principles apply,
however, depending on whether a claim is based on a violation of a
statute or the Constitution.429
i. Alleged Statutoy Violations
Separation of powers nearly always demands judicial deference to
Congress's exercise of its Article I powers to enact general laws reflect-
ing the majority's policy preferences and to determine how the rights
429 Other commentators have distinguished between statutory and constitutional
claims. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 308, at 223-24, 250-51, 280; Logan, supra note 14, at
40-42, 48-82.
Professor Steams has argued that standing furthers separation of powers by preserving
the core distinction in constitutional structure betweenjudicial and legislative lawmaking.
See Steams, Historical, supra note 310; Maxwell L. Steams, Standing Back from the Forest: Jus-
ticiability and Social Choice; 83 CAL. L Rxv. 1309 (1995) [hereinafter Stearns, Standing].
Steams's thesis can be summarized as follows. Standing doctrine reduces the ability of
interest-group litigants to control the sequence of case presentation-a matter of utmost
importance because stare decisis makes the evolution of legal doctrine dependent upon the
order of decisions. Steams, Standing, supra, at 1314-15, 1318, 1350-67, 1377, 1381-85, 1392.
By ensuring that a case's path hinges on fortuitous events beyond the parties' control
rather than litigant manipulation orjudicial preference, standing appropriately limits fed-
eral court lawmaking to ad hoc occasions where a seriously harmed individual presents a
case that must be decided. Id. at 1316, 1319-20, 1351, 1359-62, 1375-78, 1382, 1389, 1392,
1396-1403, 1405, 1411. Standing correspondingly preserves Congress's fundamental legis-
lative power to create-or to decline to create-law whenever and however it sees fit, lim-
ited only by minimal constitutional restrictions. Id. at 1316, 1319, 1357-59, 1361-64, 1377-
1401. In fact, the Court has always rejected ideological litigants to reinforce the basic sepa-
ration-of-powers principle that Congress, but not the federal judiciary, has the power to
control the timing and scope of lawmaking. Id. at 1402-03. This desire to maintain the
distinction between legislation and adjudication explains why standing, which developed
to prevent attacks on the regulatory programs that emerged in the New Deal and
mushroomed in the Great Society, has been retained by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts
despite their distrust of government regulation. Id. at 1322-23, 1327-29, 1367, 1395 n.269,
1402-04. Indeed, those conservative Courts have expanded standing doctrine to avoid
making substantive decisions whose outcome could not be reasonably predicted because of
the Justices' fragmentation into liberal, conservative, and moderate camps-in contrast to
the New Deal and Warren Courts, which shared a common doctrinal foundation on most
constitutional issues. See Steams, Historical, supra note 310, at 352-67, 375-85, 460-61.
Although I cannot respond fully here to Professor Steams's pathbreaking scholarship,
I note that he discounts the relevance of originalist historical analysis (see Steams, Standing
supra, at 1327-28 n.69) and, not surprisingly, assumes that standing properly furthers the
majoritarian norm embodied in American government. See Stearns, Standing, supra, at
1402, 1406, 1411; Steams, Historical supra note 310, at 337. Examination of Federalist-era
materials reveals, however, significant antimajoritarian aspects of the Constitution that
have been distorted in the twentieth century. See supra part IIA
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it has created can be vindicated most effectively.43 0 For example, Con-
gress may entrust protection of statutory fights almost entirely to an
executive agency, so long as the statute (1) sets forth intelligible stan-
dards to guide the exercise of administrative discretion;43' and (2)
provides judicial review at least for those whose constitutional or com-
mon law rights are directly affected by the agency's action.43 2 To pro-
mote efficiency, the Court has presumed that Congress does not
intend to grant standing generally to challenge an agency's adminis-
tration of its governing statute. For instance, nobody can question the
IRS's application of the Tax Code to Leona Helmsley except her.433
430 Thus, two Article I powers are implicated. The first is the core "legislative power"
to enact statutes, which is limited only by Article I's enumeration of powers-a virtually
meaningless restriction today. See supra notes 299-307 and accompanying text. Second,
Congress's control over federal jurisdiction enables it to determine the level of judicial
review necessary to vindicate the federal law it creates. See supra notes 108, 179 and accom-
panying text.
Because congressional grants of standing to remedy statutory "injuries" represent the
simultaneous exercise of two broad Article I powers, separation of powers dictates ex-
traordinary judicial deference. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 428, at 52-59; Logan, supra note
14, at 59-64, 69-70, 77, 81; Nichol, Justice Scalia, supra note 389, at 1157, 1160; see also 3
DAViS & PIERCE, supra note 161, at 19-21, 47-63 (In the administrative law context, congres-
sional intent should be the basis for resolving standing issues). Indeed, some scholars have
argued that standing should be treated as a substantive question of whether Congress has
created a cause of action for a plaintiff to remedy the violation of a statutory injury. See,
e.g., Lee A. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for
Claim for Relief 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974); Fletcher, supra note 308, at 223-24, 229, 242-43,
253-65; Sunstein, Lujan, supra note 389, at 166-67, 170-71, 177-78, 185, 190-91, 205-09, 211,
222-23, 229, 235-36.
This section merely outlines standing to allege executive branch statutory violations.
Particularly detailed and insightful commentary on this topic has been provided by two
scholars. First, Cuss Sunstein has contended that the Court has resurrected substantive due
process by granting standing to objects of regulation (usually powerful firms) to protect
their common law rights, while usually denying standing to regulatory beneficiaries seek-
ing to assert public rights. Sunstein, Lujan, supra note 389, at 164-65, 181-97, 211-13, 216-
20.
Second, Joseph Vining has argued that the traditional standing inquiry, which focuses
on the past deprivation of a private property right, should not be applied to administrative
law because (1) the remedy sought is usually prospective and is requested before property
rights have crystallized; and (2) judicial review of agency decisionmaking necessarily in-
volves a direct balancing of public values. SeeVINNG, supra note 313, at 67-77, 81, 89-90, 98-
99, 129-30, 164-71. Vining builds upon LouisJArE, JuDiCIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACnON 459-545 (1965).
431 See generally supra notes 303, 306 and accompanying text (discussing non-delegation
doctrine).
432 See Monaghan, Marbuty, supra note 380, at 18-20. This minimum due process re-
quirement finds expression in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982),
with a few narrow exceptions, id. §§701 (a) (1) & (2). See Fallon, Article I, supra note 380,
at 979-82 (objecting that even these exceptions offend Article III values by allowing Con-
gress to preclude judicial review of federal law questions). Other statutes can add to the
APA's floor. See Sunstein, Lujan, supra note 389, at 181-82.
433 See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (holding that
plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge an IRS ruling that pertained not to them but to
nonprofit hospitals). Similarly, in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), the Court would
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Conversely, Congress may grant broader judicial review through
public actions such as prerogative writs, relator and informer proceed-
ings, or citizen suits. Until recently, the Court properly deemed such
explicit legislative authorization sufficient to overcome its prudential
reluctance to infer widespread standing.4 4 Lujan, however, invali-
dated a citizen-suit provision on the ground that Article III prohibits
judicial cognizance of generally shared legal injuries435-despite over-
whelming evidence that public actions were part of the Anglo-
American tradition incorporated into the Constitution and have been
authorized since the beginning of the Republic. 43 6
Moreover, the Court's familiar rationale-the need to preserve
the judiciary's limited role vis-a-vis the elected branches437-is Orwel-
lian, for it engaged in activist constitutional interpretation to strike
down an act of Congress approved by the President. By asserting sole
discretion to determine standing based on "limits" that appear no-
where in Article III's text, structure, or history, the Court usurped
Congress's power to determine who can vindicate statutory rights judi-
cially.438 Had the Court applied Neo-Federalist principles, it would
have honored the statutory grant of standing, for doing so would not
have been justified in denying standing if plaintiffs had complained that the IRS misap-
plied the Tax Code to another taxpayer (i.e., private schools), for such a suit would have
"challeng[ed], not specifically identifiable Government violations of law, but the particular
program agencies establish to carry out their legal obligations." Id. at 759. However, those
plaintiffs were claiming that the IRS had harmed them by violating specific statutory and
constitutional limits on its enforcement discretion (namely, prohibitions against discrimi-
nation). Id. at 792-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
434 See supra notes 382-85, 390-97 and accompanying text. Indeed, even that champion
ofjudicial restraint, Justice Frankfurter, recognized this principle. See supra note 313 and
accompanying text.
435 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-76 (1992).
436 See supra notes 33, 37-38, 153, 197 and accompanying text; see also Sunstein, Lujan,
supra note 389, at 166-67, 171-79, 214.
437 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559-60, 573-78.
438 See supra notes 108, 179. As the dissent argued, Congress has the power to impose
procedural limits on the discretion it gives the Executive in attaining substantive statutory
goals and to authorize courts to enforce those limits through citizen suits: "Just as Con-
gress does not violate separation of powers by structuring the procedural manner in which
the Executive shall carry out the laws, surely the federal courts do not violate separation of
powers when, at the very instruction and command of Congress, they enforce those proce-
dures." 504 U.S. at 604 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see generally id. at 589-90, 601-04 (detail-
ing this argument).
Scholars have noted the irony of Justice Scalia's invocation of judicial restraint and
separation of powers tojustif' a decision that increasedjudicial power and contracted Con-
gress's authority to make judicially enforceable policy choices. See, e.g., Nichol, Justice
Scalia, supra note 389, at 1142-47, 1151-53, 1157-58, 1160, 1162, 1168-69; RichardJ. Pierce,
Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power,
42 DuxE LJ. 1170, 1170-71, 1187-88, 1198-1201 (1993); Sunstein, Lujan, supra note 389, at
166-67, 211, 214, 217-20, 236. Before Lujan, commentators had warned that dicta in prior
cases might lead to such an unwarranted outcome. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 308, at
231-34; Nichol, Injuy, supra note 374, at 1940-41.
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have forced it to render an opinion that was advisory or politically
revisable.
The Lujan Court also stressed the separation-of-powers goal of
minimizing judicial interference with the President's exercise of Arti-
cle II power to execute the law:
To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest
in executive officers' compliance with the law into an "individual
right" vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from
the President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important
constitutional duty, to "take Care that the Laws be faithfifly
executed."439
The Take Care Clause, however, does not grant the President power,
but rather imposes a duty to carry out the law as written.44° Indeed, its
purpose was to foreclose the President from claiming that his "execu-
tive power" includes the right to violate or suspend a statute44'-the
sort of total discretion Justice Scalia apparently endorses.442 Thus, ju-
dicial review legitimately stops the President from sabotaging the legis-
lature's policy choices. 443
The Court's response is that, if the President breaches his duty to
faithfully execute the law, the appropriate remedy is congressional
(notjudicial) oversight.444 For example, in Allen the Court cautioned
that allowing standing "would have the federal courts as virtually con-
tinuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action;
such a role is appropriate for the Congress acting through its commit-
tees and the 'power of the purse'; it is not the role of the judiciary."
44 5
The availability of legislative scrutiny, however, does not necessarily
439 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). But see id. at 601-04 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (Congress's authorization ofjudicial actions to enforce limitations on
executive discretion merely strengthens statutory mandates.). The Court first invoked this
"Take Care Clause" rationale in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984).
Article III standing doctrine gradually has incorporated Article II concerns as the
number of cases involving agency action has risen and the Court's separation-of-powers
philosophy increasingly has stressed deference to the executive. See Sunstein, Lujan, supra
note 389, at 194-96, 211-14, 217-18; Sunstein, Privatization, supra note 426, at 1459-61, 1470-
71.
440 See Alen, 468 U.S. at 792-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Sunstein, Privatization, supra
note 426, at 1471.
441 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
442 See Scalia, supra note 6, at 897 ("The ability to lose or misdirect laws can be said to
be one of the prime engines of social change.... ."). The President's undoubted discretion
in enforcing often vague statutory language simply does not apply where Congress's direc-
tive is clear. See Sunstein, Lujan, supra note 389, at 218.
443 See, e.g., Sunstein, Privatization, supra note 426, at 1471-72; see also Sunstein, Lujan,
supra note 389, at 212-13, 217-18, 231-33 (arguing thatjudicial review over alleged execu-
tive statutory violations would be nonexistent if the Take Care Clause barred standing to
raise such claims).
444 See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577.
445 Alen, 468 U.S. at 760 (citation omitted).
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preclude judicial review-especially in a case like Allen, where the
plaintiffs were questioning the legality (not the "wisdom and sound-
ness") of IRS tax breaks to discriminatory private schools.4
Neo-Federalism supports legislative monitoring of the executive
not only through committees and funding decisions but also by au-
thorizing judicial actions. By 1787, Parliament had long provided
such double protection, and the Federalists-who endorsed checking
even more emphatically-likely intended this practice to continue.44 7
Moreover, this dual security against executive misconduct has become
even more important in this century as the locus of government
power (and the greatest threat of tyranny) has shifted from Congress
to the executive.4 8 , Indeed, the immensity of the bureaucracy has
made it impossible for the legislature alone to police the executive.44 9
In sum, separation of powers warrants judicial deference to Con-
gress's determinations concerning standing to vindicate statutory
rights, and the exercise of all jurisdiction granted will not invade the
President's Article II power.
ii. Constitutional Challenges to Political Branch Actions
Where a plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation, the usual Neo-
Federalist bans on advisory opinions and politically revisable judicial
orders still apply.450 However, an additional rule should be followed:
At least one person must have standing to bring a claim under every
constitutional provision. According to Federalist theory, the People
established a written Constitution to identify clearly the limits on each
department, and neither Congress nor the President can impartially
446 See id. at 792-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
447 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing historical parliamentary over-
sight of the executive); supra notes 33, 38 and accompanying text (describing Parliament's
authorization of prerogative writs and other public actions to check the executive). See
generaly supra part I.B.2 (detailing Federalists' commitment to checks and balances).
A contrary inference might be drawn from the Framers' decision to allow the People
to hold the Chief Executive accountable through elections, thereby lessening the need for
the legislative or judicial oversight that existed in England. See supra notes 134-35 and
accompanying text; GwYN, MEMntqG, supra note 21, at 126-27. However, the First Congress
thought otherwise, because it directly monitored executive conduct and authorized public
judicial actions against the executive. See supra notes 153, 197 and accompanying text; see
also Casper, supra note 72 (analyzing interaction between the First Congress and President
Washington).
448 See supra notes 298-300, 375-79 and accompanying text; see also Sunstein, Constitu-
tionalism, supra note 298, at 463-85 (endorsing increased congressional and judicial scru-
tiny of agency actions).
449 The slow, cumbersome, and erratic process of legislative oversight exacerbates this
problem. See, e.g., Poisner, supra note 14, at 377-78.
450 These requirements are minimal but not meaningless. In several cases, the Court
has erroneously granted standing when Congress effectively sought judicial advice on ab-
stract constitutional questions. See Fletcher, supra note 308, at 280-90 (citing Northern
Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)).
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interpret restrictions on their own authority. Hence, judicial review
alone can check the political branches from exceeding their constitu-
tional bounds and threatening liberty.
These Federalist separation-of-powers principles have been incor-
porated into standing doctrine only partially. The Court has con-
strued its jurisdiction over "all Cases arising under the
Constitution"45' to authorize standing for those who can show a par-
ticularized constitutional injury. The Court also has adopted the pru-
dential rule that a suit can be brought only by the person harmed, not
by third parties claiming injury based on mere awareness of the gov-
ernment's unconstitutional action. 452
Restricting standing to injured individuals makes sense when the
plaintiff alleges invasion of an individual constitutional right-for ex-
ample, Article I's ban on ex post facto laws and bills of attainder; most
of the Bill of Rights;453 the Reconstruction Amendments; and the
Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-fifth Amendments.454 Fur-
thermore, this approach nicely balances competing separation-of-
powers goals. On the one hand, it protects liberty by allowing the
person whose constitutional freedom has been infringed to sue-or to
decide not to sue.455 As long as one individual can enforce such con-
stitutional provisions, they retain vitality, and the government will be
deterred from disregarding them. On the other hand, the Court pro-
motes efficiency by insulating the government's conduct from attack
by paternalistic busybodies. 456
451 U.S. CONsT. art. 1I, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
452 See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (holding that a prisoner lacked
standing to challenge a death penalty sentence imposed on a fellow inmate). The Court
has recognized certain exceptions, most importantly for claimants who are closely related
to the injured party. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 117-18 (1976) (ruling that
doctors may assert the abortion rights of their patients). See generally Henry P. Monaghan,
Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L Ray. 277 (1984) (questioning the Court's exercise of
discretion to determine that certain plaintiffs can act as private attorneys general in raising
constitutional issues affecting third parties); Robert A. Sedler, The Assertion of Constitutional
Jus Tertii: A Substantive Approach, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1308 (1982) (contending that one party
should never be allowed to assert another's constitutional rights).
453 Possible exceptions are the First Amendment's Establishment Clause and the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments.
454 See EricJ. Segall, Standing Between the Court and the Commentators: A Necessity Rationale
for Public Actions, 54 U. Prrr. L. REv. 351, 391-94, 398 (1993). Applying a private law injury
model to the Constitution is especially apt where the provision at issue has common law
roots, such as a claim under the Takings Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V, or the Contracts
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cI. 1.
455 See Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article I:L Perspectives on the "Case or Contro-
versy" Requiremen 93 HAItv. L. Rv. 297, 306-10 (1979) (suggesting that in order to protect
personal autonomy, courts should prevent meddlers from asserting the individual rights of
others who choose not to litigate).
456 Others have made similar arguments, although not from the standpoint of balanc-
ing separation-of-powers concerns. See, e.g., id.; Fletcher, supra note 308, at 279; Segall,
supra note 454, at 391-94. Arguably, the entire Constitution reflects the People's collective
486 [Vol. 81:393
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The Court has also applied its particularized-injury requirement
to determine standing under constitutional provisions that either pro-
tect collective rights (e.g., the Establishment Clause) or structure the
government (e.g., most of Articles I and II).457 Because violations of
such provisions ordinarily cannot produce a distinct injury, however,
the Court has effectively made them judicially unenforceable and
meaningless as limits on power.458 Moreover, the argument that only
Congress can authorize general standing to enforce non-
individualistic constitutional provisions459 undermines Federalist prin-
ciples. It assumes that the political branches have sovereign power to
judgment, and therefore any violation of it injures all citizens. Indeed, the Court has rec-
ognized the public's interest in the enforcement of certain constitutional rights usually
perceived as individualistic. See Doemberg, supra note 25, at 102-09 (citing cases involving
the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth and Thirteenth Amendments). Nonetheless, allowing suit
only by those personally harmed by the government's misconduct should suffice to protect
these broader societal interests. See id. at 110-12.
457 See supra part II.B.l.a.
458 Professor Doemberg has argued that standing should be granted to private attor-
neys-general to vindicate the public interest in governmental compliance with constitu-
tional provisions that cannot produce individualized injuries. See Doernberg, supra note
25, at 110-18. Such broad standing would recognize that the Constitution incorporated
the Lockean idea that certain rights are held collectively by the body politic. Id. at 56-68,
95-118; see also supra note 25 (discussing Locke). Other scholars have developed this thesis.
See, e.g., REDISH, supra note 7, at 95-97, 103; Eric B. Schnurer, Note, "More Than an Intuition,
Less Than a Theory": Toward a Coherent Doctrine of Standirig, 86 COLuM. L. REv. 564, 585-93
(1986); Segall, supra note 454, at 375-77, 380-82, 391-403; Dana S. Treister, Comment,
Standing to Sue the Government: Are Separation of Powers Principles Really Being Served., 67 S.
CAL. L. REv. 689, 709-10, 712-13 (1994). A related argument is that standing should de-
pend on the meaning of a particular constitutional provision, which should be seen as the
source of the legal duty and the definition of those entitled to enforce it. See Fletcher,
supra note 808, at 223-24, 229, 239, 251, 265-90; Winter, supra note 33, at 1463-81, 1496-97,
1503, 1508-09.
I have previously suggested that standing doctrine should be reoriented to acknowl-
edge that thejudiciary's primary function in constitutional cases is to interpret the Consti-
tution, not to resolve private disputes involving injured plaintiffs. See Pushaw, supra note
36. Others have relied on a similar adjudicatory model to argue that standing should be
granted to almost anyone who alleges a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Bandes, supra
note 290, at 281-304. Although I continue to believe that such a public law conception of
judicial review is accurate, I underestimated the utility of the personal injury requirement
as applied to claimed violations of individual constitutional rights.
459 This contention was first made by Justice Harlan in East v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 180-
33 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). It makes sense if one accepts Congress's absolute con-
trol over federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Logan, supra note 14, at 54-59, 62-63; Monaghan,
Adjudication, supra note 223, at 1375-76 (endorsing Harlan's position on the ground that
the Constitution's scheme of separated powers requires express political branch authoriza-
tion before courts can decide constitutional cases).
By contrast, I think Congress's admittedly substantial power over federal jurisdiction is
limited by Article III's command that federal courts "shall" decide "all" constitutional cases
and by deeper structural constitutional principles. SeeAmar, Neo-Federalis supra note 13, at
229-52; see also Gene R. Nichol,Jr., Standing on the Constitution: The Supreme Court and Valley
Forge, 61 N.C. L REv. 798, 840 (1983) [hereinafter Nichol, Valley Forge] (attacking Justice
Harlan for adopting an overly cautious approach to separation of powers that renders col-
lective constitutional rights judicially unenforceable solely because they are shared).
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preclude judicial review over much of the People's Constitution and
can be trusted to respect the limits that charter places on their author-
ity. It also subverts the Federalist theory that the Constitution's struc-
ture is the primary protector of individual liberty.460
The better approach would be for the Court to interpret its fed-
eral question jurisdiction as including grants of standing to enforce
constitutional provisions that benefit citizens generally.46 1 One exam-
ple would be those that directly guarantee shared civil liberties, such
as the Establishment Clause.462 Another would be structural provi-
sions that limit governmental power, most obviously those that di-
rectly embody separation-of-powers values. For instance, Article I,
Section 6 bars members of Congress from holding office in another
branch or from being appointed to an executive orjudicial office that
has been created or granted increased compensation during their leg-
islative tenure.4 63 These prohibitions, designed to prevent congres-
sional conflicts of interest, cannot safely be left to Congress's
460 See, e.g., CHEMERINKSY, supra note 428, at 68-69, 96-97; Redish & Cisar, supra note
106, at 452, 493. This focus on structure helps explain the original absence of a Bill of
Rights. See id.; see also supra note 145.
461 In addition, the Court should strike down attempts to curb such jurisdiction. See
supra notes 370-74, 458-60 and accompanying text.
On the modem Court, only Justice Douglas consistently linked the need for broad
standing to the idea of a written Constitution based on popular sovereignty and separation
of powers. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 197-202 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 229-35 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). He stressed the federal courts' "indispensable" role in "pro-
tect[ing] the individual against prohibited conduct by the other two branches of the Fed-
eral Government," which they should not "abdicat[e]" by "clos[ing their doors." Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 110-11 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring); see also id. at 109-14 (urging
liberal standing for taxpayers as "private attorneys general" to claim constitutional
violations).
Unfortunately, Justice Douglas's theory has largely been ignored, probably for two
reasons. First, he never set forth an elaborate historical defense of his position. Second,
like much of his writing, Douglas's standing opinions were often either careless or unor-
thodox. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)
(inadvertently creating a confusing "injury-in-fact" test for standing); Sierra Club v. Mor-
ton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-49 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that trees should
have standing).
462 All taxpayers should be granted standing to allege that the government's assistance
to religion violates the Establishment Clause, because the whole polity shares this "injury."
See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, 454 U.S. 464, 490-513 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Nichol, Valley Forge, supra
note 459, at 798-803, 845-48; see also supra notes 396-97 and accompanying text (discussing
Valley Forge).
By contrast, other Establishment Clause claims (e.g., that a Sunday-closing law discrim-
inates against religions with a Saturday sabbath) may be characterized as involving more
individualistic harms and thus may be subjected to conventional standing analysis. For a
discussion of various types of Establishment Clause standing, see Carl H. Esbeck, A Restate-
ment of the Supreme Court's Law of Religious Freedom: Coherence, Conflict, or Chaos?, 70 NoTm
DAME L. RExv. 581, 585-88, 628-30 (1995).
463 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 7; see supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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discretion. Yet that is exactly what the Court has held-with the
Kafkaesque rationale that separation of powers compels this result!46 4
The proposed approach would impede government functioning
only to the extent that the Constitution mandates the "inefficiency" of
compliance with its provisions.46 5 Moreover, after granting standing,
courts can employ two other doctrines to address efficiency concerns.
First, ripeness can be applied to postpone decision on premature con-
stitutional challenges.46 6 Second, the presumption that the entire
Constitution is judicially enforceable can be rebutted by evidence that
a particular provision involves a political question-i.e., grants exclu-
sive authority to Congress or the President without imposing any justi-
ciable restriction on its exercise.46 7
Although it may seem unimportant whether a dismissal is based
on standing or political question grounds, it makes a great difference
under constitutional theory. In refusing to grant standing for genera-
lized claims, the Court has stated that the political branches can diso-
bey the Constitution with impunity-a repudiation of the rule of law.
By contrast, declining to decide a political question upholds the Con-
stitution's assignment of certain issues to a political official's sole dis-
cretion; any action she takes is "legal" by definition.
464 See, e.g., Ex parteLevitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam) (denying a citizen stand-
ing to claim that Hugo Black was ineligible to serve as ajustice because as a Senator he had
voted to increase the emoluments of federal judges); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (rejecting an attempt by a public-interest group to
invoke the Incompatibility Clause to challenge members of Congress who were simultane-
ously serving in the military reserves, an executive branch agency). Both Levitt and Schles-
inger rested on the separation-of-powers rationale that an individual injury is required to
challenge political branch actions. See supra notes 385, 393-95 and accompanying text.
Dean Nichol has argued that the judiciary's limited role justifies a presumption
against its hearing generalized constitutional claims, rebuttable on a showing that either an
interest expressly reserved to the citizenry or the proper functioning of the political pro-
cess is at stake. Nichol, Injury, supra note 374, at 1943-44. In his view, neither Levitt nor
Schlesinger involved such concerns, whereas Richardson did. Id. at 1943-45.
465 Looser standing rules would broaden court access, but not necessarily to an over-
whelming extent. See, e.g., CHEMERrNSKY, supra note 428, at 55.
466 See infra part II.B.3.
467 See infra part II.B.4; see also 3 DAvIs & PiERCE, supra note 161, at 2-4, 24, 27-30, 39-40,
47, 75, 94-95 (urging the Court to recognize candidly that certain constitutional provisions
are nonjusticiable, rather than making such determinations sub rosa in its standing analy-
sis); Nichol, Rethinking, supra note 412, at 88, 93, 98-102 (arguing that the political question
doctrine is more appropriate than standing for evaluating separation-of-powers concerns).
Thus, unlike standing's injury requirement, the political question doctrine can distinguish
structural provisions that are judicially enforceable from those that are not. For example,
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974), might properly have been disposed of on
political question grounds. See id. at 178 n.11 (noting that the Framers apparently recog-
nized that the Statement and Accounts Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7, allowed some
secrecy in foreign affairs spending, as confirmed by two centuries of practice); see also Cas-
per, supra note 72, at 252, 257-58 (showing that the First Congress and all its successors
have made money available for foreign relations and given the President discretion not to
account for expenditures that he felt should not be made public).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
In sum, Neo-Federalist principles suggest that the Court may le-
gitimately apply its personalized-injury requirement to determine
standing under constitutional provisions that protect individual-but
not collective-rights.
2. Mootness and Separation of Powers
Like its standing jurisprudence, the Court's mootness doctrine
posits that Article III limits the judiciary to resolving live controversies
between parties with individual rights at stake.468 Therefore, to de-
cide a case after the litigants' dispute has ended would be to render a
forbidden "advisory opinion" with no real-world effect.469
Until 1964, however, the Court treated mootness not as an Article
III requirement but as an equitable determination.470 Indeed, it has
long decided several types of moot cases-for example, those "capable
of repetition, yet evading review."471 These exceptions are incompre-
hensible if federal courts lack Article III jurisdiction to resolve moot
cases at all.472 Thus, mootness is, and always has been, a matter of
discretion.
One major factor guiding the exercise of that discretion should
be separation of powers. Unfortunately, the Court has mentioned this
principle in only one mootness case, United States Parole Commission v.
Geraghty.473 Geraghty, a federal prisoner, brought a class action chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the parole guidelines. The district
court denied his petition for class certification and rejected his consti-
tutional claims. 474 Although Geraghty was subsequently released and
468 Instead of developing a distinct constitutional rationale for moomess, the Court
has simply incorporated its standing analysis. See infra note 476 and accompanying text.
469 See Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992). Unlike a true
"advisory opinion," however, a litigated case that becomes moot on appeal presents a fac-
tual and legal record that has been fully developed by adverse parties. See Monaghan,
Adjudication, supra note 223, at 1384.
The following discussion will be limited to mootness on appeal to the Supreme Court;
different considerations may apply to cases that become moot at earlier stages.
470 The Court first asserted that moomess was based on Article M in Liner v. Jafco,
Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964).
471 See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 830-31 (1988) (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring). An-
other exception applies where a defendant has ceased but might later resume the chal-
lenged conduct. Id- See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 428, at 128-42 (describing these and
other exceptions).
472 See Honig, 484 U.S. at 330 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The Court has adopted an
odd compromise, insisting that mootness is an Article III command yet recognizing its
"flexible character." See United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395-97,
400 (1980). However, if the Court has no constitutional power to decide a moot case, then
that requirement cannot be applied flexibly. See id. at 410-13 (Powell, J., dissenting).
473 445 U.S. 388 (1980).
474 Id. at 392-93.
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thus did not need parole, the Court nevertheless held that the expira-
tion of his substantive claim did not moot the class action.475
The Court recited that all justiciability doctrines serve two pur-
poses. First, they confine judicial power to disputes where a plaintiff
has a personal stake in the outcome, thereby ensuring that the issues
are sharply presented by adversaries. 476 The Court ruled that Ger-
aghty had retained such a personal interest in obtaining class certifica-
tion.477 Second, justiciability promotes separation of powers by
avoiding judicial intrusion into areas committed to the political
branches.478 The Court tersely concluded that separation concerns
would have been implicated if the legal issues presented (i.e., the valid-
ity of the parole guidelines) had become moot, but were not relevant
because those questions remained live and the sole determination was
whether the plaintiff was a proper party.479 The Court's unpersuasive
issue-party distinction 480 masked an obvious reason for its cursory
treatment of separation of powers: The Court ignored its stated goal
of avoiding interference with the coordinate branches by straining to
overcome the mootness hurdle so it could review executive action.
Similar contradictions pervade mootness cases involving the federal
government.481
475 Id. at 395-408.
476 Id. at 395-97. The Court relied on standing cases like Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
95, 100-01 (1968), and Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216-
18 (1974).
477 Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 401-04.
478 Id. at 395-96.
479 Id. at 396 (citing Flast 392 U.S. at 95, 100-01).
480 Geraghty's resurrection of TFhst's contrast between issues and parties was remarka-
ble, given that by 1980 the Court had rejected that distinction in the standing context
because it recognized the impossibility of separating the issue from the party presenting it.
See supra note 387; see also Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 412-13 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Article HI personal stake requirement, whether in the standing or moomess context,
furthers the same purpose of limiting the Court's role in a democratic society).
481 Often the Court ignores moomess problems and confronts a coequal branch. For
example, in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), the House of Representatives exer-
cised its Article I power over its membership by refusing to seat Powell. While his case was
pending, Powell was elected to the next Congress and seated. The Court held that the case
was not moot, id. at 495-500, and that the House had violated the Constitution. Id. at 489,
501-12, 550; see also Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12-13 (1992) (re-
versing the Ninth Circuit's dismissal on moomess grounds of a church's constitutional at-
tack against the IRS).
Conversely, the Court sometimes finds cases moot to avoid political entanglements.
See, e.g., Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987) (ruling that a challenge to the President's
"pocket veto" of a bill was moot because the bill had expired by the time of the appeal);
Department of Treasury v. Galioto, 477 U.S. 556 (1986) (concluding that Congress's
amendment of statutory provisions previously found unconstitutional by a lower federal
court mooted the appeal).
Finally, the Court sometimes decides seemingly moot cases in order to vindicate gov-
ernmental interests. For example, United States v. Villamonte, 462 U.S. 579 (1983), re-
jected a Fourth Amendment challenge to Customs Officers' boarding of a vessel without
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The Court could clarify mootness by developing a Neo-Federalist
approach that explicitly balances various separation-of-powers factors,
some of which it has acknowledged implicitly. For example, Geraghty
alluded to the wisdom of not disturbing the political branches.48 2
This efficiency concern counsels against deciding a moot case to avoid
the possibility of an adverse-and unnecessary-judgment against a
coordinate branch.48 3 If the government assumes this risk by con-
senting to suit, however, the Court ordinarily should proceed in rec-
ognition of the efficiency interests of conserving judicial resources48 4
and enforcing federal law.48 5
Efficiency, however, may conflict with other separation-of-powers
goals. Most importantly, federal courts must check the government's
violations of the law. Indeed, the "capable of repetition" exception
serves this purpose by ensuring that allegedly illegal government ac-
tions do not escape judicial scrutiny.48 6 This concern with checking
and with maintaining the rule of law applies with special force when
the case involves a constitutional rather than statutory claim.48 7 Fi-
nally, the Court should consider the liberty interests of both the plain-
probable cause and seizing drugs later used as evidence to convict the defendants. This
case appeared moot, however, because the government had voluntarily dismissed its crimi-
nal prosecution after the Court of Appeals reversed the convictions. See id. at 593-98 (Bren-
nan,J., dissenting); see also United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S.
199, 202-04 (1968) (rejecting mootness arguments and upholding the government's anti-
trust suit).
482 Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 396.
483 The Court always has discretion to dismiss a moot case, and one factor it should
consider is the desirability of avoiding needless intervention into political branch affairs. By
contrast, Neo-Federalism treats standing as mandatory- Federal courts must recognize
standing when Congress has constitutionally conferred it, even though exercising jurisdic-
tion may interfere with the political departments. See supra notes 429-65 and accompany-
ing text.
484 If a case becomes moot pending appeal and presents a question that will certainly
recur, dismissal would squander resources already expended and require further wasteful
litigation. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 331-32 (1988) (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
485 This concern underlies one of the exceptions to moomess. See United States v.
W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953) (holding that the defendants' voluntary termination
of a practice that allegedly violated the antitrust laws did not render the case moot because
they were free to return to this practice).
486 See supra note 471 and accompanying text; see also Evan T. Lee, Deconstitutionalizing
Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HAtv. L. REv. 603, 628, 631, 655-56 (1992) (assert-
ing that exceptions to mootness reflect the Court's recognition of its role in articulating
public values).
487 See, e.g., Corey C. Watson, Comment, Mootness and the Constitution, 86 Nw. U. L. REv.
143, 171-74 (1991). As with standing, moomess determinations in purely statutory cases
should turn on legislative intent. See supra notes 430-49 and accompanying text. For exam-
ple, the Court should dismiss moot cases if Congress sought to minimize judicial chal-
lenges to agency administration of statutes. Conversely, judgment should be rendered if
important statutory goals would otherwise be frustrated. See, e.g., Honig, 484 U.S. at 317-23
(deciding a moot case under the "capable of repetition" exception involving a disabled
student who alleged that a school had violated his federal statutory rights).
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tiff (who should not be forced to continue)48 8 and non-parties (whose
freedom may be threatened by the government's conduct, even
though the plaintiff's liberty is no longer endangered).
These separation-of-powers factors-the government's efficiency
concern of avoiding an adverse judgment without its consent, the
Court's checking role, and society's interest in safeguarding liberty-
must be weighed on a case-by-case basis. Nonetheless, certain fixed
rules ordinarily should apply in the four situations that may arise.
First, if both parties want a moot case decided, rendering judgment
would promote efficiency, checking, and liberty.48 9 Second, if neither
side wishes to continue, the case should be dismissed because protect-
ing the plaintiff's autonomy and governmental efficiency will usually
outweigh the need for checking. Third, if the government seeks a
decision but the other party objects, the Court may decide the case on
both efficiency and checking grounds, but should consider whether it
can make a decision without ordering the other party to proceed (e.g.,
because the case has already been briefed) and whether general lib-
erty interests are at stake. Finally, if the private party-but not the
government-requests adjudication, efficiency concerns favoring dis-
missal may be overriden by compelling checking and liberty interests.
Geraghty fits into the last category. The government claimed
mootness, but the plaintiff alleged a serious constitutional violation,
he chose to continue, and other prisoners' liberty was being
threatened in the most basic sense. Thus, the result in Geraghty might
be defensible in separation-of-powers terms. Those principles, how-
ever, should have been considered explicitly in Geraghty and in all
other mootness cases.
3. Ripeness and Separation of Powers
Ripeness differs from other justiciability doctrines in two ways.
First, whereas mootness, lack of standing, or a political question pre-
cludes judicial review, ripeness merely postpones a decision until the
factual and legal issues have matured. Second, while the former doc-
trines have historical antecedents, ripeness is a twentieth-century crea-
tion. Despite its novelty, the Court's ripeness analysis relies heavily on
its historical understanding of separation of powers, and thus suffers
from familiar defects that can be rectified by applying Neo-Federalist
principles.
488 This autonomy interest resembles that of plaintiffs who have standing because they
have suffered a constitutional injury but decline to file suit. See supra notes 455-56 and
accompanying text.
489 If the judicial resolution would also affect third parties, a court should allow their
participation and consider their interests.
19961
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a. The Historical Development of Ripeness
The Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934 ("DJA") authorized fed-
eral courts to interpret laws that had not yet been applied, so long as a
plaintiff could show an "actual controversy" with a defendant who was
threatening enforcement. 490 The DJA's purpose was to spare citizens
the Hobson's choice of either (1) complying with an allegedly uncon-
stitutional statute (or a regulation contrary to statute), or (2) violating
the law and facing severe consequences if it were upheld.49'
After finding the DJA constitutional in 1937,492 the Court devel-
oped the ripeness doctrine to determine when to issue declaratory
relief. For example, in United Public Workers v. Mitchel 493 federal em-
ployees attacked the First Amendment validity of the Hatch Act, which
prohibited them from political campaigning. The Court held that,
because the law had not actually been applied to the plaintiffs, they
faced merely a "hypothetical threat" and were seeking "advisory opin-
ions" prohibited by Article 111.494 The Court declared:
The Constitution allots the nation's judicial power to the federal
courts. Unless these courts respect the limits of that unique author-
ity, they intrude upon powers vested in the legislative or executive
branches. Judicial adherence to the doctrine of the separation of
powers preserves the courts for the decision of issues, between liti-
gants, capable of effective determination.... When the courts act
continually within these constitutionally imposed boundaries of
their power, their ability to perform their function as a balance for
the people's protection against abuse of power by other branches of
government remains unimpaired. Should the courts seek to ex-
pand their power so as to bring under their jurisdiction ill-defined
controversies over constitutional issues, they would become the or-
gan of political theories. Such abuse ofjudicial power would prop-
490 48 Stat. 955 (1934) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1982)).
491 See S. REP. No. 1005, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1934). The explosion of regulatory
laws in the early 20th century increased the frequency of such a choice.
492 Aema Life Ins. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937) (holding that the "actual contro-
versy" requirement saved the Act's constitutionality). The constitutional legitimacy of state
declaratory judgment acts had been questioned in Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n,
277 U.S. 274, 289 (1928), but was later upheld in Nashville, C. & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace,
288 U.S. 249 (1933).
The availability of declaratory judgments also has implications for moomess. For ex-
ample, if the legal rights of plaintiffs have actually been violated, they should be permitted
to obtain a declaratoryjudgment to that effect even if their case has become moot and they
have suffered no monetary harm. SeeAkhil R. Amar, Law Story, 102 HARv. L. REv. 688, 718-
19 n.157 (1989). Cf supra part I.B.2 (arguing that compelling checking and liberty inter-
ests may warrant deciding a moot case even if the government objects).
493 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
494 Id. at 89-90 (citing Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 409 (1792), and the Correspon-
dence of the Justices, 3JAY PAPERS, supra note 20, at 486). The Court also relied on the pru-




erly meet rebuke and restriction from other branches. By these
mutual checks and balances by and between the branches of gov-
ernment, democracy undertakes to preserve the liberties of the peo-
ple from excessive concentrations of authority...495
Justice Frankfurter joined the Mitchell opinion and reaffirmed its rea-
soning in subsequent cases.
4 96
Mitchell and its progeny dealt with constitutional challenges.
When a plaintiff attacked agency action on statutory grounds, how-
ever, the Court downplayed its Article III rhetoric and admitted that
ripeness was a discretionary determination based on separation of
powers. 49 7 The leading case is Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,498 in
which drug companies challenged a federal agency's interpretation of
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act to require them to change all their
printed matter to disclose generic drug names.49 9 Initially, the Court
explained:
The injunctive and declaratory judgment remedies are discretion-
ary, and courts traditionally have been reluctant to apply them to
administrative determinations unless these arise in the context of a
controversy "ripe" for judicial resolution .... [Ripeness's] basic
rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements
495 Id. at 90-91.
496 For example, in International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Local
37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954), resident aliens who wished to work seasonally in the
Alaska territory requested declaratory and injunctive remedies against INS officials who
had threatened to prevent their return to the United States. Without such relief, the work-
ers could pursue employment only at the risk of "los[ing] the home this country once
afforded them." Id. at 226 (Black,J., dissenting). Nevertheless,Justice Frankfurter, writing
for the Court, found this claim unripe: "Determination of the scope and constitutionality
of legislation in advance of its immediate adverse effect in the context of a concrete case
involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of the judicial func-
tion." Id. at 224 (citing Mitche/, 330 U.S. at 75). But see Kenneth C. Davis, Ripeness of
GovemmentalActionforJudicial Review, 68 HAgv. L. REv. 1122, 1123-34 (1955) (rejecting the
Court's assertion that Article II prohibited federal courts from resolving debilitating legal
uncertainties).
Mitchell and its progeny raised troubling separation-of-powers questions because the
Court disregarded the will of Congress, which had authorized declaratory judgments pre-
cisely to enable people to avoid having to violate a law-and risk severe consequences-in
order to challenge it.
497 For example, in Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff, 344 U.S. 237 (1952), a company
requested declaratory relief against a Utah commission that was interfering with its trans-
portation over routes authorized by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Court
held that the matter had not yet ripened into a final form that would permit it to under-
stand the legal issues clearly. Id. at 241-46. The Court repeatedly acknowledged the discre-
tionary nature of its determination. See, e.g., id. at 241, 243, 245. It emphasized the
separation-of-powers concern that the plaintiff was attempting to obtain a premature fed-
eral court declaration on legal questions committed for initial decision to the ICC. Id. at
246-47.
498 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
499 Id. at 137-39 (citing relevant statutes and regulations).
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over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from
judicial interference until an administrative decision has been for-
malized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging par-
ties. The problem is best seen in a twofold aspect, requiring us to
evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the
hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.500
Applying this balancing test, the Court found ripe the claim that the
regulation exceeded the agency's statutory authority.50
Abbott's characterization of ripeness as a discretionary inquiry into
prematurity, rather than an Article III jurisdictional limitation, was
gradually extended from statutory challenges to those based on the
Constitution.50 2 In the late 1970s, however, the Court recast ripeness
as an Article III requirement and correspondingly shifted its focus to a
standing-like search for an "injury."50 Despite abandoning Abbotts
reasoning, however, the Court has continued to apply its balancing
test. The result has been analytical incoherence. 50 4
b. A Neo-Federalist Approach to Ripeness
The Court's treatment of ripeness as an Article III jurisdictional
matter ignores the clear constitutional and statutory power of federal
courts to decide federal question cases in the form of declaratory and
injunctive actions.505 Rather, ripeness doctrine should determine
500 Id. at 148-49.
501 Id. at 148-56. First, the Court held that the issues were appropriate for judicial
resolution because a purely legal question of statutory construction had been presented.
Id. at 149. Second, it concluded that withholding review would force the companies either
to comply with the regulation and incur huge costs or to ignore the law and risk severe
penalties-the very type of dilemma the DJA sought to avoid. Id. at 152-54.
502 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 117 (1976) (Politicians' constitutional chal-
lenge to future determinations by the Federal Election Commission "is a question of ripe-
ness, rather than lack of case or controversy under Art. in."); see also id. at 114
(emphasizing the "distinction between jurisdictional limitations imposed by Art. III and
'[p] roblems of prematurity and abstractness' that may prevent adjudication").
503 See Gene . Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHr. L. REv. 153, 162-64
(1987) [hereinafter Nichol, Ripeness] (citing cases).
504 For example, Reno v. Catholic Social Servs., 509 U.S. 43 (1993), involved a chal-
lenge by illegal aliens to INS regulations that drastically restricted access to an amnesty
program authorized by Congress. The majority conflated Abbott with Article III principles
and held the case unripe. Id. at 57-61. Three dissenters argued persuasively that the case
was ripe under Abbott because the regulations immediately and severely affected the aliens'
ability to obtain amnesty, and the legal issues were fit for decision. Id. at 77-85 (Stevens,J.,
dissenting); cf id. at 67-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (also disagreeing with
the majority's holding of unripeness); see also Nichol, Ripeness, supra note 503, at 155-56,
167-85 (contending that ripeness should not be an Article III requirement, but rather a
discretionary judicial evaluation of the legal claim in light of the policy of avoiding early
adjudication).
505 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (empowering the judiciary to decide federal questions);
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) (same); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982) (authorizing declaratory judg-
ments). The constitutionality of declaratoryjudgments has not been questioned since they
were upheld 60 years ago. See supra note 492.
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whether thatjurisdiction ought to be exercised in a specific case after
a discretionary weighing of many factors,50 6 most importantly separa-
tion of powers.
The Court itself devised such an approach in Abbott, which pro-
vides a framework for reformulating ripeness along Neo-Federalist
lines. First, the Abbott Court recognized that judicial relief ordinarily
should not be granted too soon out of deference to (1) Congress's
power to commit issues to an agency for initial determination; and (2)
the executive's authority to administer regulatory laws until a final or-
der has been issued.507 Such efficiency concerns create a presump-
tion against pre-enforcement review that can be overcome if the
plaintiff shows "the hardship . .. of withholding court considera-
tion."508 This "hardship" test captures the DJA's purpose of protect-
ing individual liberty and allows the judiciary to check unlawful
political branch conduct.509
In short, the suggested methodology acknowledges that ripeness
is an inherently discretionary doctrine and focuses directly on balanc-
ing the Federalist separation-of-powers principles of efficiency, liberty,
and checking.
4. Political Questions and Separation of Powers
Federal courts decline jurisdiction over cases involving questions
that the Constitution entrusts for final resolution to Congress or the
President. This "political question doctrine" has always been based on
"separation of powers," but those two concepts mean far different
things to the modern Court than they did to the Framers. This diver-
gence is odd, because Federalists spoke with singular clarity about
political questions and their relationship to the structural Constitu-
tion. Recovering this understanding helps to elucidate a muddled
doctrine.
506 Such a test befits the equitable nature of the relief sought. See Abbott, 387 U.S. at
148. Indeed, ripeness is inherently discretionary: Determining whether a claim has devel-
oped sufficiently is obviously a question of degree.
507 See id. at 148; see also Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff, 344 U.S. 237, 246-47 (1952)
("Responsibility for effective functioning of the administrative process cannot be... trans-
ferred from the bodies in which Congress has placed it to the courts.").
508 See Abbott, 387 U.S. at 149. If no irreparable harm will result from delaying a deci-
sion, forbearance isjustified-indeed, it might obviate the need for anyjudicial resolution.
See generally CHEMEMrNSKY, supra note 428, at 116-23 (discussing this "hardship" test).
If a plaintiff is about to suffer serious harm and her claim is ripe, it should not matter
whether her challenge is based on the Constitution or a statute, despite the Court's con-
trary statements. See supra notes 493-504 and accompanying text.
509 See supra note 491 and accompanying text. Of course, such checking can occur
only through the proper exercise of judicial power-as reflected in the Abbott standard
focusing on the "fitness of the issues forjudiciai decision." 387 U.S. at 149. Such fitness
depends on the completeness of the factual and legal record and the importance of facts
to a particular decision. See, e.g., CHEMEmNSKy, supra note 428, at 123-25 (citing cases).
19961 497
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
a. The Political Question Doctrine: A Summay
The modem doctrine was established in Baker v. Car,510 which
held justiciable a claim by Tennessee voters that a statute violated the
Equal Protection Clause by malapportioning legislative representation
to favor rural areas.51' The Court characterized the political question
doctrine as a "case-by-case inquiry" based entirely on separation of
powers,5 12 as measured by the following criteria:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commit-
ment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unu-
sual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision al-
ready made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.513
The Court concluded that the Equal Protection Clause provided 'judi-
cially manageable standards" and that the other five listed factors were
not relevant because the case concerned state officials, not a coequal
federal branch.514 In the latter situation, the Court indicated that one
criterion would be the most significant and sensitive: "Deciding
whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitu-
tion to another branch of government ... is itself a delicate exercise
in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as
ultimate interpreter of the Constitution."515
The Court has followed Baker for thirty-four years in construing
the text and history of various constitutional clauses alleged to raise
political questions. Fourteen such matters have been found justicia-
ble. Most involved Article I-for example, provisions granting Con-
510 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
511 Id. at 208-37.
512 Id. at 210-11; see also id. at 210 ("[I]t is the relationship between the judiciary and
the coordinate branches of the Federal Government... which gives rise to the 'political
question.' ... The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a function of the
separation of powers.").
513 Id. at 217; see also id. (Each of these factors illustrates that "a political question [is]
... essentially a function of the separation of powers.").
514 Id. at 226. Justice Frankfurter, however, could discern no principles in the Equal
Protection Clause to guide judicial review of state apportionment decisions. Id. at 300-01
(Frankfurter,J., dissenting). He accused the majority of "rewrit[ing] the Constitution," id.
at 300, which nowhere requires states to base representation solely on population. Id. at
301-24 (citing sources).
515 Id. at 211.
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gress power to enact statutes, 516 apportion congressional districts, 517
and judge its members' qualifications. 518 Other decisions rejected as-
sertions of exclusive Article II power, most notably President Nixon's
claim of an absolute privilege to refuse to disclose confidential com-
munications to executive officers. 519
Only two questions have been deemed "political." First, in Gilli-
gan v. Morgan,520 the Court ruled that the Constitution left military
training and procedures entirely to the elected branches, and accord-
ingly dismissed a complaint by Kent State students that the killing of
protestors had resulted from the government's negligent training of
the National Guard.521 Second, Nixon v. United States522 held nonjusti-
ciable a federal judge's claim that the Senate had violated its Article I
impeachment power by convicting him based on the report of a
factfinding committee.523
516 See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 389-96 (1990) (allowing a
claim that a federal criminal statute violated Article I, § 7, cl. 1, which provides that "[a]ll
Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives"); INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 940-43 (1983) (holding that the Court has power to interpret Article I, §§ 1 &
7, which require that both Houses concur in all legislation and that every bill be presented
to the President); id. at 944-49 (declaring that a statute authorizing either House to veto an
executive decision violated Article I requirements of bicameralism and presentment, which
further separation of powers).
517 One case permitted a challenge to Congress's selection of a method for apportion-
ment of congressional districts among states under Article I, § 2. Department of Com-
merce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 456-59 (1992). All the others involved state districting
decisions that affected federal legislative elections. See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
1, 5-7 (1964) (concluding that Article I, § 4, which empowers Congress to determine "[t]he
Times, Places, and Manner" of congressional elections, does not grant it exclusive author-
ity to protect the right to vote); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582 (1964) (ruling that
Congress's admission into the Union of states with apportionment plans not based on pop-
ulation, and its implicit judgment that such states had a Republican Form of Government,
does noi bar the Court from determining whether such schemes violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause); see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 118-27 (1986) (A claim of gerryman-
dering does not raise a political question.).
518 See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S: 486, 512-49 (1969) (rejecting the argument that
Article I, § 5 created a political question). The Court has also held that Congress's exer-
cise of its vast power over Indian afflairs, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, can be reviewed if it
allegedly infringes individual constitutional rights. See Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v.
Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 83-84 (1977); see also County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470
U.S. 226, 248-50 (1985).
519 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692-97 (1974); see alsojapan Whaling Ass'n v.
American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 229-30 (1986) (permitting a challenge to the Sec-
retary of Commerce's exercise of statutory authority to decline to certify Japan for allegedly
violating an international treaty on the ground that a purely legal question of statutory
interpretation had been presented, albeit one touching foreign relations). In several other
cases, the Court has rejected political question arguments with little discussion.
520 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
521 Id. at 5-12 (citing U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. '16).
522 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
523 Id. at 226-38. Judge Nixon alleged that Article I, Section 3, Clause 6, which pro-
vides that "the Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments," requires a trial-
type procedure before the full Senate. Id. at 226-28. See infra note 556 (analyzing Nixon).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
b. Defects of the Current Doctrine
While Baker's six criteria are purportedly based on separation of
powers, they do not express Federalist separation principles-or any
other standards that might usefully distinguish political questions
from justiciable matters. 524 For example, because any exercise ofjudi-
cial power against the political branches upsets "a political decision
already made," shows a "lack of respect," and holds "the potentiality of
embarrassment,"5 25 those three Baker factors are hard to reconcile
with the Federalist institution ofjudicial review.526 Similarly, a "lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards"527 seemingly exists
in many constitutional clauses, not merely those triggering political
questions.5 2
8
Finally, judicial review would cease if "a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political de-
partment" creates a political question,5 29 for Articles I and II demon-
524 See CHFMERINSKY, supra note 428, at 144-45 (deeming Bakerfactors "useless" in mak-
ing this distinction); Mulhern, supra note 307, at 168 (to similar effect).
525 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
526 The Court itself recently rejected the government's "lack of respect" argument on
similar grounds. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 889-91 (1990). It did not
explain, however, why it persisted in even considering this "Rodney Dangerfield" factor.
527 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; see also BICKEL, supra note 5, at 184 (contending that the
Court cannot develop workable principles from certain constitutional provisions).
528 The Court has given detailed content to many generally worded constitutional pro-
visions. See, e.g., Nixon, 506 U.S. at 247 (White, J., concurring) (observing that the Senate's
power to "try" impeachments was no less judicially manageable than other constitutional
terms like "due process"); REDisH, supra note 7, at 122-26, 135. If the Baker Court can
discover in the Equal Protection Clause sufficiently manageable standards to resolve an
issue as complex and diffuse as state apportionment, one wonders whether this criterion
imposes any real limits.
Similarly unhelpful is "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determi-
nation of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. Again, Baker
appeared to involve just such a policy question, and the Court did not tell us which other
such determinations would "clearly" be left to the political branches.
529 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. Here the Court adopted a methodology similar to that sug-
gested by Professor Wechsler, who had previously argued that the political question doc-
trine requires courts "to judge whether the Constitution has committed to another agency
of government the autonomous determination of the issue raised, a finding that itself re-
quires an interpretation." Wechsler, supra note 142, at 7-8.
Unfortunately, Bakerand its progeny abandoned Wechsler's underlying rationale: that
jurisdiction can be declined only if the "political question" is based on the Constitution
because judicial review itself is rooted in the Constitution. Id. at 2-10. Wechsler stressed
that where all jurisdictional and procedural requirements had been met, courts had the
duty to decide constitutional cases, even though the action under review involved "polit-
ical" value choices. Id. at 6, 9, 15-16, 19. However, courts had to act "judicially," basing
their judgments and reasoning on neutral and general principles that transcended the
immediate result. Id. at 15-16, 19. Judicial restraint demanded that the political branches'
value choices control, absent such an adequate and principled constitutional basis to over-
turn their actions. Id. at 15, 19, 25. Thus, Wechsler rejected pure result-oriented constitu-
tional decisionmaking and the use of federal courts solely to police and advise the political
branches. Id. at 6, 11-12.
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strably commit all legislative and executive powers to Congress and
the President. Rather, the real issue is whether a constitutional ques-
tion must be left to a political branch for a final, non-reviewable deci-
sion.530 And that determination cannot be based on the
Constitution's text, which nowhere states that any particular exercise
of legislative or executive power is or is not judicially reviewable. 531
Therefore, interpretation must focus primarily not on the Constitu-
tion's language, but instead on its structure, political theory, history,
and precedent.
Unfortunately, the Court has misunderstood Federalist political
ideas and has frequently manufactured dubious history.532 Moreover,
even when the Justices have provided credible historical analyses, they
have been limited to a particular constitutional provision.533 The
Court has never set forth a broad theory that relates political ques-
tions to Federalist principles of judicial review and separation of
powers.
c. A Critique of Political Question Scholarship
Although commentators generally have assailed the political
question doctrine, their suggested cures are often worse than the dis-
ease. Professor Bickel, for example, urged the Court to manipulate
the political question doctrine to avoid constitutional decisions that
might cause confrontation with the elected branches and weakenjudi-
By applying a classic Wechslerian approach divorced from its underlying justification,
the Court has made the political question doctrine incoherent. Cf Robert F. Nagel, Polit-
ical Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of the Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. CHi. L. REv.
643 (1989) (arguing that if the Court ever frankly acknowledged that its modem constitu-
tional decisions are based on political considerations rather than legal principles, the
scope of the political question doctrine would widen greatly because such policy issues
should be left to the elected branches).
530 See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 240 (White, J., concurring).
531 See id.; REDISH, supra note 7, at 115-19, 135; Scharpf, supra note 166, at 541. As the
Constitution does not contain a specific "judicial review" clause, it obviously does not men-
tion which of its provisions are subject to this power. Admittedly, however, certain consti-
tutional language provides valuable evidence that the Framers did not intend judicial
oversight of specific political actions such as impeachments. See supra note 166.
532 For instance, the Court relied on erroneous views of American history in holding
that claims under Article IV, Section 4 (guaranteeing each state a Republican Form of
Government) and Article V (regulating the amendment process) always raise political
questions. See supra note 289 and infra note 575 (analyzing Guarantee Clause); supra notes
262-64, 320-23 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional amendments).
533 For example, while the Nixon Court provided a solid textual and historical analysis
of the Impeachment Trial Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cI. 6, it did not relate this clause
to other constitutional language and Federalist structural principles that confirm its con-
clusion that the Senate's impeachment judgments cannot be reviewed judicially. See infra
note 556.
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cial legitimacy.5M4 This idea, recently endorsed by Justice Souter,53 5
destroys Federalist political theory by granting judges absolute discre-
tion to decline to exercise judicial power.
53 6
Dean Choper has recommended that the judiciary abstain from
cases involving the Constitution's structure (e.g., separation of powers)
and instead conserve its resources for protecting individual rights.
537
This theory resembles Justice Scalia's approach to standing and
should be rejected on similar grounds: The Constitution's structure
preserves liberty every bit as much as its provisions guaranteeing indi-
vidual rights. 538
In contrast to Choper, Professor Redish has argued that federal
courts must hear all cases involving alleged constitutional violations by
the majoritarian branches and that therefore the political question
doctrine should be repudiated.539 However, Redish acknowledges
that courts should accord deference to the political departments in
rendering decisions on the merits, especially where the Constitution
grants Congress or the President power but does not specify how it
must be exercised (e.g., foreign affairs).54 Redish's proposal, which
534 BICKEL, supra note 5, at 183-85, 188.
535 See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 253 (Souter,J., concurring) (relying on Bickel in characteriz-
ing the political question doctrine as a prudential determination focusing on the respect
owed to the political branches and the urgency of providing ajudicial answer); id. (deem-
ingjudicial review unwise because the Senate had sensibly exercised its broad discretion
over the impeachment process and because intervention might embarrass the Senate and
disrupt the government, but arguing that judicial scrutiny might be necessary if impeach-
ment procedures threatened the integrity of the results).
536 See supra notes 361-63 and accompanying text.
537 JEsSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL PoLrnCAL PROCESS (1980).
538 See supra notes 457-60 and accompanying text; see also CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING,
supra note 7, at 100-01 (Choper's thesis is inconsistent with a written Constitution that
protects separation of powers.).
539 See REDISH, supra note 7, at 111-36. Like Redish, Professor Chemerinsky has con-
tended that the political question doctrine conflicts with the Court's role as authoritative
interpreter of the whole Constitution. CHEMERINSIY, INTERPRETING, supra note 7, at 97-104.
However, he recognizes a few narrow exceptions (e.g., for presidential vetoes and appoint-
ments). Id. at 110-11; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Book Review, The Seduction of Deduction:
The Allure of and Problems with a Deductive Approach to Federal Court Jurisdiction, 86 Nw. U. L.
Rv. 96, 110-11 (1991) (suggesting that the Justices might be too self-interested to review a
constitutional amendment process designed to overturn a specific Court decision); cf.
Wayne McCormack, The Political Question Doctine-Jurisprudentially, 70 U. DEn. L. REv. 793
(1993) [hereinafter McCormack, Political Question] (characterizing the doctrine as a myth,
because ajudicial decision that a constitutional provision is nonjusticiable is itself an act of
judicial review that interprets the Constitution as providing no judicially enforceable law
constraining the President or Congress); Albert, Justiciability, supra note 290, at 1161-72 (to
similar effect).
540 REDISH, supra note 7, at 116-17; see also id. at 124-27 (distinguishing total "proce-
dural" deference to any political decision from substantive deference to a political branch's
expertise or its need to determine the meaning of a constitutional provision). Redish
stresses that, even where the original Constitution vested unrestricted power in a political
department, later amendments might have limited the exercise of such authority. Id. at
118-19; see also CHEMERINSKy, INTERPRETING, supra note 7, at 102-04 (urging judicial defer-
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garnered the implicit support of Justices White and Blackmun, 541 re-
flects a sophisticated vision of American political theory. Ultimately,
however, this view cannot be reconciled with clear Federalist state-
ments that certain constitutional questions were beyond the scope of
judicial competence.M2
d. A Neo-Federalist Approach to Political Questions
A Neo-Federalist approach builds upon The Federalist No. 78 and
Marbuiy.543 The Hamilton-Marshall argument for judicial review is
well known,54 as is their rule-of-law justification: Only the judiciary
can impartially determine whether the elected branches have com-
plied with constitutional limits on their authority.545 Almost com-
pletely overlooked, however, is Hamilton's recognition that, even
though judicial review reflects the "natural presumption" that the
political branches cannot be "the constitutional judges of their own
powers," this presumption can be rebutted by the Constitution
itself.5
ence, not abdication, when the President or Congress has acted within an area of their
special competence).
541 In their last opinion on the subject, Justices White and Blackmun treated the polit-
ical question doctrine as a matter of constitutional interpretation and reached the merits,
but applied a deferential standard of review in concluding that the Senate's procedures
complied with the Impeachment Trial Clause. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 239-52 (White, J.,
concurring).
542 See infra part l.B.4.d (citing sources). Other major articles include Louis Henkin,
Is There A 'Political Question"Doctdrine, 85 YALE LJ. 597 (1976) (arguing that the Court has
no distinct political question doctrine, but rather either (1) concludes on the merits that a
government official's action was within constitutional bounds, or (2) disposes of claims by
exercising its traditional equitable discretion in light of many factors, including separation
of powers); Mulhern, supra note 307 (contending that the doctrine properly divides re-
sponsibility for constitutional interpretation between courts and the majoritarian
branches); Scharpf, supra note 166 (asserting that the political question doctrine should
acknowledge the functional limits of the judicial process that make adjudication of certain
cases too difficult).
543 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
544 Both argued thatjudges must decide cases by expounding the law; that the Consti-
tution is the People's supreme law; and that therefore the Constitution must control over a
clearly repugnant legislative act. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524-26 (Hamilton); Mar-
buy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176-79; supra notes 141-49, 251-53 and accompanying text.
545 See Marbuiy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177-78; THE FEDERASS No. 78, at 523-28
(Hamilton).
546 If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges
of their own powers and that the construction they put upon them is conclu-
sive upon the other departments, it may be answered, that this cannot be the
natural presumption, where it is not collected from any particular provisions
in the constitution.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524-25 (Hamilton). See supra note 148 (examining the meaning
of this excerpt). I have discovered only seven citations to this passage and no real analysis
of it. Most relevant is Professor Redish's quotation of these words, accompanied by his
remark that Hamilton "shift[ed] the burden of production" to those challenging the need
for judicial review. REDISH, supra note 7, at 175 n.38. But Redish ignores Hamilton's evi-
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Although Hamilton did not specify which provisions he had in
mind, the Marbuy Court identified the President's nomination of ex-
ecutive and judicial officers and his conduct of foreign affairs5 47
Chief Justice Marshall later added constitutional clauses concerning
the militia and Congress's power to declare war.5 48 Marshall plainly
stated that such political questions were beyond the reach ofjudicial
power, not merely that they were subject to a deferential standard of
review.549
A Hamiltonian approach still makes sense today: The Constitu-
tion establishes a strong yet rebuttable presumption favoring judicial
review. The areas in which the government can overcome this pre-
sumption (i.e., political questions) invariably fall outside the classic
paradigm of making, executing, and judging the law-the model that
forms the basis of the coextensiveness principle underlying judicial
review.550 Recognizing political questions does not undermine popu-
lar sovereignty, the rule of law, or checks and balances, because the
People decided that the need for efficiency was so great in certain
instances that they gave political officials unrestrained power. Any ex-
ercise of such discretion is ipsofacto "constitutional," and no one can
claim otherwise in court.551
dent meaning- When Congress or the President carries that burden, they can be the final
judge of their own powers-a situation Redish believes is intolerable in our legal regime
featuring judicial review. Id. at 111-36. Likewise, Professor McCormack contends that judi-
cial review precludes any possibility of a political question doctrine, yet he too cites Hamil-
ton's excerpt. McCormack, Political Question, supra note 539, at 799 n.21. Raoul Berger
supports his similar argument forjudicial review of the entire Constitution by quoting this
passage, but he uses ellipses to delete the key language recognizing that this presumption
can be rebutted. BERGER, supra note 52, at 116 n.62, discussed supra note 166. Finally,
Professor Paulsen invokes Hamilton's words as evidence of the Framers' understanding
that no coordinate branch has superior power to interpret the Constitution. Paulsen, supra
note 175, at 249-50. But see supra note 175 (questioning this thesis).
547 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166-67.
548 See Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 28-32 (1827) (militia); Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824) (declaration of war); see also supra notes 269-75
and accompanying text (discussing Martin and Gibbons).
549 See, e.g., Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196-97 ("The wisdom and discretion of con-
gress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at
elections, are, in this, as in many other instances ... the sole restraints on which they [ie.,
the People] have relied, to secure them from abuse [of Article I powers]."); Martin, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) at 29-32 (Anyjudicial scrutiny of the President's judgment in calling forth the
militia would interfere with his Article II powers.).
550 See supra part I. Cf Chemerinsky, Guarantee Clause, supra note 323, at 851-53, 858-59
(recommending a strong presumption ofjusticiability for claimed violations of individual
rights, rebuttable on a showing that a particular constitutional provision would be better
interpreted and enforced by the political branches).
551 See supra notes 164-70 and accompanying text. This principle can be traced to Mar-
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), which held that the President's exercise of
constitutional discretion is necessarily "legal" and thus cannot violate anybody's 'rights,"
not that some violations of legal rights have no remedy. See id. at 158-71; see also supra note
236, 266-68 and accompanying text.
504 [Vol. 81:393
1996] SEPARATION OF POWEBS 505
The most obvious political questions involve the Constitution's
two pure checks. First, the President must have total discretion in de-
ciding whether to veto a bill; giving the executive this specific share in
the legislative power would be pointless if the judiciary could share it
too.5 52 Second, impeachments are inherently political and thus com-
mitted entirely to Congress.553 More particularly, impeachment rep-
resents the Constitution's lone grant of "judicial power" to the
legislature-an exception that would be unintelligible if courts could
also participate in impeachments through the exercise of their ordi-
nary judicial authority.55 4 Furthermore, the core Anglo-American
principle thatjudicial judgments must be final applies even where the
tribunal (e.g., the Senate) happens to be composed of legislators.555
Thus, the Court reached the right result in Nixon, although it barely
mentioned the dispositive separation-of-powers considerations.
556
Of course, the Court may have to exercisejjudicial review to establish for the first time
that a particular constitutional provision raises political questions. Thereafter, however,
the issue becomes off-limits, except in a rare case in which the Court decides to reverse a
prior decision. See Gerhardt, supra note 166, at 243-46 (arguing that the political question
doctrine should not be abandoned as deceptive or confusing merely because the Court has
to exercise judicial review to the limited extent of making a preliminary determination
about whether an issue falls into an area in which courts cannot express an opinion about
a political actor's conduct).
552 U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. Congress must have the same unlimited power in
determining whether to override the veto. Anyjudicial interference would upset the Con-
stitution's delicate qualified-veto process. See supra note 165 and accompanying text; see
also Paulsen, supra note 175, at 264-67 (agreeing that the President has plenary power over
vetoes and pardons, despite contrary indications by courts). Moreover, because a legisla-
tive bill confers no legal rights, no suit can be allowed until the bill has become a statute.
553 See supra note 166 and accompanying text; see also Gerhardt, supra note 166, at 232-
34, 252-76.
554 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
555 See generally supra notes 45, 52-53, 166, 210 and accompanying text (describing the
finality of court judgments).
556 The Court devoted much of its opinion to relatively trivial linguistic analysis, which
yielded three conclusions. First, the Constitution committed "sole" (i.e., exclusive) author-
ity over impeachment trials to the Senate. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 230-31
(1993). Second, the word "try" did not afford ajudicially manageable standard of review
and did not necessarily require a judicial "trial" before the full Senate. Id. at 229-30.
Third, the specificity of the other requirements in the Impeachment Trial Clause-that
the Senate be under oath; that two-thirds of the Senators vote to convict; and that the
ChiefJustice preside when the President is tried-suggested that no additional limitations
on the Senate proceeding were contemplated. Id. at 230. Unfortunately, the Court ig-
nored many other constitutional provisions which indicate that impeachments are ex-
cluded from federal court jurisdiction. See sup-a note 166 (examining relevant language
from Articles I, II, and III).
More persuasive was the Court's historical analysis, which demonstrated that the Fram-
ers had deliberately assigned the impeachment power to Congress-and correspondingly
precluded judicial review-for four reasons. First, the Court was too small to bear this
"awful discretion" and might lack the credibility to enforce ajudgment overturning a legis-
lative vote to convict. See id. at 233-34 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (Hamilton)). Second,
judicial involvement would introduce the risk of bias that the Framers had sought to elimi-
nate by separating the Senate impeachment trial of an official from his criminal trial in
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The Constitution's drafters and ratifiers understood the nature of
the venerable veto and impeachment checks, and in bestowing these
powers assumed the risk of their abuse and relied solely on the polit-
ical process to resolve any problems. Two centuries of practice has
confirmed their practical and theoretical wisdom.557 Therefore, the
foolish or malicious use of such checks cannot justify judicial
review. 55
8
court. Id. at 234. Third, the Founders made impeachments the only direct check on the
judiciary, and courts would have a conflict of interest if they assumed final review over a
constitutional process meant to regulate judges themselves. Id. at 234-85 (citing THE FD-
ERAiisr Nos. 79, 81 (Hamilton)). Finally, the Framers provided safeguards against abuse of
the impeachment power-for example, by dividing responsibility between the House and
Senate and by requiring a super-majority vote to convict. Id. at 235-36. See generally supra
notes 166-67 (buttressing these conclusions with further historical evidence).
The Court did not, however, appreciate that the third point reflected overriding rule-
of-law concerns. Because "no man can be the judge in his own case," the Framers could
not have intended to give Congress power over the impeachment and trial ofjudges, but to
allow those same judges ultimately to determine impeachment standards or review convic-
tions (or both). See supra notes 166-67. Moreover, although the Court correctly concluded
that "the lack of finality and the difficulty of fashioning judicial relief counsel against jus-
ticiability," it focused solely on the prudential problem of disruption of governmental oper-
ations pending judicial review of an impeachment decision. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 236. The
Court failed to grasp that the Senate's judgment was final because it was rendered as a
"court" exercising "judicial power." See supra note 555 and accompanying text.
The overwhelming evidence from the Constitution's text, structure, and history re-
futes the argument that impeachment does not always present political questions-a claim
made by several jurists and scholars. See, e.g., Nixon, 506 U.S. at 239-52 (White & Blackmun,
J., concurring); id. at 252-54 (Souter, J., concurring); BERGER, supra note 52, at 103-20;
Rebecca L. Brown, When Political Questions Affect Individual Rights: The OtherNixon v. United
States, 1993 Sup. Cr. REv. 125.
557 See Gerhardt, supra note 166, at 232, 261.
558 Raoul Berger has argued that judicial review of impeachments should be available
at least to ensure that Congress has not exceeded its jurisdiction (e.g., by convicting an
official for conduct that does not constitute "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors"), as opposed to second-guessing its substantive judgment about matters
within its jurisdiction. BERGER, supra note 52, at 104-07, 111-14. This approach presents
two problems. First, nothing in the Constitution's text, structure, or history authorizes
even this restricted form ofjudicial review. See supra notes 166-67, 553-56 and accompany-
ing text. Second, although certain jurisdictional issues seem clear-cut and amenable to
judicial review (e.g., whether the person impeached was a United States officer, U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 4, or whether the Senate's punishment extended only to removal and
disqualification from office, U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 3, cl. 7, manyjurisdictional questions can-
not be resolved by courts without infringing on Congress's constitutional discretion. For
example, if Congress impeached and convicted ajustice for usurping legislative power, the
Supreme Court might vacate thatjudgment on the jurisdictional ground that the Justice's
conduct did not amount to a "high Crime or Misdemeanor." However, the power to make
precisely such a determination-whether labeled "jurisdictional" or "substantive"-falls
within Congress's impeachment authority, as Federalists explicitly recognized. See, e.g.,
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 546 (Hamilton).
Professor Berger also defends his approach as consistent with Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486 (1969). BERGER, supra note 52, at 104-08, 112, 119. Powell involved Article I,
Section 5, Clause 1, which provides that "[e]ach House shall be the Judge of the ...
Qualifications of its own Members." The Court asserted jurisdiction on the ground that
the case arose under the Constitution and held that Congress's power to judge its member-
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Another class of political questions consists of those constitu-
tional provisions that authorize the legislature to share in traditional
executive prerogatives. For example, the President nominates execu-
tive officers and judges, but their appointment requires Senate advice
and consent.559 This process involves the exercise of political discre-
tion before any legal rights have crystallized; hence, no one can sue
over an appointment-
560
Other joint executive-legislative powers implicate international
relations. For instance, Congress can declare war and regulate the
armed forces, but the President is Commander-in-Chief.561 Similarly,
the President makes treaties, but they become valid only with the ad-
vice, consent, and two-thirds concurrence of the Senate.562 The Fed-
eralist Justices understood that the allocation of these shared
discretionary powers to the elected branches implicitly excludedjudi-
ship was limited to the qualifications expressly set forth in Article I, Section 2, Clause 2
concerning age, citizenship, and residency. Powell, 395 U.S. at 512-50. Consequently,
although the legislature's determination as to a constitutionally listed criterion might be
final, the House had exceeded its power by adding qualifications and excluding Powell on
that basis. Id. Berger argues that, just as Congress's exclusive power to judge its member-
ship is limited by, the Constitution's specification of three qualifications, so too Congress's
sole power of impeachment is restricted to the three enumerated grounds of treason, brib-
ery, and high crimes or misdemeanors. BERrER, supra note 52, at 104-07.
Professor Berger's analogy collapses, however, if Powell was wrongly decided-as the
leading constitutional law scholar of that era believed. See Wechsler, supra note 142, at 8
(concluding that Congress's power over its membership and impeachment were the most
obvious political questions). Most importantly, Article I's language that each chamber
"shall" (ie., must) be the "judge" (not the preliminary arbiter) of its members' qualifica-
tions strongly suggests that federal courts should not question that judgment. Nonethe-
less, as there is no evidence that the Framers either endorsed or rejected judicial review of
such legislative decisions, perhaps the presumption favoring review should apply and Pow-
eL's holding should be accepted as correct. It does not necessarily follow, however, that
impeachment should be treated similarly, for two reasons. First, impeachment is a check
and thus has a unique status in our constitutional scheme. More specifically, it is a check
againstfederaljudges, which makes review by those judges problematic under the rule of law.
See supra notes 166, 556. By contrast, that risk of bias does not arise when courts review
Congress's power to determine its members' qualifications. Second, abundant historical
evidence indicates that impeachment decisions are immune from federal court scrutiny.
See supra notes 166-67, 553-56 and accompanying text.
559 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See supra notes 168, 267 and accompanying text.
560 See CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING, supra note 7, at 102 (identifying appointments and
vetoes as the only true discretionary political questions). For example, the President and
the Senate can make considerations of race or gender dispositive in appointments, even
though they would violate the Equal Protection Clause by enacting or executing a law that
allocated benefits based solely on such factors. A person not appointed has no legal right
to ajudicial or executive office, and thus no basis for a lawsuit. The onlyjudicially enforce-
able limit on the appointment power is the Ineligibility Clause, which protects citizens
generally against members of Congress who have conflicts of interest from obtaining ap-
pointments. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 7, discussed supra notes 124, 463-64 and accom-
panying text.
561 U.S. CONSTr. art. I, § 8 and art. II, § 2. See supra notes -169-70 and accompanying
text.
562 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. See supra notes 169, 183 and accompanying text.
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cial review, except in rare instances when the exercise of such powers
clearly violated someone's vested legal rights.
563
The Court has properly continued to find the process of making
foreign and military policy to be nonjusticiable, 564 although it has rec-
ognized that the results of such decisions may sometimes be scruti-
nized if they invade individual rights, especially fundamental
constitutional liberties.565 For example, although the negotiation, rat-
563 See supra notes 267-75 and accompanying text (citing early cases recognizing that
military matters, foreign affairs, and appointments raise political questions). The necessity
for legislative-executive coordination in such areas minimizes the likelihood of unconstitu-
tional, unreasonable, or arbitrary action, thereby making judicial review less critical than in
situations where the President or Congress acts alone (except for vetoes and
impeachments).
564 For example, Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973), denied injunctive relief that
would have required federal judges to oversee the actual training of soldiers. Even the
Baker Court acknowledged that most foreign policy matters involve the exercise of discre-
tion committed to the executive or legislative branches, require a unitary statement of the
government's views, or concern legal standards that defy judicial application. Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). One example is the declaration of war and the determina-
tion of when a war has begun or ended. See id. at 213-14. Another illustration is the Presi-
dent's unreviewable exercise of his Article II, Section 3 power to recognize foreign
ministers and their governments. See e.g., Oeten v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302
(1918). See generally Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111
(1948) ("IT]he very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, notjudi-
cial. Such decisions ... are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy....
They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor
responsibility. ... ).
565 See, e.g., Scharpf, supra note 166, at 583-85. Even when such basic rights are at
stake, however, the Court has applied an extremely deferential standard of review, most
notoriously in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (allowing Japanese-
Americans to bring a 14th Amendment challenge to their internment, but upholding the
government's "military necessity" justification for this imprisonment). See generally
Blumoff, supra note 145, at 230-34, 252, 259-60, 307-64 (arguing that federal courts should
decide cases involving international relations only when doing so is absolutely necessary,
either because important individual legal rights have been infringed or because the polit-
ical departments have deadlocked on a question about the constitutional distribution of
their powers).
When one political branch has allegedly usurped the other's constitutional preroga-
tives, granting standing to the affected government representative(s) and ruling on the
merits might seem to be the most direct and orderly way to vindicate the Constitution. See,
e.g., Linda Champlin & Alan Schwarz, Political Question Doctrine and Allocation of the Foreign
Affairs Power, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 215 (1985); Carlin Meyer, Imbalance of Powers: Can Congres-
sional Lawsuits Serve as a Counterweight?, 54 U. Prrr. L. REv. 63, 70-73, 103-20 (1992). None-
theless, such disputes invariably raise issues that the Constitution does not clearly address
and that the Founders left to the political process, with each department using its constitu-
tional weapons to protect its interests and to force a compromise. See Blumoff, supra note
145, at 230-31, 307-22, 330-32, 350-58.
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ification, and termination of treaties are political questions, 566 persons
granted rights under treaties can vindicate them judicially.
5 67
In contrast to checks and joint political branch authority over ap-
pointments and foreign relations, all other constitutional delegations
of power carry a presumption ofjudicial reviewability that is very diffi-
cult to overcome. For instance, the Court has correctly allowed chal-
lenges to statutes allegedly enacted in contravention of Article I
procedures.568 Likewise, a claim that a purported constitutional
amendment does not satisfy Article V should be justiciable. Because
the Framers made the Constitution (including its amendments) the
People's supreme law and designed the judiciary to vindicate that law
against transient majoritarian sentiments, Congress should not have
absolute control over amendments. 569 The contrary conclusion in
Coleman °7 0 conflicts with Federalist theory, history, and precedent.57 '
Finally, certain constitutional clauses, although justiciable, should
be interpreted with extraordinary deference to the political
branches.5 72 For example, the Constitution grants Congress near-
total power over federal electoral matters5 73 and imposes few limits on
state apportionments, so the Court should uphold such political deci-
sions unless they plainly violate constitutional rights (particularly free-
dom from racial discrimination).574 Thus, the Court erred in Baker
566 In Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), the Court appropriately dismissed a
complaint by some Senators that the President cannot terminate a treaty without Senate
consent. FourJustices concluded that this matter was a political question because it con-
cerned Congress's power to negate the President's action in foreign affairs in an area
where the Constitution is silent-treaty abrogation. Id. at 1002-06 (plurality opinion). Jus-
tice Powell deemed the case unripe because Congress had not yet taken any official action,
and he urged the Court not to intervene until the legislature and executive had reached an
impasse. Id. at 997-1002 (Powell,J., concurring); see also Blumoff, supra note 145, at 322-58
(endorsing Powell's approach).
567 Indeed, Article I included treaty jurisdiction, U.S. CONST. art. IlI, § 2, cl. 1, to
rectify the flouting of such accords under the Articles of Confederation. See Carlos M.
Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 CoLuM. L. REv. 1082, 1097-1114
(1992); see also supra notes 81-82, 100, 169 and accompanying text.
568 See supra note 516 (citing cases).
569 See supra part I.B; see also CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING, supra note 7, at 103-04.
570 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
571 See supra notes 262-64, 320-23 and accompanying text (citing sources).
572 See supra note 540 and accompanying text.
573 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (empowering Congress to "make or alter" state regu-
lations concerning "[t]he Times, Places, and Manner" of congressional elections); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (authorizing Congress to apportion House representation). Some
scholars have argued that these provisions implicitly give Congress unreviewable power to
draw election districts. See e.g., Wechsler, supra note 142, at 8-9.
574 Of course, noninterpretivists scoff at the notion of "clear" constitutional violations
and instead endorse activist constitutional interpretation based on current social, moral,
and political values. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CoNsrrnOtrN, THE CouRTs, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (1982). By contrast, the Federalists believed that the very legitimacy of
judicial review depended upon its application only in cases of unambiguous unconstitu-
tionality. See supra notes 150, 155-57, 194, 211. More generally, the Framers understood
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and its progeny not by exercising jurisdiction, but rather by constru-
ing the Equal Protection Clause as forbidding apportionment deci-
sions based on innocuous factors such as geography.5 75
Overall, Neo-Federalism presumes that the power of judicial re-
view should be exercised, absent persuasive evidence that the Consti-
"judicial power" to mean the application of pre-existing rules to particular facts. See supra
notes 112-13 and accompanying text. Although this original understanding cannot be re-
covered fully, it remains a useful ideal. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitu-
tion, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1981) (defending constitutional interpretation based on text,
structure, history, and precedent).
575 See supra notes 510-15, 517 and accompanying text (summarizing Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962) and its progeny). Indeed, the Equal Protection Clause, which guards the
rights of minorities and non-voting persons, seems generally inapplicable to state legislative
districting, which concerns the political (voting) rights of majorities. Rather, apportion-
ment really implicates Article IV, Section 4, which guarantees every state "a Republican
Form of Government" (i.e., one based on majority rule and popular sovereignty). SeeAkhil
R. Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and
the Denominator Problem, 65 U. CoLo. L. REv. 749, 753-54 (1994) [hereinafter Amar,
Central].
The confusion of these two constitutional provisions originated in Baker. The Baker
Court conceded that a challenge to apportionment based on the Guarantee Clause would
be futile because of longstanding 20th century precedent dismissing as nonjusticiable all
claims invoking that provision. Baker, 369 U.S. at 223-29. The Court avoided this case law
by characterizing the matter as an Equal Protection complaint that individual voting rights
had been impaired (id. at 226-27, 232)-a disingenuous "relabeling" of the Guarantee
Clause claim. Id. at 267, 286-87, 297-300 (Frankfurter,J., dissenting); see also id. at 266, 277-
80 (criticizing the majority for failing to reconcile its holding with cases that had specifi-
cally ruled apportionment to be a political question).
The Baker Court thereby sidestepped the key separation-of-powers issue: What is the
appropriate role of each branch in ensuring states a Republican Form of Government?
Although commentators have differed on the precise answer, they have agreed that the
Constitution's text, structure, history, and precedent do notjustify treating all Guarantee
Clause challenges as political questions. See, e.g., Symposium, Ira C. Rothberger, Jr. Conference
on Constitutional Law: Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Governmen 65 COLO. L REv. 709
(1994) (setting forth arguments by Professors Amar, Chemerinsky, Merritt, and Weinberg
that Guarantee Clause claims should bejusticiable); see also New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 184-85 (1992) (acknowledging the force of previous academic arguments making
a similar point).
This scholarship supports a Neo-Federalist approach, which presumes that Article IV,
Section 4 should be judicially reviewable. Indeed, that clause provides that "the United
States" (whose government includes federal courts) shall guarantee every state a Republi-
can Form of Government-not that "Congress" alone shall do so. See Bonfield, supra note
289, at 523. Moreover, the historical evidence does not indicate that Guarantee Clause
issues are generally nonjusticiable. See id. at 513-65 (tracing the history of this clause and
cases interpreting it). Thus, courts ordinarily should adjudicate complaints that a particu-
lar aspect of a state's government is incompatible with Article IV. See, e.g., Chemerinsky,
Guarantee Clause, supra note 323. However, the piesumption favoringjudicial review can be
rebutted where Congress or the President has explicitly determined that one of several
competing governments in a state is valid-the limited holding of Luther v. Borden, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), discussed supra note 289. The key issue in Lutherwas not whether
Rhode Island's longstanding government was republican, but rather whether it was still a
government-a question akin to the international law problem of recognition and thus com-
mitted to the political branches. See Amar, Centra; supra; at 776.
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tution's structure, political philosophy, history, and precedent make a
question suitable for political resolution only.
5. A Neo-Federalist Approach to justiciability: A Summary
The Court should abandon its current approach to justiciability,
which rests on the mistaken idea that federal judges have a uniquely
limited role in our constitutional government. Instead, the Court
should adopt a Neo-Federalist methodology, which acknowledges the
judiciary's coordinate function of adjudicating federal law cases to
promote liberty, the rule of law, and checks and balances, yet also
recognizes the need to exercise that jurisdiction with due regard for
governmental efficiency. The Court should explicitly identify and bal-
ance these competing separation-of-powers principles in its standing,
mootness, ripeness, and political question decisions.
CONCLUSION
The Justices who developed the jurisprudence on justiciability
and separation of powers over the first two-thirds of this century can
perhaps be forgiven for getting it wrong. They were products of an
era that devalued Federalist ideas as unimportant both to the Framers
themselves (whose true motivations were allegedly economic) and to
modern American government.576 Consequently, serious considera-
tion of Federalist concepts in formulating the justiciability doctrines
might have seemed a waste of effort; vague assertions would suffice.
The members of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have no such
excuse. Since the late 1960s, several monumental works of history,
577
political science, 578 and legal history 579 have demonstrated that the
576 See supra part IIAl-2.
577 In 1969, Gordon Wood published his pathbreaking intellectual history of the crea-
tion of the American republic. See WOOD, supra note 25. Wood built upon the work of a
few skeptics who had challenged the prevalent economic interpretation of the American
Constitution, and his book sparked a significant reanalysis of the importance of Federalist
thought in American history. For a good bibliography, see AciatmAN, supra note 13, at
347-52.
578 Garry Wills has provided especially keen insights about Federalist political science
in a series of books beginning in the 1970s. See, e.g., WLLS, supra note 42. More specifi-
cally, the two leading studies on separation of powers were published in the mid-to-late
1960s. See GwYN, MUNnG, supra note 21; VnLE, supra note 21.
579 In 1971, Julius Goebel published his seminal work on the Supreme Court's early
history. See GOEBEL, supra note 66. In 1985, a valuable compilation of Court records from
1789-1800 (many previously' unpublished) appeared. See DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 15. Maeva Marcus, who edited this project, has used these sources to support her
reinterpretations of key Federalistjusticiability cases. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 192 (ana-
lyzing numerous jurisdictional decisions from the 1790s); Marcus & Teir, supra note 213
(examining Hayburn's Case); Bloch & Marcus, supra note 215 (discussing Marbuy). Finally,
in the mid-1980s, several legal scholars began to demonstrate the relevance of Federalist




Federalists created a unique political theory that has continuing vital-
ity. A Court professedly committed to "original intent" jurispru-
dence580 must incorporate this genuine Federalist understanding into
its justiciability doctrines.
580 TheJustices have consistently maintained that their justiciability doctrines reflect
the Framers' ideas. See supra note 1 (collecting cases). Similarly, several recent separation-
of-powers decisions have relied heavily upon the need to preserve the Founders' design.
See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721-27 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-
51, 955-59 (1983).
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